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The Effectiveness of National Human Rights Institutions (NHRI): Towards Establishing an Effective NHRI in 
the UAE 




This is a case study on establishing a human rights institution in the UAE that would promote 
and disseminate the culture of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the country. The 
study argues that establishing a strong, politically independent, active and effective national 
human rights institution in the UAE sooner than later is of paramount importance. The research 
emphasises that this is the age of human rights and freedoms and a relevant mechanism to 
safeguard these freedoms should appear in the UAE. Human rights have become the norm and 
means of measurements of everyday life- business, politics, international relations and co-
operations. In a nutshell, the UAE requires more debate, more serious studies on the issue, 
political dialogue and political consensus on its possible form, functions and a mandate of the 
new human rights institution. This study suggests that establishing a human rights institution 
to promote, protect, monitor and consolidate human rights and fundamental freedoms in the 
UAE is vital. As such organisations become the norm worldwide; the UAE cannot live in 
isolation. 
NHRIs are useful institution and can make an important contribution to the protection and 
promotion of human rights in the country. In this current climate, it becomes increasingly more 
vital to defend and protect established international human rights standards, challenge abuses 
of limit maladministration in public office and glitch demographics. Establishment of a new 
Human Rights institution in the UAE requires and demands a careful balance between 
traditional values, norms and established principles and changes. Otherwise, the newly found 
NHRI in the UAE would be prone to suffer from structural problems, functional deficiencies 
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and may lack adequate mechanisms for enforcement of human rights. The time is now ripe to 
establish a human rights institution in the UAE to tackle the many challenges that the 
nation is facing in coming years, as highlighted by the international reports issued by 
international human rights organisations. 
This study suggests a human rights approach is a crucial tool to improve the current 
understanding of why the UAE need to establish a National Human Rights Institution and to 
describe the Human rights situation in its broader context. The challenges of the UAE’s human 
rights application and the need to consider a balanced approach incorporating a clear human 



















I declare that the thesis is my own work and certify that all the material in the thesis which is 
not my own work has been identified and acknowledged. No materials are included for which 























I wish to thank everyone who did not hesitate to provide assistance and advice in completing 
my studies to gain a PhD. Owing to limitations of space; mention will only be made of those 
who were particularly generous with their time and assistance. First and foremost, I must thank 
my supervisors Professor Sigrun Skogly and Neil Kibble for their invaluable guidance, 
encouragement, constructive comments and tireless efforts throughout the study, for all of 
which I am very grateful. 
I wish also to express my gratitude to the staff of Sharjah Police Academy, Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, Emirates Association for Human Rights, and other federal and local agencies for their 
help, concern and valuable assistance. More specifically, I owe a large thank you to Highness 
Sheikh Dr. Sultan bin Mohammed Al Qasimi, and all members of the Board of Directors of the 
Sharjah Police Academy for their financial support. Also, special thanks go to all colleagues 
and senior officers who provided me with all necessary data and information during my study. 
Last but not least, I owe a great debt of gratitude to my parents, wife, children, brothers and 














AI Amnesty International 
  
CDLR Committee for the Defence of Legitimate Rights 
  
CEDAW Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women 
  
CERD International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination 
  
CESCR Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
  
CRPD Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 
  
CUP Cambridge University Press 
  
DFWAC The Dubai Foundation for Women and Children 
  
ECSSR Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research 
  
FLD Front Line Defenders 
  
FNC Federal National Council 
  
GANHRI Global Alliance of National Human Rights Institutes 
  
GCHR Gulf Centre for Human Rights 
  
HRC Human Rights Commissions 
  
HRW Human Rights Watch 
  
IC Index on Censorship 
  
ICCPR International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
  
ICESCR International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
  
ICJHR International Centre For Justice And Human Rights 
  
ICSRF The International Centre for Supporting Rights and Freedoms 
  
IHRC Islamic Human Rights Commission 
  
ILO The International Labor Organization 
  
JS1 Joint Submission 1 
  
NHRI National Human Rights Institution 
  
ODVV Organization for Defending Victims of Violence (Tehran) 
  




OUP Oxford University Press 
  
QNHRC Qatar National Human Rights Committee 
  
PUP Princeton University Press 
  
RWB Reporters without Borders 
  
TAN Transnational Human Rights Networks 
  
UDHR Universal Declaration on Human Rights 
  
UNESCO The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation 
  
UNGA United Nations General Assembly 
  
UNHRC United Nations Human Rights Council 
  
UNICEF The United Nations Children’s Fund 
  
UPR Universal Periodic Review 
  




















The United Nations (UN) defines the conceptual notion of Human Rights to be a set of intrinsic 
immutable and universally applicable rules, which safeguard the welfare of every individual 
human being. 
The concept of human rights acknowledges that every single human being is 
entitled to enjoy his or her human rights without distinction as to race, colour, 
sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, 
property, birth or other status1. 
 
The UN specifies that this can be attained through legally mandated human rights laws, which 
protect ‘individuals and groups against actions, which interfere with fundamental freedoms and 
human dignity’2 Although human rights are usually embodied as treaties, principles or laws 
within the legislative framework of nation States, the UN recognises that these do not innately 
constitute the notion of human rights. The UN maintains, ‘human rights are inherent 
entitlements which come to every person as a consequence of being human’3, further arguing 
that the various treaties and laws governing human rights protection must be perceived as the 
reified acknowledgment of these fundamental inalienable rights of humanity. 
Todorov’s (1999) argument with regards to the dominant ideologies of Western empires, 
imperialisms, and colonialisms captures the apparently contradictory reading of humanity by 
Sepulveda and Las Casas. On the one hand there exists the racial other as an inhuman or 
                                                                
1 OHCHR, A Basic Handbook for UN Staff, vol 2 (1997) 





subhuman, justifying their enslavement, eradication and the civilisation processes. Whilst 
conversely, the use of occupation, subjugation, and conversion are legitimate strategies used to 
develop and bring into the fold of humanity the naïve, innocent natives, the white man’s 
burden4. However, although the researcher agrees to a degree, with the assertion that 
contemporary human rights are a continuation of the colonial legacy of the West, the researcher 
also contends that this narrative has been over exploited. 
Suzan Waltz,5 discussed the long, multi-civilizational and multi-religious conflict between 
religion and human rights as an example of how the understanding of human rights differs and 
varies between cultures. She also highlighted the importance of approaching the issue of human 
rights from both a philosophical and religious perspectives. 
Saad Ibrahim,6  the renowned Arab human right activist and distinguished scholar, observes 
that it is often assumed that the essentialist and communalistic nature of Islam ignores the rights 
of individuals. Therefore, the argument is often made that the innate democratic values are 
somehow alien to Islamic thought and by default Muslim societies. Ibrahim argues that the 
human rights record of nations is a mirror of their general economic and socio-political 
development rather than the role of Islam, within Muslim majority nations. Hence, this explains 
the significant differences in human rights records amongst these nations. A counter argument 
here suggests however, that despite the wealth and infrastructural development of the Gulf 
nations, their human rights violations are high. Ibrahim presents three underlying causes for 
the poor human rights records witnessed in the Arab and Muslim countries. Although a 
                                                                
4 T Todorov, The Conquest of America: The Question of the Other (1999) 168. 
5 S Waltz, ‘Universal Human Rights: The Contribution of Muslim States’ (2004) 26 Hum. Rts. Q. 799. 
6 S Ibrahim, Egypt Islam and Democracy: Critical Essays (American Univ in Cairo Press 2002). 
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discussion upon these factors is beyond the scope of this thesis, it suffices here to briefly 
introduce them. 
The first factor he identifies is the presence and nature of the government as either being 
despotic or non- despotic. He argues that nations like Egypt have increasingly become more 
despotic as governments are incapable of upholding their part of the bargain; they have become 
more repressive against the people and have used judicial and extrajudicial means to 
consolidate their authority. In contradistinction, nations such as Qatar and the UAE have 
demonstrated their increasing democratisation through reforms, such as the establishment of 
elections and representative parliaments. This analysis is in line with Ibrahim’s assertion that 
wealthier nations tend to have better human rights records or provisions. 
Ibrahim7 also cites the conflict between the textualists, contextualists and secularists of the 
Islamic faith tradition. He notes that this open debate and discussion conducted through the 
extremes of terrorism to academic debates is at once a set back to the full appreciation and 
understanding of a global human rights plan on point with the Islamic faith teachings. On 
another level, it presents an opportunity for the contextualists to introduce their arguments and 
present a challenge to the traditional textualists (literalists).  
The third point Ibrahim raises for the abject human rights records in the Arab and Islamic world 
is due to the conflation of anti-globalist and anti-hegemonic discourse with human rights 
norms. He argues that the credibility of the concepts democracy and human rights has been 
severely impacted by issues such as US foreign policy and its partiality towards Israel in the 
region, for example.8  The discussion is initiated from the basis that there is an explicit 
                                                                
7 ibid. 
8 R Noack, ‘Trump’s U.S. Embassy Jerusalem Move: Allies Say Bad Idea - The Washington Post’ (7 
December 2017) <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2017/12/06/its-catastrophic-
u-s-allies-reject-trumps-expected-jerusalem-
pronouncement/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.ee205496551f> accessed 20 December 2017. 
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appreciation for the legitimacy of external factors, which impact upon the attitude towards and 
the practice of human rights safeguarding. However, there is also a recognition that ultimately 
it is up to national governments to take responsibility for their actions and those that occur 
within their defined territorial borders.  
The argument stipulates that the establishment of a NHRI within the UAE will only serve to 
advance and enhance the socio-political culture and climate of the nation. The Commission on 
Human Rights defines the purpose of the NHRI to be an authoritative, autonomous, licit 
institution that is both founded and established by the national government. This implies that 
they are established by national constitutions or acts of legislatures, guaranteeing their 
independence from political direction or interference, both governmental and non-
governmental; they have broad mandates for the promotion and protection of human rights. 
The NHRI must comply with the international minimum standard for NHRIs, ‘the Principles 
relating to the Status of National Institutions for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights 
(the Paris Principles)’9 . 
An NHRI is an official institution, which exists within the State structure but is independent 
from the institutions of government, parliament and judiciary. If the NHRI is designed and 
planned to reflect the subtle cultural nuances and traditions, such as respect for heritage, status 
and authority then both society and the government can utilise it as a vehicle for mutual 
governance. 
It must also be acknowledged that the concept of the NHRI is a recent development and so 
there is a degree of uncertainty with regards to its full potential and functionality. This limited 
awareness of the NHRI is reflected by the review of literature, which reveals a dearth in the 
                                                                
9 UNGA, ‘A/RES/48/134. National Institutions for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights’ 
<https://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/48/a48r134.htm> accessed 27 May 2019. 
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study and exploration of (native) Emirati perspectives on human rights and establishing the 
first NHRI in UAE. The literature that exists predominantly reflects the perspectives of 
(external) international human rights organisations and media agencies, who have cited the 
UAE for its flagrant human rights practices and limited provisions. They argue that the UAE 
government is too tribal and anachronistic to cope with the reality of its meteoric development 
and the economic boom, accompanied by the mass migration of an international labour force 
which has introduced previously alien concepts to the nation and the region. 
The onus of this study is to address the lacuna in the literature by capturing and analysing 
primary first-hand data on native Emirati perspectives on human rights and the formation of a 
NHRI in the UAE. This implies that the focus is on those involved in the process of developing, 
sustaining, and maintaining or ensuring human rights provisions in a professional capacity in 
the UAE. Consequently, the adopted methodological structure, the exploratory qualitative 
approach is undertaken with this appreciation. The exploratory aspect of the methodology 
demonstrates that this is a pioneering investigative study, which seeks to capture the direct 
perspectives of the ‘social actors’ and provide the impetus for further research into previously 
unidentified areas. 
1.1 Research Questions 
The objective of this thesis is to explore the establishment of a NHRI in the UAE. In order to 
analyse and decipher the narrative within the broader context of the UAE, this thesis explored 
the purpose for the establishment of a NHRI in the UAE through the following central research 
questions: 
1. What aspects of the existing social, political and legislative milieu facilitate the 
establishment of an NHRI in the UAE? 
2. What is the theoretical purpose of NHRIs in accordance to the Paris Principles and 
their place in the Arabian Gulf Region? 
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3. What are the perspectives of the Emirati population and Human Rights activists on 
Human Rights Issues and on the need for an NHRI in the UAE? 
4. What is required for the establishment of an NHRI in the UAE? 
In order to address the research questions, as per the requirements of the exploratory study, a 
comprehensive review of literature, alongside a series of six in-depth semi-structured 
interviews, will be conducted. The literature review is to be conducted through both a socio-
legal approach and comparative legal analysis. The socio-legal approach explores law as a 
social phenomenon or type of social experience. Socio-legal scholars often characterise their 
approach as the ‘difference between law in book and law in action’10 Murphy and Morris argue 
that socio-legal research can reveal the political nature of laws and indicate whether laws have 
achieved their intended effect. This can assist in law reform proposals by linking law and policy 
goals with the experiences of groups who interact with the law. Socio-legal research is inter-
disciplinary, based on sociology, criminology, economics and politics and can investigate the 
social role of law or explore law as a form of power or a cultural practice.11 Consequently, as 
the Paris Principles do not provide fixed, but rather general guidelines on establishing a suitable 
model, the socio-legal approach requires that the thesis examine the prevailing legal, political, 
economic system, historical and traditional experiences alongside a comparison of the region 
in which the State is located. The additional application of the comparative legal analysis 
approach provides insight with regards to observing how political, social and legal problems 
are resolved in other jurisdictions. 
This does not imply that examples and standards from other nations are automatically 
appropriate for the UAE context. The researcher agrees with Siems that the transplanting of 
                                                                




foreign legislations and rules into domestic law should be undertaken with great care and 
consideration12. In support, Legrand contends that in actual practice, it is difficult to import, 
borrow or transplant rules13. The thesis adopts the middle ground by adopting the best practices 
with consideration to the domestic UAE context. In order to capture soft data, the study will 
conduct a series of interviews. The data as derived from the dialogical interview process is 
analysed through the qualitative method.14 
It should also be recognised here that this research project represents a personal response of a 
young native Emirati citizen to the fundamental issue of human rights in the UAE. The 
researcher, in working as a senior officer in the Sharjah Police Department in the UAE, is an 
example of the increasing awareness and interest in International human rights norms within 
governmental agencies at both the federal and regional levels. Furthermore, it should also be 
taken into consideration that the researcher is not seeking to establish a traditional comparative 
law thesis, which aims to demonstrate the similarities and differences that exist between 
institutions. The aim of this exploratory study is to initiate proactive dialogue and discussion 
about human rights and the potential to establish an NHRI to oversee their development in the 
UAE. 
1.2 Organisation of Study 
The thesis begins in chapter two by addressing the question, what aspects of the existing social, 
political and legislative milieu facilitate the establishment of an NHRI in the UAE? It does this 
by firstly introducing the discussion on the phenomenal socio-economic growth experienced 
by the UAE. The argument presented then examines the Constitution and Federal structure of 
                                                                
12 M Siems, Comparative Law, vol 4 (1st edn, Cambridge University Press 2014) 4-23. 
13 P Legrand, ‘What “Legal Transplants”?’ (2001) 55 Adapting legal cultures 67 cited in; D Nelken and 
J Feest (eds), Adapting Legal Cultures, vol 55 (Bloomsbury Publishing 2001). 
14 See Chapter four 
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the UAE where it is demonstrated that the Emirate rulers have maintained their hereditary tribal 
and patrimonial structure, which is evident in the organisation of the State. The chapter then 
proceeds to argue that the formation of the Federal National Council (FNC) and the first 
election of the FNC members in December 2006 represent the intentions of the government to 
transform their society. It is asserted that despite some issues of note, the formation of the 
Federal National Council and the election process demonstrated the UAE’s commitment to 
establish an election-based, democratic culture for the first time, ahead of its more established 
regional neighbours. The discussion then suggests that the rapid global economisation and 
growth had overwhelmed society, the consequences being the violation of human rights. The 
argument presented describes and critically analyses the formal methods of the political process 
to safeguard the provisions for human rights. It is noted that the UAE Constitution contains 
measures to guarantee the freedoms and rights to all citizens. Finally, the chapter concludes by 
noting that the UAE government is currently seeking to establish its own NHRI by reviewing 
the provisions afforded to the Federal National Council. 
Chapter three is focused upon tackling the core objective and question of what the theoretical 
purpose of NHRI was in accordance to the Paris Principles and its place in the Arabian Gulf 
Region? Discussion is initiated with a clear definition of the notion and concept of NHRI, as 
proposed by the UN. The chapter then analyses the core principles of functionality for NHRIs 
as recommended by the Paris Principles. The discussion then explores the core objective of the 
chapter by examining the jurisdiction and investigatory powers afforded to NHRIs by the Paris 
Principles. This also includes its role in investigating individual cases and bringing them before 
parliament and the compliance of NHRIs with the Paris Principles. The argument stipulates 
that the Paris Principles must be analysed from a developmental perspective, whereby they 
become identified with a set of prerequisites that must be attained for the NHRI to function 
with its designated purpose. The final section of the chapter proceeds to discuss the 
 9 
 
establishment of NHRIs in the broader Arab world. It is argued here that, despite the 
establishment of the NHRIs, there appears to be a universal crackdown on human rights 
activists in many of the Middle Eastern and North African nations. The chapter concludes by 
observing that the establishment of a successful NHRI is dependent upon a democratic civil 
society that understands the role of social and political activism.  
The objective of the fourth chapter is to investigate the question: What are the perspectives of 
the Emirati population and Human Rights activists on Human Rights Issues and on the need 
for an NHRI in the UAE?  
The chapter is organised into three main sections. The first section begins by examining the 
‘exploratory’ research method, which is used to conduct the fieldwork, the research design 
developed upon the premise that the sample population from which the data is to be generated 
and collated are all individuals that are in some capacity either directly responsible for the 
preservation of human rights provisions, experienced violation of their human rights 
provisions, or are commentators, jurists or activists in the UAE. The discussion will then move 
on to the use of the Semi-Structured Interviews alongside Document Analysis as the main data 
collection instruments to extract data from the study participants and the review of literature. 
This section concludes with a discussion on the use of the deductive approach to evaluate the 
data and its compliance with the recommendations mandated by the British Educational 
Research Association15. The second section of the chapter will begin by discussing the adoption 
of an ‘exploratory qualitative case study’ to be implemented for data collection and analysis. 
Established themes will be explained and the subsequent data analysis.  
 
                                                                
15 BERA, ‘Ethical Guidelines for Educational Research’ <https://www.bera.ac.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2018/06/BERA-Ethical-Guidelines-for-Educational-
Research_4thEdn_2018.pdf?noredirect=1> accessed 1 November 2018. 
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The third and final section of the chapter will present and discuss at length the two major 
findings from the data analysis phase. 
The fifth chapter seeks to address the core objective and question of what is required for the 
establishment of an NHRI in the UAE? The chapter begins by introducing the mechanisms used 
to propagate the discourse on human rights norms. The focus of the chapter is then exclusively 
upon the UAE, whereby it is noted that the UAE has recognised the necessity and value of 
human rights through its international commitments. This is further supported by the data 
collected in chapter four where the data derived from the interviews testifies to UAE’s 
international commitments and its active process to change and implement policies that adhered 
to these international standards. The chapter then moves to discuss the notion of radical culture 
universalism (normative commitments), which argues for human rights discourse to be focused 
upon culture specific values and the Spiral Model, which postulates that change is possible in 
repressive governments as a result of a combination of pressures. 
The final section of the chapter seeks to address the possibility for the formation of NHRI in 
the UAE. It is argued that there exists no homogenous model or structure for an ideal NHRI.  
Accordingly, due to the inherently unique cultural contexts; the NHRI should reflect the society 
in which it is established. It is argued that the most suitable type of NHRI for the UAE would 
be the more pluralistic based institution, such as the Human Rights Commission, which adheres 
to the fundamental standards of the Paris Principles. 
The sixth and final chapter provides the conclusion to the thesis and is written to express the 
researcher’s personal perspective and summarise the entire study and its findings. The 
argument stipulates that the major findings of the study are encompassed in the appreciation of 
the culture and tradition of the region. The government, it is argued, is an expression of that 
context, therefore, the government is not only central to the formation of the NHRI; in its own 
existence it encloses the very purpose of government, safeguarding their citizens’ fundamental 
 11 
 
human rights. The argument then contends that the NHRI to be established in the UAE should 
be focused upon an educational endeavour. The purpose of the NHRI is broadly objectified, in 
its authority to contribute to schools and training curriculums alongside social policy debates. 
The overarching aim of the NHRI at this stage is to transform UAE society through the 
understanding and appreciation of international human rights norms alongside indigenous 
beliefs and customs. In summation, it is argued that the potential NHRI should be granted a 
unique special constitutional status within the overarching political structure of UAE in line 
with the Paris Principles. This could empower it to affect all of UAE society as a medium for 
education and awareness of human rights norms with the funding and support provided by the 








Aspects of the Existing Social, Political and Legislative Milieu  
facilitating the establishment of an NHRI in the UAE 
The UAE has been criticised by international non-governmental organisations and the media 
for its human rights record and provisions. Until recently this issue has received little attention 
in the UAE, whereby constitutional rights are almost exclusively viewed in terms of the 
individual’s relationship with the State and its institutions. However due to the substantial 
economic growth of the domestic UAE economy and the mass migration of an International 
labour force, the governmental policies and practices of the UAE government are under far 
greater International scrutiny. Although the UAE has tended to favour its traditional tribal 
culture over international human rights discourse, it has acknowledged this shortcoming and is 
working to implement the necessary changes through both its informal and formal political 
processes. This chapter seeks to explore one of the core questions of this thesis in that: What 
aspects of the existing social, political and legislative milieu facilitate the establishment of an 
NHRI in the UAE? 
 
2.1 The Socio-Political Status Quo of the UAE 
 
The unearthing of oil, together with the lifting of trade barriers, has opened the UAE to the 
outside world and converted the once ‘small sheikhdoms, subsisting on pearling, fishing, 
herding and agriculture, to a modern state with a high per capita income and substantial trade 
surplus’16. It has become an attractive prospect for foreign investments, as multinational 
corporations investing in the UAE benefit from reduced or minimal utility costs and full 
ownership of their businesses in the free trade zone. They are also exempt from taxes in all 
                                                                
16 E Linden, Focus on Terrorism, vol 7 (Nova Publishers 2006) 65. 
 13 
 
sectors (excluding banking) and encounter no restrictions on the repatriation of capital and the 
free movement of labour.17 
The subsequent influx of a sizable expatriate global labour force has had a profound effect upon 
the political stability and socioeconomic development of the UAE. According to the 2010 
census, there are 8,264,070 inhabitants of the UAE; the vast majority (7,316,073) are of foreign 
origin, with the native Emiratis only accounting for 11% (947,997). This radical discrepancy 
has forced UAE policy makers to revaluate their commitment and obligations towards these 
foreign economic migrants to the nation.18 
From a historical perspective, the notion of citizenship is a recent phenomenon. It has only 
emerged after the discovery of oil, the arrival of major corporations investing in the region and 
the subsequent migration of a large expatriate population. Loyalty to tribe and family was 
conceived to be of far greater importance than allegiance to artificial borders or territory across 
the Arabian Peninsula. However, shortly after obtaining independence, the UAE formally 
restricted the possibility of obtaining citizenship. Article 4 A1 in the Nationality Law states19 
that: 
Any person who has preserved its normal residence-ship in the State since 
1925 is to be registered in the register of Nationality according to a statistical 
declaration of such a person’s family. The children of such persons and 
children of their male children resident in the state since birth shall also be 
registered20.  
                                                                
17 Ministry of Economy, O Amer, ‘The Economic and Social Developments in the UAE 2000-2005’ 
<http://www.economy.gov.ae/English/Pages/default.aspx> accessed 15 April 2016. 
18 Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) , ‘Report Submitted by State Parties 
in Accordance with Article 9 of the Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, UAE’ 
(2009) UN Doc CERD/c/ARE/12-17 para 43. 
19 ‘UAE Cabinet Decision No.2 of 1972, On Issuing the Executive Regulation for the Law of 




Kapiszewski observes that it was mandated to increase the ‘size of the nation’s citizenship, as 
Abu Dhabi, in particular, wanted to enhance its political weight against the other smaller 
Emirates’21. Although non-localised Arabs have received citizenship, it is an exception rather 
than the norm and even the political rights of the naturalised citizens are curtailed and restricted. 
Davidson argues that with regards to the status of non-citizens in the country, they are ineligible 
‘to participate in the political process’22 as a result of the protectionist tribal heritage of the 
nation. As discussed later in Section 2.1, the political context in which the UAE was formed is 
based upon a traditional tribal heritage, which is administered via a hybrid, neo-patrimonial 
system of government23 with the extraordinary levels of socio-political and economic 
development attained by the UAE having led to greater levels of international scrutiny upon its 
human rights record.  
Deutsch24 and Lerner25 argue that traditional political systems dominated by patriarchal or 
patrimonial authorities will eventually transform due the rise of modernisation. Beblawi26 
supports this argument by stipulating that the great socio-economic growth experienced by 
these Rentier States27 is due to the ownership of substantial oil revenues within their 
jurisdictions. However, analysts agree that this profitability would eventually translate into the 
development of schools, universities, hospitals and formal government institutions. These 
would in turn lead to the formation of a new middle class that would ultimately be dissatisfied 
                                                                
21 A Kapiszewski, Nationals and Expatriates: Population and Labour Dilemmas of the Gulf Council 
States, vol 51 (Ithica Press 2001) 51. 
22 C Davidson, ‘The United Arab Emirates: Prospects for Political Reform’ (2009) 15 Brown J. World 
Aff. 118. 
23 ibid. 
24 Karl W Deutsch, ‘Social Mobilization and Political Development’ (1961) 55 American political 
science Review 493, 514. 
25 D Lerner, The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East. (Free Press 1961). 
26 H Beblawi, The Rentier State in the Arab World (1990) in ; G Luciani (ed), The Arab State, vol 24 
(Routledge 1990). 
27 Beblawi (n 26). 
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with its non-participatory political structures28. In consequence, investors, entrepreneurs, and 
an increasing number of stakeholders in the UAE would demand greater transparency and 
accountability. Conversely, the National Report presented to the Human Rights Council by the 
UAE government29 argues against the absolute castigation and ridiculing of initiatives to 
expand the formal participation of its citizens through semi-elected councils. The report 
contends that despite the inability of the UAE to attain immediate desirable results, it 
nevertheless demonstrates the commitment of the UAE leadership to the development and 
progress of their societies. So it is reasoned that genuine political liberalisation will develop 
naturally in relation to UAE’s rapid economic development, which may serve as a catalyst for 
political reform. Davidson30 argues that the rise of the non-oil sectors has already led to the 
UAE as premier destination for global events, tourism and the emergence of a large-scale urban 
society. Furthermore, UAE’s early adoption of technology and telecommunications makes it a 
regional leader and global hub for online commerce31. The discussion concurs with Khalaf’s32 
observation that the impact of modernisation upon the region has already replaced poverty, 




                                                                
28 Deutsch (n 24) 493-514. 
29 ‘The UAE National Report Presented In Accordance with Article 15 (a) of the Appendix to the 
Decision of the Human Rights Council 1/5’ <http://www.uae-
embassy.org/sites/default/files/pdf/UAE_MinistryofLabour_National_Report_to_UN.pdf> accessed 16 
December 2016. 
30 Davidson (n 22). 
31 ibid. 
32 S Khalaf, ‘Poetics and Politics of Newly Invented Traditions in the Gulf: Camel Racing in the United 
Arab Emirates’ (2000) 39 Ethnology, 243-261. 
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2.2 Foundations and Formation of the UAE 
 
The UAE is a federal nation state, comprised of seven previously independent Sheikhdoms33. 
Preceding 1971, these Sheikhdoms although independent, were collectively referred to as the 
Trucial Sheikhdoms, as they were signatories to a protectorate treaty with the Colonial British 
Empire. 
Zahlan34 asserts that the greatest impact of the signed treaties was that it allowed the Trucial 
States to exist in an international bubble, whereby the British managed all the external affairs 
of the States. This isolation allowed the leaders to develop their state craftsmanship and to 
establish core legislative and bureaucratic structures to function as an independent nation state. 
A further crucial effect of this isolation was the protection and reinforcement of Arab tribal 
customs and heritage. Heard-Bey35 maintains that this continuation and strength of the tribal 
nature of the people was a necessity for survival. Due to the climatic and geographic structure 
of the Arabian Peninsula, each tribe was specialised to harness its own industry and economic 
activities as a group. In the Arabian Gulf the predominant industry for commerce was 
agriculture, camel, goat, horse breeding, fishing and pearling. Heard-Bey36 expands this point 
with the example of the two most dominant tribes in the present-day United Arab Emirates. 
The Qawasim tribe from the mountains in the desert outside Sharjah and along the entire 
coastlines of the Arabian Peninsula were specialised in pearling and fishing. Whilst the Bani 
Yas, split into two families, the al-Nahyan, traditionally the rulers of Abu Dhabi were date 
                                                                
33 Abu Dhabi (Capital of the UAE: est. 1761), Ajman (est. 1816), Dubai (est. 1833), Fujairah (est. 
1876), Ras Al-Khaimah (est.: 1708), Sharjah (est.: 1727), Umm Al-Quwain (est.: 1775) RS Zahlan, 
The Origins of the United Arab Emirates: A Political and Social History of the Trucial States 
(Routledge, Abington 1978) 1–15. 
34 RS Zahlan, The Making of the Modern Gulf States: Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab 
Emirates and Oman, (Unwin Hyman 1989). 
35 FH Bey, From Trucial States to United Arab Emirates: A Society in Transition, (Longman Group 
1996). 
36 ibid 68. 
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farmers in the desert and the Maktoum, rulers of Dubai since 1833, were fishermen by heritage 
and tradition. Furthermore, many wandering Bedouin tribes of the desert also belonged to either 
the Qawasim or the Bani Yas. Therefore, Heard-Bey37 argues that the foundations for the 
eventual independent nation state of the UAE are based upon a tribal confederation. 
Zahlan observes that, in addition to these tribal affiliations and practices, ‘The entry of the oil 
companies in search of concessions soon after World War I… became a major milestone in the 
socio-political and economic evolution of the region…’38 Predominantly Western oil 
corporations had to work with the rulers of the different Trucial States who owned the raw 
natural resources within their political boundaries. Although this further enhanced the 
credibility and legitimacy of the rulers, it also made the oil corporations ‘agents of major 
change…’39 Since the socio-politico tribal society was focused solely upon the authority over 
people rather than over territory or boundaries, the precise demarcation of each Emirate’s 
boundaries had yet to be defined40. 
With the discovery of oil in the region from as early as 1932 (Bahrain) and then the initiation 
of major exploration and discovery of oil in Abu Dhabi (1959)41 and Dubai (1966)42 every 
Emirate sought to cement and extend its territorial claims. Heard-Bey43 contends that when the 
British declared their intentions in 1968 to terminate its special protective relationships with 
the Trucial Sheikhdoms by 1971, the tribal rulers of these States were taken aback. The 
resolution presented by the British to negate these possible threats was to unify these small 
                                                                
37 ibid 32. 
38 Zahlan (n 34) 16. 
39 ibid. 
40 Bey (n 35) 56. 
41 MQ Morton, ‘The Abu Dhabi Oil Discoveries’ (2011) 8 GeoExPro Magazine  pt 3 
<http://www.geoexpro.com/articles/2011/03/the-abu-dhabi-oil-discoveries > accessed 15 April 2017. 
42 RE Owen, ‘One Hundred Years of Middle Eastern Oil’ (2008) 24 Middle East Brief 1. 
43 ibid; MC Hudson (ed), Middle East Dilemma: The Politics and Economics of Arab Integration 
(Columbia University Press 1999). 
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independent sheikhdoms into a single nation state. Hence, on the 18th of February 1968, the 
rulers of Abu Dhabi and Dubai convened on the agreed demarcated borders between their 
emirates and declared the unification of their respective States. Furthermore, they sought to 
invite the leaders of the other Sheikhdoms establishing the Trucial States encompassing Qatar 
and Bahrain. However, due to significant differences between the States, the process of 
unification proved to be unsuccessful with regards to the union with Bahrain and Qatar. 
Henceforth, on the 14th August 1971, Bahrain declared its independence, with Qatar following 
on the 1st of September 1971. The remaining emirates, apart from Ras al- Khaimah, agreed 
upon a provisional constitution and joined Abu Dhabi and Dubai on 2 December 1971. Ras al-
Khaimah joined the federation soon after on the 10th of February 1972.44 
 
2.3 The Federal Structure and Legislative System of the UAE 
 
Iliya Harik’s classification of Arab states in accordance to their established authority, identifies 
UAE as a secular State within a traditional hierarchical organisational structure in which ‘the 
chieftain principle is paramount, implying that the ascendancy of the ruling dynasty has been 
continuously on the increase to the present. Nowhere did religious power manifest itself, nor 
was it associated with the ruler…’45 
Herb46 understands the modern bureaucratic structure of the UAE to be defined by the dynastic 
monarchies or ruling families, which have in turn become the governments. This, he argues, 
implies that the tribal and family lineages have become formalised to uphold the most high-
profile postings in the national government.  The federal constitution establishes that the 
                                                                
44 Hudson (n 43) ch 1. 
45 I Harik, ‘The Origins of the Arab State System’ (1990) 24 The Arab State 1 in; Luciani (n 26). 
46 M Herb, The Wages of Oil: Parliaments and Economic Development in Kuwait and the UAE 
(Cornell University Press 2014) 107-144. 
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President of the UAE holds the position of Sheikh of Abu Dhabi, whilst the Ruler of Dubai 
also holds the office of Prime Minister of the UAE. 
Herb47 argues that the before a sheikh passes away, he recommends a family member or son to 
succeed him. However, the ‘family as a whole retains the consensual power to remove a ruler 
and replace him with another member of the family, if he does not adopt policies that are in the 
interests of the family’48. Al-Suwaidi49 summarises the nature of the political system in the 
UAE as being: 
Predicated upon the old Lockean principle of the explicit and implicit consent 
of the governed… in which the government's legitimacy rests upon a universal 
acceptance of both its form and those who lead it. Whether it is at the local or 
the federal level, UAE leaders boast a sense of legitimacy that no one, even 
those on the fringes of the political process, doubts or disputes50. 
 
2.3.1 The UAE Constitution 1971 
 
The objectives of the UAE Federation state that: 
The Federation aims to maintain its independence and sovereignty, safeguard its 
security and stability, defend its existence or the existence of its member 
emirates from any act of aggression, and protect the rights and responsibilities 
of the people of the Federation. It aims to work in close co-operation with each 
of the emirates for their common benefit in realising these objectives and 
promoting their prosperity and progress in all fields to provide a better life for 
all citizens, ensuring mutual respect by each emirate for the independence and 
sovereignty of the other emirates in matters related to their internal affairs within 
the framework of the Constitution… Each emirate of the UAE shall handle all 
authorities that are not assigned by the Constitution to the Federation. Moreover, 
each emirate shall contribute to building and protecting the Constitution as well 
                                                                
47 Herb (n 46). 
48 AL Aartun, ‘The Political Economy of the United Arab Emirates: An Analysis of the UAE as an Oil 
Rentier State’ (PhD Thesis, University of Oslo 2002). 
49 A Al-Suwaidi, ‘The United Arab Emirates at 40: A Balance Sheet’ (2011) 18 Middle East Policy 44. 
50 ibid 45. 
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as benefiting from its services. All member emirates of the Federation will strive 
to coordinate their legislatures in all areas to achieve standardization51.  
 
The provisional constitution, enacted on the 2nd   of December 1971 for a proposed period 
of five years, was eventually succeeded by a permanent constitution comprising 152 
articles52 in 1996.53 
In order to facilitate the unification of the Emirates and establish a national identity through the 
legal, political and social channels, federal legislation effectively superseded the local or tribal 
laws.  Consequently, Articles 150 and 151 of the constitution were utilised as tools for national 
identity formation. This is evident from an analysis of Articles 120 and 121 of the Constitution, 
which permit the federal government to maintain full jurisdiction and responsibility for areas 
ranging from: aviation, banking, citizenship, currency, defence and security, education, foreign 
affairs, immigration, labour, licensing, postal service, public health, telecommunications, 
territorial waters and major legislation relating to penal, civil, commercial and company law 
alongside the extradition of criminals. The terms of the new permanent constitution allude to 
the emergence of a more inclusive society, whereby each individual emirate is in control of 
‘developments in civil aviation, oil, internal security, finance and investment, and economic 
policy’54. 
 
                                                                
51 UAE GOV, ‘Federal System’ (GOV Online Portal) <https://uaecabinet.ae/en/federal-system> 
accessed 17 December 2017. 
52 The Constitution is divided into ten sections: The federation, its constituencies and principal aims; 
The fundamental social and economic basis of the federation; Public freedom, rights and duties; The 
federal authorities; Federal legislations, decrees and authorities in charge; The emirates; Allocation of 
legislative, executive and international jurisdiction between the federation and the emirates; Financial 
affairs of the federation; Armed forces and security forces; Final and transitional provisions 
53 In 1996, the Federal Supreme Council approved two amendments to the provisional Constitution, 
making it permanent and naming Abu Dhabi as the capital of State  ‘Government and Political System 
@ Emirates.Org’ (2012) <https://www.emirates.org/gov.html> accessed 15 April 2017. 
54 The Economist, ‘United Arab Emirates’ (Country Fact File)’ <http://country.eiu.com/united-arab-
emirates > accessed 16 April 2017. 
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2.3.2 Federal Structure 
 
Under Article 45 of the Constitution the federal structure is organised according to the federal 
authorities outlined in the following table 2.155 
                                                                
55 UAE Constitution 1971, art 45 
56 All Articles and information are taken from UAE Constitution, 1971 
57 ‘UAE Yearbook 2009’ (Printable PDF Brochure)’ 
<http://www.uaeinteract.com/uaeint_misc/pdf_2009/> accessed 17 April 2017. 
FEDERAL STRUCTURE OF THE UAE56 
Federal 
Authorities 




This is the highest federal authority in the UAE. It consists of the leaders of the seven 
emirates. The head of this council is the President of the UAE. 
Article 47 of the Federal Constitution states that the Supreme Council has the power 
to decide the general policy of the federation, keep control over the affairs of the 
Union and ratify treaties and international agreements. 
The Council elects the President and the Vice President of the UAE (both for a five-
year term) and approves the appointment of the Council of Ministers.57 
The President of the Union presides over the Supreme Council and directs its 
discussions (Article 54, paragraph 1), terminate its sessions, sign Union laws and 
supervise the implementation of Union laws. 
The President appoints the Prime Minister and diplomatic representatives of the 
Union 
The President represents the Union and exercises the right of pardon and 
commutation of sentences (Article 54). 
The Council of 
Ministers 
This is the executive authority of the Union. 
Chaired by the Prime Minister of the UAE and each Emirate has at least one 
minister. 
Article 60 of the Federal Constitution defines the responsibilities of the Council: 
o The power to implement the general policy of Supreme Council 
o Initiate drafts of federal laws 







The Council has a consultative role in reviewing the national legislature ( Majlis Al 
Ittihad Al Watani) 
Reviews draft federal laws before they are submitted to the President and the 
Supreme Council. 



















Abu Dhabi: 8; Dubai: 8; Sharjah: 6; Ras al-Khaimah: 6; Ajman: 4; Umm al-Qaiwain: 
4 and Fujairah: 4 






The Supreme Court is responsible for upholding the constitution. 
It consists of a president and up to five judges. 
Articles 94-109 of the Federal Constitution address the role of the Judiciary body. 
The federal law supersedes local laws in a conflict of legislature. 
Article 99 stipulates that the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the interrelationship 
between the emirates and between the individual emirates and the Union. 
Local Government 
(Emirate) 
Under articles 116 and 122 the Constitution allows local governments to pass local 
laws 
There are two restrictions: 
o These local authorities shall not enact laws within the federal legislature 
grounds, 
o Local law cannot conflict with federal law. 
In this occurrence, the local law is invalidated. 
Table 2-1 Federal Structure of the UAE 
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2.3.3 Reform of the Federal Structure 
 
The political system of the UAE government according to the official perspective58 is a 
reflection of the pre-federation heritage of the region. The principle of Shura or consultation 
implied that the individual leaders of tribes and the emirates worked together to reach mutually 
acceptable decisions. This ensured relative peace, prosperity and the eventual formation of the 
UAE federation in 1971. The government argues that the same principle of consultation is 
found at the very nexus of the UAE's Constitution and within the federal authorities vested with 
the power and influence to implement its articles. 
The Federal National Council or  Majlis Al Ittihad Al Watani was formed specifically to 
represent the broad concerns of the Emirati citizenship. Articles 89-9259 of the UAE 
Constitution state that the Federal National Council has both a legislative and supervisory role 
and is responsible for examining, and amending all proposed federal legislation, and may 
summon for questioning any federal minister regarding their performance.60 
After considerable reformation, the first public election of the Federal National Council 
members in December 2006 represented the first steps towards the political liberalisation of the 
federal structure. The UAE cabinet approved the President’s proposal to establish an electoral 
college of notables (selected by both the rulers and advisers) in each emirate to elect half and 
appoint the other half of the members to the Federal National Council. Under Article 69 of the 
Constitution, the eligibility for Federal National Council membership is the responsibility of 
                                                                
58 UAE GOV, ‘Federal National Council Structure and Info’ <https://government.ae/en/about-the-
uae/the-uae-government/the-federal-national-council-%20%E2%80%8E> accessed 17 December 2017. 
59 UAE Constitution, art 89-92 
60 The official government website of the FNC states that its responsibilities include: Passing, 
amending or rejecting federal draft laws including financial bills; Examining the Annual General 
Budget draft law and the draft law of the final accounts; Discussing international treaties and 
agreements; Discussing general subject pertaining to the FNC offering recommendations; The FNC is a 




‘Each emirate… to determine the method of selecting the citizens representing it in the Federal 
National Council’61. 
Furthermore, there are specific rulings that are applicable to potential and active Federal 
National Council members. Articles 70 and 71 stipulate that Federal National Council members 
must be Emirati citizens and permanent residents of the emirate which they represent in the 
Federal National Council. There are also age restrictions such as being not less than 25 years 
of age; possessing a reputable civil record; being literate and not an incumbent of a current post 
or office in another ministry. Although candidates have the right to run for elections in their 
respective emirates, the discretion as to eligibility is afforded to the rulers. They effectively 
dictate the representative demographics of the members and the terms and conditions of the 
voters (e.g. gender). Firstly, the voters must be registered in the ‘family book’, Khulasat Al 
Qaid, which verifies the candidates’ heritage and establishment in the emirate; the voters must 
present valid Emirati ID and under the Single Vote system each individual voter is granted one 
vote to cast for one candidate. The twenty candidates with the highest votes are automatically 
elected to become members of the Federal National Council. 
However, despite the authority delegated to individual emirates and their rulers, the actual 
planning and supervision of the election process is conducted by the National Election 
Committee. This was created as a result of a resolution by H. H. Sheikh Khalifa bin Zayed Al 
Nahyan in 2006 and oversees the regulations and assigns the dates for elections. The National 
Election Committee is responsible for the polling stations inside the UAE and the polling 
stations in UAE embassies and consulates worldwide. Three elections have been held since 
2006. The first elections of Federal National Council were conducted in December 2006 with 
the authority of Resolution No. 3 of 2006, issued by the President of the UAE. Notably, Emirati 
women demonstrated a strong presence in these elections by taking twenty-two percent of the 
                                                                
61 UAE Constitution, art 69 
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total seats, alongside the election of the first woman ‘to the Federal National Council and the 
appointment of nine female members’62. 
However, Davidson observes that despite these efforts ‘…the steps that have been taken to 
reform the Federal National Council have thus far backfired and, if anything, have made the 
ruling establishment warier of future adjustments…’63 Firstly, the rulers of the emirates chose 
only 6,689 UAE citizens from a population of roughly 900,000 citizens and 4.7 million 
foreigners to vote or stand for the 20 elected seats in the 40-seat Federal National Council. Out 
of these there were only 1,189 women and only 60 percent of the voters actually cast their 
ballots. Al-Suwaidi described the elections as ‘a setback that showed clear tendencies towards 
tribalism’64. Davidson in agreement notes ‘…By the time the elections were held in late 2006… 
the human rights progress was scant… with authorities censoring and harassing human rights 
activists...’65 In response to this criticism, the President of the UAE introduced the adoption of 
amendment number 1 in 2009.66 This was created with the intention to increase the Federal 
National Council’s powers and establish a fixed duration for the Council members from two to 
four years under the constitutional amendments to Article 72. 67 
There was also an increase in the duration of the annual sessions to more than seven months 
under Article 78. Under Article 6868 of the Federal Constitution, the members were to be 
proportionally represented from each Emirate in accordance with their population. The 
government conducted a second Federal National Council election on 24 September 2011 and 
                                                                
62 ‘UAE Yearbook 2009’ (Printable PDF Brochure)’ (n 57). 
63 Davidson (n 22) 120. 
64 Al-Suwaidi (n 49) 45. 
65 Davidson (n 22) 120. 
66 United Nations Human Rights Council (UNCHR), ‘Summary Prepared by the Office of the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights in Accordance with Paragraph 5 of the Annex to Human Rights 
Council Resolution 16/21’ (2013) UN Doc A/HRC/WG.6/15/ARE/3. 
67 UAE Constitution, art. 72 
68 UAE Constitution, art 68 
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claimed that the size of Electoral College grew to 135,308 voters with 85 women contesting 
the elections. The ‘third and most recent election took place in October 2015 and according to 
official governmental figures the Electoral College increased to 224,279 voters, with women 
representing forty-eight percent of total voters’69. 
The reformed Federal National Council has also addressed many diverse issues such as: the 
restrictions on use of internet services; mixed marriages; protection of environment; licences 
for dog owners and banning private ownership of wild and exotic animals; raising pensions for 
police and military personnel who retired before 2008; providing housing allowances instead 
of housing loans to Emiratis above 60 who earn less than 15,000 AED per month; the rising 
number of deaths from drug use; the lack of rehabilitation centre beds; specialist educational 
programmes in schools; and the concern about Emiratis marrying foreign women. 
However, Al-Suwaidi70 states that there has been increasing discontent and criticism of the 
Federal National Council with many of its members and citizens claiming it to be largely 
ineffective.71 It is contended, as per Davidson’s72 perspective, that despite the Federal National 
Council being incapable of making more substantive interventions (such as diverging from a 
certain minister’s opinion; price of petrol or the cultural content of terrestrial television) the 
introduction of the election process provided the Emirati citizens with the opportunity to engage 
with the decision making vehicle of government and establish an election-based, democratic 
culture for the first time, ahead of its more established regional neighbours. 
 
                                                                
69 UAE GOV, ‘Federal National Council Structure and Info’ (n 58). 
70 Dr. Jamal Sanad Al-Suwaidi is a UAE intellectual and strategic expert, and is the Director General of 
the Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research (ECSSR). 
71 Al-Suwaidi (n 49) 45. 
72 Davidson (n 22) 120. 
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2.4 Contemporary Human Rights Challenges 
 
Human Rights Watch affirms that activists campaigning for human rights in the UAE and 
critics of the government are liable to be charged with harassment, and subjected to criminal 
prosecution resulting in custodial sentences.73 Moreover, contrary to international principles, 
Human Rights Watch claims that UAE’s penal code allows the government to criminalise 
speech based on broad content restrictions.74 This is further supported by the recent annual 
Amnesty International Report which focused on UAE’s poor record and the government's 
restrictive approach to ‘freedom of speech and assembly’75. The reports by Human Rights 
Watch and Amnesty International note that the UAE is in violation of the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights, Article 19 and 20 which state that all signatories are bound to acknowledge 
the freedom of expression, assembly and association76. World Press Freedom Index placed the 
UAE at 119th in 2016 for the freedom afforded to the Press.77 
The Amnesty International annual report78 also drew attention to the fact that the authorities 
used provisions of the Penal Code, the 2012 cybercrime law and the 2014 anti-terrorism law to 
arrest, prosecute and imprison critics. In July of the same year, the enactment of a new law on 
combating discrimination and hatred further eroded rights to freedom of expression and 
                                                                
73 Human Rights Watch, ‘World Report 2012: Rights Trends in World Report 2012: United Arab 
Emirates’ (Human Rights Watch, 2012) <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2012/country-
chapters/united-arab-emirates> accessed 16 April 2017. 
74 ibid. 
75 ‘Amnesty International Report 2016/17’ [2017] Amnesty International Ltd 379, 379-381. 
76 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR): Article 19: Everyone has the right to freedom of 
opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to 
seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers. 
Article 20: Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 1. Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful 
assembly and association. 2. No one may be compelled to belong to an association. UDHR (adopted 
10 December 1948) UNGA Res 217 A (III) (UDHR) art 19-20
 
 
77 Reporters Without Borders, ‘United Arab Emirates’ (2016) <https://rsf.org/en/united-arab-emirates> 
accessed 29 May 2019. 
78 ‘Amnesty International Report 2016/17’ (n 75). 
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association. The new law defines hate speech as ‘any speech or conduct, which may incite 
sedition, prejudicial action or discrimination among individuals or groups’79 which is 
punishable by a minimum of five years imprisonment. It also empowers the courts to order the 
disbandment of associations deemed to provoke such speech and imprison their founders for a 
minimum of 10 years80. 
The United Nations Special Rapporteur observes that ‘the right to freedom of speech and of 
peaceful assembly’81 is part of human nature. The organisation advises that the most viable 
methods for this is through the election process, where citizens have a right to express their 
opinions, join trade unions, elect leaders to represent their interests and hold them accountable 
at national governmental elections. Furthermore, it advises that assembly and association rights 
are a prerequisite not only for a legitimate democracy, but also for a just society. The right to 
freedom of peaceful assembly is the right to gather publicly or privately and collectively 
express, promote, pursue and defend common interests. Nation States must refrain from unduly 
obstructing their citizens’ right to freedom of association and respect the privacy of 
associations.82 
However, it would appear that the Federal Constitution of the UAE actually supports these 
recommendations as can be deciphered from Articles 30 and 33,83 which state: ‘Freedom to 
hold opinions and express them orally, in writing or by other means of expression shall be 
guaranteed within the limits of the law’84 (Article 30) and ‘The freedom of assembly and the 
                                                                
79 ibid. 
80 ibid. 
81 UNHRC, ‘The Rights to Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association’ (2016) UN Doc  
A/HRC/RES/32/32 . 
82 ibid. 
83 UAE Constitution, Art. 30 and 33 
84 UAE Constitution Art 30 
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freedom to hold meetings shall be guaranteed within the limits of the law’85 (Article 33) 
The Amnesty International report on Human Rights 200886 argues that although the Federal 
Constitution vouchsafes the freedoms due to individual citizens and groups, the current 
legislative norms and practices deems such freedoms an anathema to the nation’s very 
existence. This is evident from the joint report submitted to the UN Universal Periodic 
Review87 by nine stakeholders. 88The stakeholders observe that Islamists and political 
dissenters criticising the political structure or human rights record of the UAE are often 
arrested, arbitrarily detained, face ambiguous charges and/or receive partial trials. Human 
Rights Watch, in particular, notes that political parties are prohibited in the UAE and that rights 
of assembly and association are limited. They note further that although the government has 
granted Non-Governmental Organisations representatives permission to visit, it is extremely 
controlled and limited in its scope89 leading the stakeholders to argue that despite the 
stipulations made in the Federal Constitution, independent Non-Governmental Organisations 
and trade unions are not tolerated. A major aim of the joint report submitted to the United 
Nations Human Rights Council by the nine stakeholders90 was to request the UAE to respect 
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the international human rights laws governing Non-Governmental Organisations. Amnesty 
International and Alkarama called upon the UAE to amend the 2008 Law on Associations, 
including its Article 16 to ensure that Non-Governmental Organisations can function free from 
State interference. Alkarama further lobbied the UAE government to reinstate the boards of 
associations, which had been removed under this law. Whilst the International Centre for 
Supporting Rights and Freedoms (Cairo) requested that the legislation is amended to allow for 
the freedom to establish associations outside of the official state sanctioned bodies.  This should 
also be supported by adopting the appropriate legislation to ensure the protection of human 
rights proponents in the conduct of their work.91 However, some international observers such 
as the US Department of State on Human Rights claims that UAE’s judiciary and court system 
provides for a substantial obstacle in the reformation process. 
By tradition the… diwans, have maintained the practice of reviewing… 
criminal and civil offenses before they are referred to the prosecutors… 
Further still they also review the adjudicated sentences… and approve the 
release of every prisoner after the completion of their sentenced terms…if 
they did not approve of the verdicts, they return the case to the court on 
appeal… The diwans involvement leads to lengthy delays prior to and 
following the judicial process… and lengthens the time defendants spend in 
prison92. 
Doherty93 states that the government controls the UAE judicial system, which constitutes a 
direct violation of the independence of this authority.  She further argues that the notion of 
human rights is directly related to the independence of the judiciary system as Article 94 of the 
Federal Constitution of the UAE states that, ‘Justice is the basis of authority. Judges shall be 
independent and subordinate to no authority but the law and their own conscience in the 
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performance of their duties’94. Alkarama95 argues that, as the UAE President is also the head 
of the Federal Judicial Council, this constitutes a direct violation of the principle of separation 
of powers. They assert that there is great inconsistency in the UAE judiciary and the manner in 
which they apply the laws96. 
The UN Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner notes that the functioning of the UAE 
judicial system directly impacts upon The delivery of justice, the enforcement of peoples’ 
human rights and the public’s confidence in the judiciary and ‘such challenges should not be 
ignored; they should be addressed as a matter of urgency in order to bring the administration 
of justice in the UAE in line with international human rights standards’97  
The UN Special Rapporteur has even requested the UAE to review their legislation and to 
ensure that the right of appeal exists within their legislation. 
It should take measures to ensure the independence of the judiciary, and in 
particular adopt legislation to separate the functions of the Ministry of Justice 
from those of the judiciary and the courts... The public’s awareness needs to 
be raised with regards to the content of legislation, its application, the 
differences that exist across the individual Emirates, and the applicability of 
the federal laws98. 
Davidson asserts that a significant factor impacting the current situation is the general weakness 
of ‘civil society’99 in the UAE due to its ‘severe lack of civic space’100. 
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Heard-Bey argues that this ‘lack of civic space’101 is due to the restrictive nature of UAE law 
with regards to the establishment of associations of any nature: 
Considering that the vast majority of inhabitants is foreign and come from 
countries where political and social strife is not uncommon, the authorities 
wanted to avoid as much as possible the importation of such festering 
problems… In consequence, even foreign charitable groups… such as 
environmental initiatives, art societies, and trade-based groupings… such as 
national business associations… are currently still rare and have to observe 
circuitous measures to function legally...102 
 
2.5 Safeguarding Human Rights 
 
Although the UAE government has been criticised for its failures to uphold the internationally 
accepted norms of human rights103, there exists both an informal and formal political process 
for actively instituting changes based upon the will of the public. 
2.5.1 Informal Safeguards 
 
Hudson observes that the original tribal tradition of consultation inherently ‘includes the notion 
of human rights’104 and still defines the style of politics in the UAE: ‘The Sheikh of a tribe 
leads by virtue of his personal qualities as recognised by a council of elders… the heads of the 
main families’105. Thorleifsson106, in support, adds that this council of elders is collectively 
referred to as the  Majlis. The term  Majlis is literally translated to sitting room and refers to 
the quarter of the house in which the predominantly male head of the family welcomes male 
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guests to the premises. Contextualised to a tribal setting, tribal members of the tribe were 
permitted to visit the Sheikh’s  Majlis to discuss any issue that was pertinent to them. The 
practice of the Majlis within a national socio-political context entails the granting of an 
audience to the citizens of the UAE by the rulers of the State. The petitioners (citizens of the 
UAE) to the President, Crown Prince, Prime Minister or other members of the ruling dynasty 
are able to present their concerns and issues directly and often receive instant responses or 
mandated actions. This practice has traditionally facilitated an open dialogue between the rulers 
and their subjects and raised the rulers’ awareness of the socio-economic situation and reality 
of the citizens. 
This informal yet traditional method of personal interactions between the public and their 
leaders was historically conducted in tents in the desert or the living space of the tribal elders. 
Naoom107 observes that the modern  Majlis is usually held in the royal palace of the President, 
Crown Prince and Vice President or in the offices of a Minister, reception halls of the governors 
or mayors.  The President and Prime Minister of the UAE hold the Majlis at least once a week 
with dinner being served for the public. The Crown Prince meet with the public at least twice 
a week with meetings taking place both in the morning and evening. Ministers usually hold 
open meetings at least once a day with regards to the specific remit of their portfolios. 
Al Yassini,108 in his analysis on the practice of the  Majlis in the Gulf region, observes that 
traditionally any person could attend the gathering despite their race, creed or nationality. He 
identifies the types of issues that are typically discussed in the Majlis. These have historically 
encompassed tribal conflicts, distribution or access to water resources, security, personal 
property, real estate or title deeds along with seeking financial and medical assistance. 
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Furthermore, Misha ’al109 notes that although the Majlis is an informal part of the political 
process it is conducted within the traditionally accepted norms of Arab society. The public is 
seated and awaits the arrival of the dignitary or ruler to the Majlis. On his arrival, he greets the 
present public and then proceeds to hear each individual petitioner, with priority given to the 
sick and elderly. If possible, the ruler or his deputy will attempt to remedy the situation instantly 
through a decree. However, if further evidence or paperwork is required it is duly noted and 
the petitioners are given a date and time to resubmit their request. If the President or his deputies 
are presented with a problem that has already been adjudicated upon by an Islamic court, then 
the traditional practice has been for the rulers to respect that decision and not contradict the 
religious edict or ruling. The Majlis is traditionally a part of the Islamic heritage of the region 
and imbued into the tribal traditions. 
Islamic scholars consider the Majlis to be an overt manifestation of the concept of consultation 
(Shura) as ordained by the Qur'an. Allah (sbt) advises Prophet Mohammad (s), through the 
Quran, that he is to ‘consult his followers in taking decisions’110 and has equated it to ‘acts of 
devotional worship, such as prayer (salaat) and charity (zakat)’111. Misha ‘al112 argues that even 
before the coming of Islam to the region, the custom of the Arabs in Mecca had led to the 
establishment of an assembly of influential economic and spiritual leaders referred to as the 
Dar A' Nadawh. This literally translates to the house of consultation, where important issues 
were publicly discussed. 
Al-Ansari113 argues that it was only when Islam had cemented itself as the dominant socio-
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political ideology in the region that the first criterion for human rights were established. He 
argues that this was embodied in the leadership of Prophet Mohammed (s), and the Quranic 
guidance: ‘O mankind, we created you from a single pair of a male and a female and made you 
into nations and tribes, that you may know each other’114. 
This implies that the Prophet (s) treated everyone equally and afforded full rights to the citizens 
of Madinah without recourse to their faith or class identities. Furthermore, the Islamic tradition 
as captured in the Prophetic narrations and the hadith material demonstrates Muhammad (s) 
seeking the counsel of his companions and acting upon it. This includes the influence of women 
as exemplified by the Prophet terminating his state of Ihram in front of his dejected companions 
after signing the Agreement of Hudaybiyyah (1st year H, 628 CE) based upon his consultation 
with his wife. 
Moten115 argues that the earliest leaders in the nascent Muslim community did not consider 
themselves princes but merely primus interprets. A Hadith from the Prophet’s (S) 
companion Muadh b. Jabal (d. 640), demonstrates this attitude: 
Our leader is one of us; if he implements among us the teachings ... of the 
Quran and the Sunnah, we shall have him over us. If he goes against it, we 
shall depose him. If he commits theft, we shall amputate his hand; if he 
commits adultery, we shall flog him ... He will not hide himself from us, nor 
will he be self-conceited ... He is a person as good as we are116. 
Shura is a tradition that is a mutual process allowing leaders to seek counsel and judgment from 
followers whilst at the same time providing counsel and leadership to their followers in 
accordance with the Quran and Sunnah. This concept is most accurately immortalised by the 
words of Abu Bakr (d.643) as he made his inaugural speech as the first of the Rashidun 
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Khaliphs. He proclaimed, ‘Obey me as long as I obey God and His messenger, if I disobey God 
and His messenger, then you owe me no obedience’117. Muslim scholars have often used this 
narration as proof of the empowerment of the followers to assess and audit their leaders.118 
This is further reinforced through the Quranic notion of bayaat (oath of allegiance)119 whereby 
individuals willingly select and pledge individual allegiance to their leaders. The most famous 
example of this is in the election of the first of the Rashidun Khaliphs (rightly guided), Abu 
Bakr (d. 643). Prophet Mohammad (s) did not appoint an heir to lead the Muslim community 
before he passed and instead left the decision to the community itself, demonstrating that the 
Arab Muslim tradition has always valued the role of the followers in judging the adequacy, 
competency and proficiency of their leaders by electing them directly and then maintaining a 
direct contact with them. Hudson120 contends that in theory, tribal politics was extremely 
democratic. He notes however that although the Majlis is still utilised, ‘with the onset of the 
modern bureaucratic structure of the state’121, it has increased efficiency for the educated and 
well-informed members of the general populace to contact the relevant state offices, then to 
meet directly with the sheikhs. 
It is argued that the spirit of the Majlis has remained in the contemporary era of its place in 
UAE society. The launch of the Smart  Majlis by Sheikh Rashid Al Maktoum122 demonstrates 
the commitment by the leaders to hear from their people directly. The communality of the 
socio-political system is, as shall be argued throughout the thesis, the glue which holds the 
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society together. The Majlis in its overt form may only represent a symbolic gesture, whereby 
the tribal leader hosts their subjects in a traditional manner. Nevertheless, it is a consultative 
meeting and gathering, which offers the people to meet with their leaders directly and to hear 
and get a feel for their personalities and characters in a social setting. This personal aspect of 
the Majlis may be changing due to the emergence of new technologies, which although they 
offer direct access to the leaders, also eliminate the humanness of personal meetings and 
physical presence. So, the very concept of the Majlis is changing but it retains its essential 
functionality to connect the people with the leaders.  
The question that has to be posed is to what extent the leaders can extend their personal space 
and time to foreign residents and migrant workers. If the directives of the Paris Principles are 
to be adhered to and respected, then the UAE leaders must naturally and prudently open their 
communication channels. This includes the Majlis, wherein the foreign non-citizens can openly 
share their grievances with the leaders in charge. This will only serve to act as a clear 
demonstration of the sincerity and openness of the leaders to implement the requisite changes. 
The Majlis has the potential to become a developmental tool to gauge and connect with the 
foreign migrants and to further benefit from their experiences through this informal mode of 
socio-political gathering. 
2.5.2 Formal Safeguards 
 
Khalaf and Luciani123 argue that building a democratic society is best for the ongoing protection 
of human rights. They suggest it consists of two core components: 
1. A formal constituent of constitutional reform, including the creation of institutions, the 
establishment of procedural rules, and a division and attribution of powers  
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2. Political participation, namely the culture of political debate in society, which includes 
the expression of ideas, enhanced access to information, and the articulation of 
proposals for the conduct of the state. 
In analysing the UAE Constitution, it is evident that it already has inbuilt measures to 
guarantee the freedoms and rights of all citizens. Chapter 3 of the UAE ‘Constitution is 
devoted to public freedoms, rights and duties, and contains a number of provisions 
guaranteeing protection to these freedoms and rights’124. This includes such measures as 
the freedom of speech and press, peaceful assembly and association and the practice of 
religious beliefs. It also forbids torture, subjective arrest and detention. Moreover, the UAE 
has incorporated into their Constitution the laws and fundamental principles included in the 
Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The UAE 
have also agreed to ‘fundamental international human right treaties, further helping to 
promote the human rights principles to which the international community is committed’125. 
According to Article 125 of the UAE Constitution: 
The Governments of the Emirates shall undertake the appropriate measures to 
implement the laws promulgated and the treaties and international agreements 
concluded by the Federation, including the promulgation of the local laws, 
regulations, decisions and orders necessary for such implementation. The 
Federal government shall supervise such implementation126 
On both the federal and local levels, the authorities have initiated awareness through policies 
and mechanisms designed to bring awareness to and protect the rights of all individuals within 
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their jurisdictions. In response to the United Nations Human Rights Council’s mandate, which 
involves Universal Periodic Review of the human rights record of all United Nations member 
states, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs conceded that it must:127  
1. Provide the necessary ‘mechanisms to protect human rights, while keeping up with 
national and international developments, and updating laws and systems as required’128. 
2. Meet the State's expectation with regards to developing the national potential through 
an increased focus upon the remit ‘for education on human rights and basic freedoms 
through a national plan’.129 
3. Strive ‘to regulate the relationship between employers and workers in a framework that 
preserves dignity and rights,’130 particularly regarding domestic labour. 
4. Increase the empowerment of women's role in society, increasing opportunities for 
involvement in a number of fields based on their skills and abilities. 
5. Work to confront human trafficking crimes by reviewing the best international practices 
in the field, working to update and improve the State's legislature in accordance with 
international standards, working to establish institutions and agencies to confront 
human trafficking crimes, and working to support the foundations of international 
cooperation with international organisations and institutions.131 
The UAE government is currently studying the establishment of a NHRI. Since the first UPR 
                                                                
127 Ministry of Foreign Affairs (UAE), ‘Annex: Actions and Measures Taken by the United Arab 
Emirates to Implement Accepted Recommendations and Voluntary Pledges Made during the (UPR) for 
the Period 2008-2012’ <https://www.upr-
info.org/sites/default/files/document/united_arab_emirates/session_15_-
_january_2013/a_hrc_wg_6_15_are_1_e_annex.pdf>. 
128 ibid  
129 ibid  
130 ibid  
131 ibid  
 40 
 
that took place in 2009, the UAE has comprehensively reviewed its Constitution to facilitate 
the implementation of systems that effectively protect human rights. The revisions include 
among others, a provision for the Federal National Council to expand and include a role in 
debating international treaties and international conventions, a series of memoranda of 
understanding with major labour-exporting countries with a view to protect workers from 
exploitation and a new wage protection system, and a new law to protect domestic workers and 
women.132 
Although women now occupy around 30 per cent of the higher leadership and decision-making 
positions in the UAE, up until December 2012 it was not compulsory for corporations and 
government agencies to include women on their boards of directors. In governmental posts the 
situation was more in favour of women as they occupied two-thirds of the jobs, while nine 
women were serving as ministers in the Government. In 2016, two new ministries, the new 
Ministry of State for Happiness and the Ministry of State for Tolerance were established and 
women were appointed to both (ministerial) posts.133 
The progress made by the UAE has translated into a three-year membership of the UN Human 
Rights Council starting from early 2013. The country was elected in a secret ballot conducted 
by the UN General Assembly, in which 32 countries from 18 geographical groups competed 
for 18 vacant seats, starting from the beginning of 2016 and ending in late 2018. The UAE 
received 195 votes, the second highest number of votes garnered by any Asian countries.134 
Further evidence of the transformation and development of the UAE is the establishment of 
Emirates Human Rights Association under the Federal Public Interest Associations Act No. 6 
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of 1974. It declares its role to be primarily concerned with raising the awareness of human 
rights issues in accordance to the Federal Constitution and international obligations. It acts 
primarily as an intermediary and interlocutor between detainees, prisoners and the authorities. 
Furthermore, it also attempts to provide support to victims of natural disasters and special 
needs. Another example of this reformist agenda was the introduction of human rights and 
societal awareness modules in primary (Grades 1-12) and tertiary (University) education by the 
Ministry of Education.135 
This includes tuition on: 
1. ‘Civil and political rights (such as the right to life, the right to non-discrimination, the 
right to private life, the right to equality before the law, the right to freedom of thought, 
the right to freedom of expression, the right to political participation)’136; 
2. Social and economic rights; 
3. ‘Environmental rights (such as the right to clean water resources, the right to breathe 
clean air, the right to equality between generations, the right to protection of the 
environment and public health)’.137 
The UAE Ministry of the Interior ran more than 121 human rights training courses between 
2009 and 2012 in police academies and schools to familiarise students and personnel on the 
nature of the human rights concepts, the international and regional human rights organisations, 
collective rights, the rights of prisoners, human rights in domestic legislation, the role of the 
police force in safeguarding human rights and the teaching of international humanitarian law.138 
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Furthermore, the Ministry of Interior also included courses on combating human trafficking.139 
Heard-Bey140 contends that a significant reason for the UAE’s underlining diffidence towards 
human rights issues has been due to the existence of an inherent social support system. These 
have traditionally been in the guise of strong extended families and the tribe. However, with 
the flux of economic migrants and corporations into the nation, the UAE is gearing itself for a 
new changing reality.  Heard-Bey argues that at present: 
There are almost no UAE nationals who are manual labourers in the UAE… 
however; a well-publicized initial draft for legislation to allow trade unions and 
labour associations is currently being discussed because the establishment of such 
organizations is mandated by the International Labour Organizations for 
countries that want to join the World Trade Organization141 
Some significant examples of this change have already translated into practice. The capturing 
of under-aged foreign children being used as camel jockeys in 2004 by a foreign documentary 
crew, brought immediate universal condemnation but also an instant response from the UAE 
leadership. The government sought to eradicate this practice and punished local and foreign 
agents involved in the exploitation of the children from disadvantaged Pakistani and Somali 
communities. Legislation was also created to prevent the illegal immigration of children 
through preventative measures prompting enhanced investigation of parents travelling into the 
UAE with their supposed children, especially from third world nations.142 
Furthermore, the UAE government adopted Act No. 15 of 2005, which prohibits the 
employment of persons under the age of 18 in camel racing; with the Ministry of the Interior 
establishing relevant committees to ensure the application of the Act. It also signed an 
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agreement with UNICEF on rehabilitating child jockeys in their communities and raising their 
living standards. A budget of US$30 million was allocated for this purpose in 2007 to 
compensate each child who had participated in camel racing. On 6th of June 2012, according 
to a 2013 national report submitted ‘in accordance with paragraph 5 of the annex to Human 
Rights Council resolution 16/21 paragraphs 23 and 24, the committee responsible for following 
up on compensation payments held its final meeting, marking the closure of the dossier on child 
jockeys in the UAE’143. 
Another major example includes the Ministry of Labour’s decision to levy heavy fines of ‘up 
to Dh 30,000 (£6,500) and refusal of new work permits for a period of up to one year’144 for 
any corporation that fails to protect its workers. This came as a response to the labourers’ 
demands of not having to work in direct sunlight during the hours of 1230- 1500.145 
 
2.6 Evaluating the Current Social, Political and Legislative Milieu 
 
The formation of UAE’s socio-political climate is a reflection of its tribal heritage, whilst its 
legislative and constitutional developments can be attributed to both its religious tradition and 
the direct influence of European colonialism. Although the UAE is governed by a codified civil 
law, its penal system is derived from the Sharia (Islamic law). It has also been demonstrated 
that the UAE federal government has a fully ratified permanent constitution and has established 
a parliamentary body, which is in theory and practice a representative body of the people. This 
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penultimate section of the chapter provides the personal analysis of the researcher on the 
identified factors which could support the establishment of the NHRI. 
The conclusions drawn from the review of literature suggest that the UAE ruling elite, in the 
form of formal feudal tribal chieftains and clans have created a political structure, which is a 
direct correlation of their historical custom and practice. This aspect of the historical form of 
tribal governance has it is argued, ensured the stability and consistency required to establish a 
new unifying structure and the emergence of the contemporary notion of a UAE society. This 
aspect of the socio-political provisions and the general consensus of the public is discussed and 
explored through the series of interviews with study participants in chapter four. Here it suffices 
to note that the public in the UAE perceive the role and place of the government to be 
encapsulated within a traditional understanding that it exists to protect them. 
This argument is however either ignored or marginalised by its complexity as the review of 
literature attempts to highlight the issue of governmental protection of its citizens at the expense 
of foreigners, without ever referring to this initiating factor. Conversely, this line of reasoning 
does not imply that the researcher perceives the criticism aimed at the UAE legislative and 
consultative functions to be similarly oblivious. The fact that the constitution was only 
officially made permanent in 1995 is symbolic of the attitude taken towards this aspect of 
governance. It is asserted that the form of governance, which entails codified secular rules and 
regulations and is derived from foreign inspiration, did not initially translate into a viable form 
of practice on the inception of the UAE state in 1971. However, with time the UAE rulers and 
society has started to become more assured of their own identity and legitimacy to their social 
and political roles. In theory, the permanence of the Constitution was a demonstration of the 
government’s will to codify and act upon the articles that were designed to protect society as a 
whole. The results of the practice are however, questionable, even contradictory as can be 
discerned after a brief examination of freedom of speech and equality issues. 
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The constitution of the UAE vouchsafes freedom of speech.  However, the UAE Federal Law 
No. 15 of 1980 for Printed Matter and Publications strictly regulates the majority of media 
outlets. The State actively censors all domestic and foreign publications prior to their 
distribution. Furthermore, there is zero tolerance for ‘criticism of the government, UAE rulers 
and ruling families, and friendly foreign governments’146; this is deemed a case of slander and 
denigration.  Any deemed violations of this law can lead to financial penalties or even prison 
sentences. Journalists also now face the threat of prosecution for their online content, through 
the cybercrime law of 2012. This new legislation criminalises using the Internet to violate or 
speak/write against political, social, and religious norms.  This is further supported by Article 
24, which appropriates a crime through the misuse of the computer network.  Article 28 of the 
law states that the publication or dissemination of information, news, or images deemed: 
       …liable to endanger security and its higher interests or infringe on the public order 
can be punished with imprisonment and a fine of up to 1 million dirhams 
($270,000). Under Article 29, deriding or harming the reputation, stature, or status 
of the state, any of its institutions, its president or vice president, the rulers of the 
emirates, their crown princes or their deputies, as well as a number of national 
symbols, is also punishable with imprisonment and a fine of the same amount. 
Article 41 allows the government to close websites related to the commission of 
these crimes147. 
 
Other prominent examples of this discrepancy between the constitutional rights and federal 
laws alongside governmental practice includes a three-year prison sentence to Osama al-Najjar 
for using social media (Twitter) to broadcast the abuse and violation of his father’s human 
rights. He was further convicted under the cybercrime law for ‘insulting the state, inciting 
hatred and violence, and being a member of the banned party Al-Islah’ as well as being fined 
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$136,000148. Another online activist Obaid Yousef al-Zaabi was arrested by the ‘security 
forces and charged under the cybercrime law with offending the Supreme Court, offending 
the state security apparatus, and instigating people against the rulers and the security of the 
state’149. Obaid had demonstrated his active frustration at the lack of free speech and justice 
with a US based cable news network. 
The antiterrorism law passed in 2014 has been described as being dangerous to human liberties 
as it seeks to prevent any form of dissent, protest or critical speech. The penalties proscribed 
for this act include, but are not limited to, a death sentence, life imprisonment, and fines in 
excess of 100 million dirhams150. Some findings from the Interviews conducted in chapter four 
reveal that any commentary deemed inappropriate is censored when articles or broadcast 
reports are prepared with regards to religion, politics or UAE allies. The reason for this is 
exemplified in the case of the Ugandan journalist, Yasin Kakande, who was working for the 
National newspaper. He was fired from his job in 2014 because he failed to gain prior 
permission for the publication of his book on self-censorship in the UAE. He was accused of 
defaming the organisation and the government.151  In his book, Kakande claims that public-
relations executives from the state ministries and corporations effectively shaped and 
influenced the media on behalf of the ruling elites. Furthermore, he claims that journalists tend 
to ignore the exploitation of foreign workers as it is an often censored subject and they fear the 
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repercussions from the security forces and so do not report on their activities.152 
Although it can be argued that these governmental federal laws have been, by design, 
established to undermine the constitution, the other argument presented suggests that the 
government is reacting to the contemporary security situations in the region. This implies that 
the guarantees provided by the Constitution are in reality not guarantees but possibilities and 
aspirations. This is still a young nation, which is seeking to act quickly and aggressively without 
always considering the impact its actions will have on the validity and credibility of the national 
constitution. However, it is argued that over a longer period of time, the national rulers 
alongside society will appreciate the normative worth and value of the Constitution and this 
will require further amendments and additions. 
For instance, Article 25 of the constitution calls for equality among Emirati citizens, 
‘…Without distinction between citizens of the Union in regard to race, nationality, religious 
belief, or social status...’153. However, rather strikingly, the constitution fails to recognise the 
issue of gender equality. It can be argued by analysing Articles 15 (family is basis of society) 
and 16 (protection of childhood and motherhood) that the fundamental aim of the constitution 
is to reinforce certain roles in society such as the traditional role of women in home making. 
Further examples of these contradictory practices include Article 26 of the constitution, which 
guarantees personal liberty to UAE citizens and which also forbids arbitrary searches, 
detention, torture and degrading inhumane treatment.  Additionally, Article 28 seeks to provide 
defendants the status of innocence until proven guilty. However, in practice, Federal Penal 
Code (No. 3 of 1987) is often applied in a discriminatory fashion against immigrant foreign 
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The point of this discussion is not to highlight every single case of discrepancy and violation 
of the constitution by the government itself; rather it is to identify the existence of this 
discrepancy. It is suggested that the flagrant abuses of human rights by the governmental 
agencies are conducted as a result of the traditional attitude towards outsiders, women and any 
factor deemed to be a threat to the overarching socio-political system. 
Although the UAE government has faced consistent criticism from such organisations as 
Amnesty International,155 it has attempted to address this issue with positive changes and strict 
enforcement. Some significant examples, all funded and created by the authorities, include the 
Administration of Human Rights Care at Dubai Police Department. Established on the 30th of 
September 1995, it aims to train policemen in human rights legislation and practice156. It aims 
to achieve excellence in five dimensions:157 Complaints; Humanitarian and Social Services; 
Social Solidarity; Research and Development; and Human Rights. The Dubai Foundation for 
Women and Children, the first licensed non-profit shelter in the UAE for women and children 
suffering from domestic violence, child abuse, and human trafficking opened in July 2007158. 
Currently, the Dubai Foundation for Women and Children operates only in Dubai and has 
focused mainly on cases from Dubai’s official agencies159. Other Emirates, namely Abu Dhabi, 
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Sharjah and Ras Al Khaimah have the EWA’A (meaning to shelter) for victims of Human 
Trafficking, which began their activities in 2008.160 On the International stage the UAE has 
demonstrated its commitment to championing and protecting Human Rights issues by 
becoming a signatory to and ratification of the International Convention on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Racial Discrimination (1974); the Convention on the Rights of the Child (1997); 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination 
against Women (2004)161; Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (2004); 
Convention against Transnational Organised Crime (2007); the Convention against Corruption 
(2006); the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and its Optional Protocol 
(2010)162. 
Furthermore, the UAE has signed nine International Labour Organisation conventions on the 
subjects of working hours, forced labour, labour inspections, night work for women, equal pay, 
the minimum age for employment and the worst forms of child labour. The UAE have ratified 
the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment and the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, especially 
women and children, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational 
Organized Crime. Recently, the UAE has signed on to the Optional Protocol of the Convention 
on the Rights of the Child regarding the sale of children, child prostitution and child 
pornography since 2016 and Federal Decree No. 08 of 2016, concerning the country's accession 
to the UN’s ‘Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the sale of 
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children, child prostitution and child pornography’163. 
In addition, the UAE has increased its involvement within specialised agencies such as The 
World Health Organisation (WHO); The International Labour Organisation (ILO); The Food 
and Agriculture Organisation (FAO); The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organisation (UNESCO) and The United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF)164 Moreover, the 
UAE has signed memorandums of understanding with over twenty-eight UN funds, while they 
have asked for consultancies in order to assist ministries, federal and local authorities to 
modernise.165 
In an earlier article, Heard-Bey166 had already begun to acknowledge the efforts of the UAE 
government. He argued that with time more local individuals would join these formal 
organisations, so as to share their common interests and discuss the reformation of their society 
and to influence the way the country is governed not just on a local but global stage. 
It is asserted that the UAE is moving towards a more open and pluralistic society with the 
creation of the Federal National Council, combined with the new election and voting processes. 
This, it is contended, presents us with the intentions and pathway the UAE government is 
attempting to forge. 
Human Rights norms through the far-reaching education of society, including its leaders, will 
ensure a period of reflection and conciliation, which will eventually 
foster the necessary conditions for the constitution to become the human rights document for 
the UAE. It is the researcher’s personal belief, that the establishment of the NHRI will help 
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UAE society as a whole appreciate the role of the constitution in guiding the destiny and image 




This chapter sought to examine the question What aspects of the existing social, political and 
legislative milieu facilitate the establishment of an NHRI in the UAE? The chapter served to 
demonstrate that the traditional political systems that were dedicated exclusively to serve native 
tribal interests in the UAE are transforming. 
It is recognised that the phenomenal socio-economic growth experienced by the UAE was 
initially attained and developed upon the discovery of substantial oil reserves within its 
jurisdictions, which has subsequently led to the mass influx of economic migrants, investors, 
entrepreneurs, and an increasing number of stakeholders to the UAE. This in turn has presented 
the UAE administration with unprecedented circumstances and challenges with regards to 
human rights issues and provisions. The once rural and native tribes of the region have managed 
despite their own internaltribal conflicts and resistance to the expanding British Empire, to 
establish a nation state, under a federal structure with a constitution that reflects its heritage. 
Although it can be argued that it has taken a long time for the initial draft Constitution to be 
ratified and became permanent in 1996, this represents both the rate of progression and the time 
it takes to undertake political change in that region. Therefore, it was inevitable that in forming 
and organising the UAE nation state, the emirate rulers maintained their hereditary tribal and 
patrimonial structure. They have always belonged to localised tribes with undefined physical 
borders and territories, which naturally infers that there existed significant differences in 
family, tribal status and wealth distribution. This also implies that the privileges enjoyed by the 
UAE citizens are not available to non-citizens. Hence, the UAE has been severely criticised 
and chastised for its seemingly poor human rights record and practice by global organisations 
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such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch. They claim that the UAE utilises its 
penal code to criminalise speech based on broad content restrictions and is in violation of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The joint report submitted to the UN Universal 
Periodic Review167 by nine stakeholders requested the UAE to respect the international human 
rights laws governing Non-Governmental Organisations and called upon the UAE to amend 
the 2008 Law on Associations, including its Article 16 to ensure that Non-Governmental 
Organisations can function free from State interference. Other international governmental 
observers such as the United States Department of State on Human Rights claims that UAE’s 
judiciary and court system constitutes a substantial obstacle in the reform process. However, 
without seeking to deflect the criticism aimed at the UAE it can also be argued that the 
introduction of social and legislative infrastructure to safeguard the rights of all UAE citizens 
and immigrants has begun to address issues of inclusivity such as labour laws, rights of migrant 
workers, citizenship and democratic processes. The steps taken to hold the first inaugural 
election of the Federal National Council members in December 2006 broadly represented a 
movement towards the political liberalisation of the federal structure. Although the UAE 
government was heavily criticised for its selection of candidates and their remits, it was the 
President of the UAE who introduced the adoption of amendments, which included increasing 
the powers of the Federal National Council, establishing a fixed duration for the Council’s 
members from two to four years and an increase in the duration of the annual sessions to more 
than seven months. This demonstrated the Government’s commitment to not only introducing 
the election process but to provide Emirati citizens with the opportunity to engage with the 
decision-making vehicle of government. Furthermore, this also allowed the UAE to establish 
an election-based, democratic culture for the first time, ahead of its more established regional 
neighbours. A close examination of the reforms instituted by the UAE government 
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demonstrates that it has relied on both an informal and formal political process for actively 
instituting changes in the UAE. The informal method entails the original tribal tradition of 
consultation, which inherently considers human rights to be a factor in all decisions, thus 
effectively defining the style of politics in the UAE. The council of elders collectively referred 
to as the Majlis, which in the contemporary national socio-political context entails the granting 
of an audience to the public by the rulers of the State. This means that petitioners to the 
President, Crown Prince, Prime Minister or other members of the ruling dynasty are able to 
present their concerns and issues directly and often receive instant responses or mandated 
actions. This practice has traditionally facilitated an open dialogue between the rulers and their 
subjects and raised the awareness of the rulers to the socio-economic situation and reality of 
their followers. It is however recognised that this process is not open to the non-citizens in the 
UAE and thus they are openly discriminated against in this process. However, as argued this is 
an indigenous practice intended for those who are deemed to be part of the internal dialogue 
and process of the region. Therefore, it will take time and political changes to take place before 
non-citizens are afforded the space and opportunity to directly petition the leaders of the State. 
The formal methods of the political process that are being developed to address and safeguard 
the provisions for human right are being built upon the UAE Constitution. This inherently 
contains the measures to guarantee the freedoms and rights to all citizens. Moreover, the UAE 
social policy makers have now begun the process of incorporating laws and fundamental human 
rights principles included in the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights into their Constitution. The UAE have also agreed to fundamental 
international human right treaties, thereby helping to promote human rights principles as 
demanded by the international community. 
However, it must be acknowledged that this intention to safeguard human rights is not a new 
initiative for the UAE as the establishment of Emirates Human Rights Association under the 
Federal Public Interest Associations Act No.6 from 1974, had already declared its role to be 
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primarily concerned with raising the awareness of human rights issues in accordance to the 
Federal Constitution and international obligations. This now includes changes in the education 
system to reform the cultural tribal mind set by introducing topics on human rights and societal 
awareness modules in primary (Grades 1-12) and tertiary (University) stages. 
Consequently, the commitment to preserving and protecting human rights norms is reflected 
by the UAE government efforts in establishing its own NHRI. It has begun to review the 
provisions afforded to the Federal National Council by debating upon the issues of international 
treaties, conventions, series of memoranda of understanding with major labour-exporting 
countries to protect workers from exploitation, wage protection system and laws to protect 
domestic workers and the developing role of women. 
The government of the UAE cannot be absolved for its negligence and violations of human 
rights abuses.  However, it is a young state, in transition and on the path towards addressing its 
shortcomings at the pace that is viable for its society, the socio-political context of the 
environment alongside the development of the expertise required to make this a permanent and 
inherent part of UAE’s culture and society. 
The next chapter will seek to understand the theoretical purpose of NHRIs in accordance to the 




The Theoretical Purpose of NHRIs in Accordance to the Paris 
Principles 
and their Place in the Arabian Gulf Region 
 
The conception of the NHRI as a government initiative in accordance to the Paris Principles, 
has become synonymous with internationally mandated requirements to promote and protect 
human rights. They are expected to function by adhering to expected principles. However, the 
jurisdiction and investigatory powers afforded to the NHRIs in conducting their investigations 
has been questioned. Critics suggest that the broad nature of the Paris Principles implies that 
an NHRI’s role is to educate a very broad segment of civil society and to demonstrate human 
rights norms into their practice rather than simply replicating the role of the national judiciary. 
One can argue that for the appropriate decipherment and implementation of the Paris Principles 
there is a prerequisite for a democratic set of processes within a liberal orientated society. In 
focusing on the context of the non-democratic Arab world, the role of the NHRIs are almost 
unattainable as authoritarian leaders utilise the formation of NHRIs to enhance their personal 
international human rights credibility whilst suppressing any opposition to their rule under the 
guise of national security. This chapter seeks to address one of the core questions identified in 
the introductory chapter: What is the theoretical purpose of NHRIs in accordance to the Paris 
Principles and their place in the Arabian Gulf Region? 
 
3.1 The Purpose, Objectives and Role of NHRIs 
 
The concept of the National Human Rights Institute (NHRI) as conceived and defined by the 
United Nations (UN) is a ‘body which is established by a government under the constitution or 
by law or decree, the functions of which are specifically defined in terms of the promotion and 
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protection of human rights’168.  The UN states that ‘national human rights institutions, at least 
those that are in compliance with the Paris Principles, are the cornerstone of national human 
rights protection systems and, increasingly, serve as relay mechanisms between international 
human rights norms and the State’169. 
Corkery170 notes that the argument for the establishment of NHRIs stems from the notion that 
domestic courts and parliaments are limited in their abilities to focus upon specific cases due 
to constraints on resources and the prevailing social norms. Dam171 argues the underlining 
purpose of the NHRIs is to provide sincere advice and guidance to governmental bodies on the 
compliance with legislation on international human rights policies and their implementation. 
He advocates that NHRIs should: 
Resolve human rights complaints brought by citizens; Make policy 
recommendations to government; Promote national laws and practices that 
conform to international standards; Conduct inquiries into significant 
allegations of abuse and violations of rights by the state’s authorities; finally, 
Promote and educating norms and values of human rights in the society as a 
whole.172 
Moreover, NHRIs can also suggest: 
…amendments to the existing legislation or initiate new draft legislation, prepare 
reports on the national situation with regards to human rights, draw the attention 
of the government to situations in any part of the country where human rights 
are being violated and make proposals to put an end to such situations173 
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Smith suggests that NHRIs are, in theory, statutory bodies, established as an act of parliament, 
the constitution, or by ‘decree with specific powers and a mandate to promote and protect 
human rights’174. Whilst De Beco, notes that the primary function of NHRIs is to oversee the 
establishment of institutions that promote and protect human rights by ‘narrowing the gap 
between international human rights treaty norms and their application in practice’175.  
Remarkably, NHRIs have visibly attained a measure of success within nation states who have 
‘yet to ratify major international treaties or conventions and have subsequently failed to meet 
the international human rights obligations they have adopted’176. In accordance to the Paris 
Principles, NHRIs can facilitate ratification, or accession to these obligations by ensuring their 
implementation at the national level.177 
The Paris Principles seek to establish the ‘responsibilities and working methods of NHRIs and 
stress the importance of these institutions being pluralistic and independent’178. Their typical 
functions entail: 
Resolving human rights complaints lodged by citizens, making policy 
recommendations to government, promoting national laws and practices that 
conform to international standard, conducting inquiries into significant 
allegations of abuses, and promoting human rights in the community.179 
While the Paris Principles lay down a number of responsibilities to be fulfilled by an NHRI,180 
these are not exhaustive. The founding state is free to entrust the institution with additional 
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tasks that augment the promotion and protection of human rights. An NHRI’s responsibilities 
must include: 
Reporting to the Government on Human Rights Issues; Promoting and 
Ensuring Harmonisation of National Law with the International Human 
Rights Treaties to which the State is Party; Encouraging Ratification of 
International Human Rights Instruments; Contributing to Reports to Treaty 
Bodies; To Express an Opinion on the Subject (whilst maintaining an 
impartial stance); Cooperating with International, Regional and Other 
National Human Rights Institutions; Assisting in Human Rights Education; 
and lastly, Publicise the concept of Human Rights and under take the effort 
to Combat All Forms of Discrimination181. 
In accordance with the Paris Principles, NHRIs are expected to be primarily responsible for the 
protection and promotion of human rights. This responsibility may encompass the seeking of 
amicable settlements, recommendation, addressing and referring complaints to the competent 
authorities, investigation of abuses, visiting field and prisons (detention facilities) and to 
provide the appropriate legal advice and support as required.182 The Paris Principles stipulates 
that NHRIs define their objectives,183 which shall ‘freely consider any questions falling within 
its competence, whether they are submitted by the Government or taken by it without referral 
to a higher authority, on the proposal of its members or of any petitioner’184. 
In line with the defining purpose and role of the NHRIs in investigating human rights 
violations, Amnesty International recommends that NHRIs should be equipped with definitive 
powers to investigate and establish the parameters for their work in relation to the severity of 
the violations.185 Amnesty International further argues that it is incumbent upon NHRIs to 
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identify systematic patterns and root causes of consistent human rights violations. They should 
be able to identify patterns with past cases, expose failures of existing institutions and the 
judiciary whilst always seeking to uphold and assess human rights. In addition, they should 
identify specific reforms within the legal and institutional system to address the deemed and 
observed violations.186 
3.2 Functionality of NHRIs 
 
As independent entities established by Governments to monitor their practices, NHRIs are 
uniquely envisioned to bridge civil society with its Governmental apparatus. They effectively 
act as the conduit through which dialogue and action can be facilitated. The Paris Principles, 
as adopted and agreed to by GANHRI members, identify several factors perceived to be crucial 
in the functionality and credibility of an NHRI187  namely Independence, Accountability, 
Funding, Appointment of members, Pluralism of Composition and Accessibility. 
3.2.1 Independence 
 
‘A commission without strong and independent commissioners is voiceless and powerless’188. 
The establishment of the NHRI should entail the explicit understanding that there is a binding 
legal basis for the government to refrain from interfering in the mandates, function, 
composition and competence of the NHRI.189 This implies, as per the advice by the Paris 
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Principles, that government officials should not be members of the advisory or supervisory 
boards of NHRIs. 
Any members deemed to be in breach of this condition could face a suspension of their voting 
rights. Murray, in reflecting upon this discussion, states that: 
The notion of independence is a difficult one to define. Dictionary definitions 
suggest ‘freedom from the influence or control of others, namely not depending 
on another for financial support. While the Paris Principles capture certain 
elements of this, they do not reflect the subtleties of the relationship that an 
NHRI should have with government190 
For these reasons, Amnesty International has suggested that the preferred method of NHRI 
establishment should be through legislative and constitutional amendment as the issuing of 
presidential decrees or special executive decisions are usually short-term measures utilised to 
satiate a particular segment of society or International obligation.191 
While many national institutions work under the executive branch of government, the NHRIs 
are theoretically independent of the direct authority of the executive, legislature or judiciary.192 
Spencer notes that although the NHRIs are accountable to the legislature, ‘It is of paramount 
importance to these bodies that they operate as freely as possible from government control’193. 
Similarly, Burdekin and Naum argue that NHRIs that are not independent of governmental 
influence cannot be a credible human rights actor, protector and promoter.194 In support, 
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Renshaw notes that NHRIs cannot turn into a robust critic of government action, policy and 
legislation unless they are free from governmental influence.195 
However, it must also be recognised that the NHRIs are inherently susceptible to executive 
influence, as they are, by definition, designed to operate in complete independence of the very 
governments that implement them. Murray contends that ‘…This requires not only that the 
NHRI maintain its independence and not be subject to government pressure but, conversely, 
work closely enough with government that it is able to influence and by whom it will be taken 
seriously’196. 
In practice, the official mandate and formal powers afforded to the NHRIs is through the State 
authorities. This presents the NHRIs with an opportunity to engage with all tiers of government 
and form strong functional and institutional relationships with their respective governments. 
De Beco discusses the initiatives of NHRIs in periodically inviting government officials to 
working group meetings with reciprocal arrangements from the government.197 He argues that 
‘in order for NHRIs to act as platforms where both state and civil society actors can interact, it 
is essential that they become rapidly acquainted with the government’s preoccupations, 
initiatives and difficulties regarding the promotion and protection of human rights’198. 
Furthermore, NHRIs are not only liable to be influenced by governments but external non-
governmental actors. Although the NHRIs are neither a governmental authority nor a non-
governmental organisation, they occupy a unique central space between government and non-
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governmental organisations199. However, as Smith notes: 
                …this same idiosyncrasy creates difficulties... NHRIs have to grapple with the 
uncomfortable dilemma of how to be independent from both government and 
Non-Governmental Organisations, while at the same time establishing 
working relationships with both actors200. 
Carver perceives the inter-relationship between these institutions and independent human rights 
groups to be mutually suspicious, especially on matters relating to civil rights, political reform, 
and constitutional amendment.201 Although both the NHRIs and Non-Governmental 
Organisations are primarily focused on the redress of human rights and fundamental freedoms, 
there exists a vast difference between their functionality and purpose.202 
‘NHRIs are established by an act of the government through constitutional amendment and as 
a result have an official mandate, and a formal relationship with the State (the executive branch 
in particular)’203. The converse impact of this association with the government is that NHRIs 
are perceived to be instruments and agents of the governments by Non-Governmental 
Organisations and civil society, thus damaging their credibility.204 Collingsworth believes that 
‘there is no doubt that the greater the independence and functional autonomy of the NHRI, the 
better their performance regarding human rights protection’205. 
In contrast, Non-Governmental Organisations or civil society organisations are not officially 
related to government or State agencies. They are independent and able to administer their own 
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works schedule, create policies and roles whilst having no formal relationship or accountability 
with state authorities. This includes being financially more independent, all of which guarantee 
them total independence. 
Notably, critics of NHRIs, such as Renshaw et al, contend that the independence of State 
affiliated institutions is questionable;206 they argue that NHRIs have become indicia of a 
progressive democratic liberal state. ‘If in the 1950s, the status symbol of a developing country 
was a steel mill, by the late 1990s it had turned into a human rights commission’207. NHRIs 
have begun to assume the role of providing legitimate evaluation of State compliance with 
human rights obligations and subsequently setting the precedence to replace civil society 
critiques. This will naturally lead to the establishment and practice of NHRIs without the 
necessary relationships, mutuality and input from civil society organisations.208 
De Beco observes that NHRIs are dependent on civil society institutions such as Non-
Governmental Organisations to gain the necessary knowledge, expertise and trust in the human 
rights arena.209 The 2006 Asian Forum for Human Rights and Development, consisting of an 
alliance numbering forty-eight Asian Pacific, Non-Governmental Organisations met for a 
Regional Consultation on Cooperation between NHRIs and Non-Governmental Organisations, 
where they concluded that strong, fair and sincere collaboration and cooperation will lead to 
more result oriented NHRIs. 
It is put forth that by virtue of their constitutional statutes and powers, NHRIs are in a position 
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to oblige the government to consider their recommendations and proposals, unlike the Non-
Governmental Organisations. As a consequence, Non-Governmental Organisation demands 
‘channelled through the NHRI may have more impact on the government than would be the 
case if they were channelled through the media or through unofficial means’210. Murray asserts 
that ‘…While the educational and promotional role of NHRIs causes less controversy for Non-
Governmental Organisations focused on human rights education; governments are not potential 
opponents, but necessary partners’211. NHRIs give civil organisations an institutionalised and 
in some cases direct channel of communication by which they can directly approach 
governmental bodies or even higher international authorities. De Beco suggests that the NHRI 
can become a common, impartial, independent platform to serve a common interest in 
protecting human rights by allowing these ‘…organisations to become cognisant of the 
government’s position regarding their human rights concerns… NHRIs that facilitate such a 




A central focus in the literature is the tension between independence and accountability.213 
Smith observes that there have to be mechanisms to appoint those in charge and call them to 
account without interfering with their operational independence. He notes that there exists an 
ambiguity as to whether the NHRI or the government is accountable for the actions of the 
NHRI.214 
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Although the notion of accountability is broad, Schedler et al., stipulate that it must be 
acknowledged that ‘the attractiveness of the concept of accountability derives from its 
breadth…It implies subjecting a power to the threat of sanctions; obliging it to be exercised in 
transparent ways; and forcing it to justify its acts’215. 
Pegram construes this to be the process of horizontal accountability, whereby the ‘State 
agencies are legally enabled, empowered, willing and able to take actions…in relation to 
actions or omissions by other agents or agencies of the state that may, presumably, be qualified 
as unlawful’216. Schedler et al., add that ‘while accountability forces power to enter into a 
dialogue, the notion of responsibility permits it to remain silent’217. The idea of accountability 
introduces a dialogue between citizen and public official into the democratic discourse. 
Lindsnœs and Lindholt propose that NHRIs should ‘be responsive to the expressed needs of 
the public’218 and should be held accountable for their practices by independent civil society 
institutions or dedicated parliamentary bodies. De Beco suggests that an inherent part of the 
legislature should entail the representatives of NHRIs to determine their perspectives on human 
rights issues as identified by proposed legislation. Further still, the NHRIs should have full 
access to the government perspective on their recommendations, proposals and have the 
jurisdiction to directly address parliament.219 The International Council on Human Rights 
recommends that ‘that all the findings and recommendations of the institution are publicly 
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available, whether through the annual report or some other mechanism’220. ‘The institution 
should aim to publicise their exemplary recommendations’221 via the media as well as other 
means of communication. As Murray argues, ‘thus accountability can be ensured through 
reporting to the legislature and many institutions are required to submit annual reports to the 
parliament. This should be an opportunity to engage in-depth with Parliament’222. 
Consequently, NHRIs become accountable to Parliament and the Public and not to 
governments or their agencies.223 Smith contends that NHRIs have both upward and downward 
accountabilities. NHRI are downwardly accountable to their staff, beneficiaries, and civil 
societies and are upwardly accountable to the Parliament.224 Smith maintains that being 
accountable to elected representatives may increase the autonomy and legitimacy of the 
institution through both public and governmental perception.225 Murray notes that a significant 
problem has been that ‘in the past many members of Parliament were not aware, interested or 
understood what it did’226. 
Using the Polish Commissioner for Civil Rights as an example, they are directly accountable 
to the legislative body. The Commission must submit its achievements, progress and reports 
on a yearly basis to the legislative body. The Commission is directly answerable and 
accountable to the people since the legislative body is the supreme representative body of the 
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people.227 However, in accordance to the Paris Principles, the NHRI’s only accountability is 
with regards to the process of appointments, financial accounts and reports. 
3.2.3 Funding 
 
Financial self-sustainability is a core recommendation of the Paris Principles.228 An NHRI’s 
independence is subject to budgetary non-interference from any of the government branches. 
The UN has emphasised this principle in a number of reports, which ‘states that a national 
institution shall have an infrastructure which is suited to the smooth conduct of its activities, in 
particular adequate funding’229. 
However, a continuing paradoxical conundrum presents itself again, in that NHRIs are 
recipients of public funding and thus cannot be considered truly independent. 
Aichele observes that studies from across the world demonstrate instances when some 
governments have influenced the NHRI strategy to adjust the NHRI’s budget accordingly.230 
In the case of Nepal for example, the government allocation of funds to the National Human 
Rights Commission was ‘extremely small’231 and insufficient to run the office and pay for the 
salaries of the executives and their staff members. Amnesty International reports that: 
           …restrictions in NHRI budgets are used as a punitive measure to control an 
NHRI which is deemed to be too critical of government. Amnesty has 
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received reports of many examples where once set up, NHRIs are 
underfunded to the extent that they cannot function effectively leading to 
reasonable doubts about how serious the government was in the first place 
about improving the implementation human rights through the NHRI232. 
A government’s failure to provide sufficient financial support for an NHRI impedes the NHRI’s 
operations; this, Burdekin and Naum believe shows the ‘…significance of funding cuts also 
lies in the message being sent by government to an institution: that power to define the NHRI’s 
works rests with the government and that they will use this power to restrict an NHRI’s 
autonomy’233. This practice is contrary to the requirement of the Paris Principles for 
governments to provide the provisions through which the NHRIs are adequately funded and 
conversely independent from governmental influence.234 
Aichele argues ‘that to ensure the financial independence of the NHRI, two aspects need to be 
considered’235. The first is the need to find ways of funding that secure the institution’s 
existence and its long-term operation independent from political or economic fluctuations. 
Much discussion has been made to include the institution’s funding as a separate item on the 
annual budget legislation. Furthermore, NHRI spokespeople are granted the right to 
consultation prior to any final decision being made on the annual funding in the legislature.236 
This provides the NHRI with the opportunity to determine their objectives and as Carver, and 
Korotaev state ‘…Public funds should be provided through a mechanism that does not fall 
directly under governmental control, such as a vote in Parliament’237. Specifically, provision 
for the NHRI within a public budget should specify the allocated amount. NHRIs should be 
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‘entitled to determine their own spending within the allocated budget but financial probity 
should be ensured by regular public financial reporting and a regular (e.g., annual) independent 
audit’238. 
Furthermore, it is argued that, with regards to establishing parameters to secure effective and 
alternative routes to receive funding, the mandate should include specific powers and establish 
process. The onus is on GANHRI to develop guidelines for fundraising that ensure that the 
independence and impartiality of NHRI is not compromised through the receiving of donations 
from private donors or international agencies. 
3.2.4 Appointment of Members 
 
The Paris Principles advocate that an appointment process for NHRI members must be 
pluralistic, democratic and representative of the broad spectrum of society. However, they are 
extremely vague in their guidance on the actual recruitment process, other than to suggest the 
complete exclusion of governmental representation. This ensures that representatives of the 
executive branch do not gain any voting rights to influence the NHRIs, which naturally implies 
that the designation of NHRI members to the executive body is also discouraged. 
An Amnesty International report on ‘Recommendations on NHR Institutions’239  recommends 
that the ‘selection, appointment, and removal procedures of the members of the NHRI should 
not be handled by the executive branch of government’240. 
Furthermore, as noted by Linos and Pegram, the Principles do not explicitly specify fixed terms 
for NHRI commissioners and even the possibility of reappointment is referred to as an optional 
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feature.241 Carver and Korotaev argue that: 
…the members of the NHRI should have clearly defined terms of office in 
legislation (even if they are indefinite, as for judges, or renewable) and the 
terms should not be too short. Longer non-renewable terms are a better 
guarantee of independence than renewable shorter terms. Five years is a 
reasonable period within which members can be effective but not too 
influenced by concerns about future job prospects and Members should not 
fear dismissal (or non-reappointment) if they displease powerful interests242. 
For that reason, an independent, democratic appointment process is more likely to ensure the 
right calibre of leaders, which can maintain the independence of the institution. Furthermore, 
the processes of appointing the commissioner must be competitive, transparent,  giving 
increased public confidence in the outcome243. 
 Furthermore, emphasis should be given to the social legitimacy of the NHRI management. As 
such, the executive members should be elected or appointed in a transparent process that 
guarantees the representation of all groups in society, which is concerned with the ‘promotion 
and protection of human rights’244.  The Paris Principles, do not however, identify a criterion 
for the internal structure of a NHRI, which leaves the founding state with a wide range of 
possibilities. 
In Nepal, for instance, the NHRI composition constitutes a chairperson and four other 
members, all appointees are full time so to avoid any conflict of interest and are appointed by 
the Prime Minister should the Constitutional Council recommend action.245 The Secretary of 
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the Human Rights Commission of Nepal is the focal point for the administration as their 
appointment is made by the Prime Minister with the recommendation of the National 
Commission. The Commission has the power to ‘appoint employees as may be required to 
carry out its functions’246. Should the Commission requests assistance from ‘any government 
office in the performance of its functions, the office must comply’247 and that request for 
support needs to be backed by reports which demonstrate that this institution is politically 
influenced, underfunded, under-staffed and works to carry out the agenda of the government.248 
Just as the Paris Principles emphasise independence from the executive branch for the 
NHRIs,249 they also recommend the independence of the procedure for constituting the 
membership of the NHRI.250 
3.2.4.1 Membership and Staffing 
 
Like the judiciary, the members of a NHRI should be immune from criminal or 
civil legal action for all tasks undertaken by them in the proper exercise of their 
official functions. However, decisions made by them in their official capacity 
should still be subject to judicial review by the courts251. 
A functioning and efficient secretariat must exist within the NHRI in order that tasks entrusted 
to members are carried out. 
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Criteria should be clearly established, preferably by law, in advance of 
appointment. They must be objectively verifiable criteria against which the actual 
appointment can be assessed. A potential danger of membership criteria is that 
they may be chosen in order to exclude specific individuals or groups. This is a 
further reason to ensure that appointment criteria are made public and subject to 
discussion by all stakeholders, in particular civil society organisations, before 
adoption252. 
However, experience demonstrates that there are many actions and omissions that can be taken 
by governments to curtail the autonomy of the NHRI. For instance, if a government wishes to 
curtail the influence of an NHRI, it need not necessarily take politically difficult steps to do so, 
there are other methods that can be used, such as appointment of staff and commissioners who 
are closely affiliated to politicians, political parties and most importantly those individuals 
‘who are believed to be sympathetic to government positions on human rights’253. Integrity and 
autonomy can best be maintained only through a democratic and transparent process of 
appointment and composition of an NHRI.254 
One of the defects of the human rights ombudsman model is that candidates for the post of 
human rights ombudsman are generally nominated by either the Executive, the President of the 
republic, or by a group of Parliamentarians. In some countries, such as Georgia and Lithuania, 
Non-Governmental Organisations are able to informally recommend their preferred candidates 
to a group of parliamentarians or to comment on those already nominated.255 The group is 
usually headed by a single decision-making member, which distorts the requirement for 
pluralism as one member from a dominant group may diminish the NHRI’s credibility amongst 
other segments of society. Any NHRI, in general, is dependent on the quality and independence 
of their leadership in order to produce effective results. Should a single member be accountable 
for leadership within an ombudsman-type human rights institution, they are vulnerable to 
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outside pressures and criticism of the inconsistencies in their performance. Independence 
should not be a mere formal fiction but should be based on the local legal model.256 In a 
presidential republic, the election of the human rights ombudsman by Parliament is not ideal 
and may lead to the human rights ombudsman being a media person who does not have the 
tools to really implement his recommendations. In addition, the argument put forward by 
Abedin in the case of Trinidad and Tobago, was that a ‘multi-racial society needs a multi-racial 
institution’257. Thus, concerns were raised about the ‘capacity of the Ombudsman to decide 
impartially if he should happen to belong to the same racial group as the complainant’258. The 
idea for the establishment of a ‘plural (i.e. a commission of three or more persons)’259 human 
rights ombudsman system was also considered. The support of a plural system, in this instance, 
was inseparable from the issues of race and ethnicity; therefore, the outcome of this 
consideration was the acceptance of a rotating ‘office between an Afro-Trinidadian and an 
Indo-Trinidadian ombudsman’260. 
This example demonstrates that a broad representation of society is vital to gain and maintain 
social credibility and trust. The Paris Principles emphasise the importance of pluralistic 
representation and call for engagement with non-governmental organisations and the private 
sector that work ‘on human rights issues, such as associations of lawyers, doctors, journalists 
and eminent scientists’261, therefore, allowing representatives of civil society to nominate 
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potential applicants for NHRI membership and involving them in the selection and appointment 
process. 
3.2.4.2 Pluralism of Composition 
 
Human rights commissions are usually either composed of leading tech experts, which, at 
present, is often demonstrative of equality and anti-discrimination, or in accordance to the Paris 
Principles, the composite NHRI structure, should be constituted by a pluralist representation of 
society. This also implies pluralistic thought in the design, outreach, implementation and 
conduct of its programming.262 Aichele argues that the institutional staff and executives should 
reflect the cultural and social diversity of their particular societies. They should be 
representative of the different ideological and political standpoints, ethnic and social minorities, 
and professions and academic disciplines. Staff pluralism enhances the expertise of the 
institution, facilitates the access of socially disadvantaged groups, and strengthens people’s 
trust in its impartiality263. 
NHRIs should be multi-member bodies that can place people from divergent professional and 
social backgrounds on a single platform. As NHRIs are often more resourced than Non-
Governmental Organisations they have the opportunity to undertake a pluralistic representation 
of their society.264 Carver and Korotaev, suggest that diversity can be attained through 
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considered allocation of seats on the governing board and staff. They warn against ‘large and 
unwieldy memberships as they often paralyse decision-making and note that even multi-
member institutions tend to be more effective when they have a small number of members’265. 
They recommend that ‘members and staff of NHRIs should always be selected on expertise 
and abilities’266. The Amnesty International Report Recommendations on NHR Institutions 
(2011) observes that ‘for the effective promotion and protection of human rights, NHRIs 
require experienced, trained and skilled staff that are coordinated by independent thinkers and 
leaders of the institution’267. Carver and Korotaev maintain that an effective NHRI is run and 
managed by staff and members that are professional and have a depth of human rights expertise. 
At the same time, ‘induction and training for both will be necessary, in particular to ensure that 
members and staff are equipped to deal with issues that are sensitive, outside their experience, 
or clash with their personal beliefs’268. 
From the above, it could be argued that the NHRI member composition and selection criterion 
is a major factor in determining its independence and functionality. The appointment of 
members should take into account the geographical diversity of the state as well as the system 
of government. Some NHRIs have difficulties in addressing human rights violations across 
federal states. For this reason, ‘in some federal countries, NHRIs have been established with 
mandates that only permit them to consider cases where federal personnel commit human rights 
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violations, or where human rights violations take place during the enforcement of federal 
law’269. 
However, an NHRI can only be considered national if it has authority over the entire national 
territory of the founding state.270. Amnesty International summarises this point by noting that: 
         Any legislation in federal systems setting up an NHRI is made explicitly 
applicable to all parts of the federal system so that there are no de facto gaps in 
jurisdiction. Any NHRI should be able to examine all human rights violations, 
as defined by international human rights law, throughout the country’s territory 




The International Council on Human Rights observes that the very nature of human rights 
violations in most cases involves the most vulnerable members of society (e.g. prisoners).  Due 
to the constrained availability of resources most NHRIs cannot establish a national or even 
regional presence in their respective nations let alone ‘acquire powers to make themselves 
accessible to those in custody’272. Murray argues 
that ‘it is important, therefore, that more attention should be paid in evaluating NHRIs to the 
extent in which they pay attention to the most vulnerable’273. 
A significant challenge presented to the NHRI is one of accessibility to individuals at 
significant risk of human rights violations. In nations with federal political structures it is usual 
for the judiciary to establish state commissions to work alongside the federal organisation 
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without diluting the power and difference of jurisdiction between state and federal structures. 
This is the case, for example, in ‘Mexico, which has a federal/state division both in political 
and in the human rights institutional structure’274. Unfortunately, Amnesty International 
reports that: 
NHRI offices are located near military installations or police stations. In such 
cases, potential complainants may fear being noticed or monitored by the 
security forces if they bring their complaints. Amnesty International has 
received other reports of offices being intimidatingly smart or located in very 
up-market areas, so that the poor and other disadvantaged groups feel too 
uncomfortable and conspicuous to be seen going there. Other reports indicate 
that some offices are located in inaccessible areas where it is difficult for 
complainants to visit275. 
In South Africa, the Human Rights Commission has made strides in making ‘itself accessible 
to vulnerable segments of society by opening offices in the regional provinces’276. As Murray 
observes ‘…Having regional offices may of course be an expensive option, but it would appear 
to increase the institution's profile and accessibility across all areas of the jurisdiction, 
particularly if they are located in rural areas that may not be served by other institutions’277. 
Murray further adds that: 
        The institution itself must operate in a manner that is fair, open and transparent. 
Other factors include the extent to which a NHRI hold regular and open 
meetings with organizations and public and ensure that the minutes of its 
internal meetings are available in detail to the public. The use of a website and 
the availability of email can also help278. 
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3.3 Jurisdiction of the NHRI 
 
In terms of the jurisdiction and investigatory powers afforded to NHRIs, the Paris Principles 
are equivocal as to whether an NHRI should have the power to participate in court 
proceedings.279 Amnesty International advocates that, even if they are not officially mandated 
with this type of privilege, the NHRI is encouraged to have authority to call witnesses to appear 
before their monitors and subpoena evidence with a consequence of sanctions for refusal to 
comply. In addition, Amnesty International recommends that ‘State officials should be legally 
obliged to cooperate with the NHRI’s investigations’280. A NHRI should have the power ‘to 
compel the attendance of witnesses and the disclosure and production of documents and any 
other evidence’281. Sanctions are useful to have in place as a repercussion to any refusal or 
interference in these situations; yet, it is imperative that NHRIs make their own judgement on 
any case that is brought to their attention.282 Moreover, NHRIs should be capable of bringing 
superior officers to justice in case they observe any violation. 
Even further, if the NHRI observes ‘short-comings in the law, whereby it is not possible to hold 
such officers accountable, the NHRI should make recommendations for appropriate legal 
reforms’283. 
For example, the Indian National Human Rights Commission has the quasi-judicial power and 
mandate to confer powers to civil court and it is also ‘empowered to grant compensation and 
may direct disciplinary action against public servants responsible for violation of human 
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rights’.284 In Sri Lanka, the mandate of the Commission is structured in broad terms.  It provides 
for complaint-based jurisdiction (power to dispose complaints regarding alleged violations of 
human rights) caused by executive and administrative action and review of legal procedures to 
ensure compliance with the constitutional guarantees of fundamental rights. 
Furthermore, it guides the government in formulating legislation and administrative procedures 
for the protection of fundamental rights. It also ensures that existing international human rights 
treaties and norms guide the legislation around human rights.285 
The International Council on Human Rights observes that: 
       There seems to be a fundamental divide between those institutions that investigate 
complaints and those that do not. It is in their handling of complaints that national 
human rights institutions stand or fall in terms of public legitimacy. However 
valuable their other work may be education, training, scrutiny of laws, study of 
international instruments the public judges them in terms of their willingness to 
tackle violations of human rights. They may do so by resolving individual 
complaints or by publicly exposing and challenging wrongdoing by the government 
or other powerful institutions.286 
However, it is interesting to observe that the Paris Principles perceive the complaints procedure 
to be optional, alongside the possibility of NHRIs issuing binding decisions and their 
subsequent frequency or content.287 It is suggested by the articles of the Principles that NHRIs 
may ‘seek to settle disputes through consultation or mediation between the individual and the 
governmental body; to inform the alleged victim(s) of their rights; and of the hearing of their 
complaints, or alternatively to transmit them to another competent authority’288. El Fegiery 
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argues that an NHRI without a clear investigative mandate to pursue complaints requires the 
assistance of an official authority to gather the necessary information. ‘Authorities against 
whom complaints are made should be required to make an initial response within a certain time 
period’289. 
An alternative perspective argues that the reasons the Paris Principles do not compel NHRIs to 
possess formal powers of investigation and adjudication is that they would become specialised 
human rights courts, and would lose their distinctiveness. They would abandon or seriously 
compromise their promotional, educational, advisory, and investigative roles. Yet the 
performance of these non-court-like roles are, in most places, arguably more critical to the long-
term success of the human rights struggle than schemes for ex post facto enforcement that are 
based on complaints-oriented mechanisms.290 
Okafor and Agbakwa argue that: 
National Human Rights Commissions have certain additional features, and granted 
that courts already serve the function of hearing complaints and ordering 
enforcement, the additional features that National Human Rights Commissions 
possess ought to receive much more attention and emphasis in the conception and 
operation of National Human Rights Commissions. These additional features 
(such as promotion, education, policy advice, and investigations) ought to receive 
priority, and achieve centrality, both in the design and operation of these bodies291. 
There is an evident, inherent paradox whereby major functions of the State sponsored NHRI 
necessitate scrutinising State action, educating State actors, and advising State entities.292 As 
Gomez has argued, since its inception, NHRIs have attracted much suspicion because of their 
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status as government institution.293 El  Fegiery  advises  that  ultimately  it is the  political  will, 
sincerity, support and commitment of the governments that determine the role and jurisdiction 
of NHRIs in their societies.294 
However, Aichele295  argues that in most cases, the authorities disregard international human 
rights norms and treaties even if those have been integrated into the legal system of the country. 
Additionally, the government authorities responsible may have little will to clarify such cases, 
leaving the investigation of cases not thoroughly scrutinised for institutional safeguarding 
failures. The theoretical jurisdiction of the NHRI in accordance to the broad mandate of the 
Paris Principles suggests that that it should be able to gain legal access to all factual information 
or data with regards to the case under investigation and have the authority to claim reparations 
for the victim. 
Aichele observes that there are a significant number of cases entailing a NHRI supporting the 
accused perpetrators of human rights violations in the investigations into their own practices 
rather than the NHRI.296 This is supported by Amnesty International, which claim that NHRIs 
in some developing nations systematically compromise the sensitive nature of personal data. 
This may entail passing on the complainant’s initial complaint and its communication to the 
alleged perpetrators that may include the victim’s personal details. This clearly introduces a 
significant degree of partiality into the investigation and most importantly fails to safeguard 
the complainant, as this puts them at risk for reprisals and discourages the exposition of similar 
cases (e.g. involving the police or security forces).297 It can be deduced that NHRI failure to 
investigate individual violations at the outset effectively reduces the opportunity to understand 
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the context, the ensuing factors and the identification of the remedy process required to bring 
about ultimate change of practice.298 It is argued that strong, independent NHRIs are essential 
in combating the inherently, engrained cultures of impunity and to ensure justice for victims. 
Amnesty International has recommended that NHRIs should be empowered ‘to ensure effective 
non-judicial remedies, including interim measures to protect the life and safety of an individual 
and offer adequate medical treatment if needed; this should ensure that measures of redress and 
rehabilitation are taken’299 when needed. 
3.3.1 Compliance and Accreditation 
 
Due to the broad generalist guidelines and standards put forth by the Paris Principles, it can be 
argued that ‘virtually all national institutions can claim to abide by them to a certain extent’300. 
Moreover, the original Paris Principles are ambiguous with regards to the required strategies to 
attain these objectives. Murray argues that the powers of the NHRI should be “defined 
precisely” and should be clearly set out in order to ensure that the NHRI is free to do its work 
…’301 
Dam notes that just adopting the norms and values of the Paris Principles alone ‘cannot always 
be an effective test for judging the independence and efficacy of national commissions’302. It 
is argued that the Paris Principles are just instruments for structural evaluation, not for 
performance-based or impact-based evaluation. They do not purport to evaluate effectiveness 
                                                                
298 ibid 21. 
299 ibid 17. 
300 CHR Res. 9 (XVIII) of 27 March 1962, which was endorsed later by ECOSOC Res. 888 F 
(XXXIV) of 24 July1962 
301 Murray, ‘National Human Rights Institutions. Criteria and Factors for Assessing Their 
Effectiveness’ (n 196) 202. 
302 S Dam, ‘Lessons from National Human Rights Institutions around the World for State and Local 
Human Rights Commissions in the United States’ [2007] John F Kennedy School of Government, 
Cambridge, MA <www.hrccj.org> accessed 29 July 2017. 
 83 
 
or impact but ‘merely to set some benchmark by which national institution can be assessed for 
its formal compliance with these minimum standards’303. 
The formation of the Global Alliance of NHRIs (GANHRI), in 1993, was supposed to address 
this implementation issue. Previously referred to as the International Coordinating Committee 
of National Institutions (ICC), GANHRI promotes the importance of NHRIs worldwide by 
providing a forum for its members to interact and exchange, as well as facilitating their 
engagement with international organisations.3304 
3.3.1.1 GANHRI 
 
GANHRI operates as a gatekeeper and is responsible for:305 
1. Liaising with institutions at the global level and with the UN 
2. Accrediting national institutions that abide by the Paris Principles 
3. Organising biennial conferences 
Institutions wishing to be accredited must delegate a member of their organisation to represent 
them on the GANHRI.306 Working through a peer-review process, the Sub Committee on 
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Accreditation issue certain General Observations with regards to the State’s compliance with 







Table 3-1 GANHRI Compliance and Accreditation (Adapted from Beco308) 
 
Table 3.1 lists the Compliance Status of the Institution alongside its Accreditation 
Classification. An Institution attaining Full Compliance is labelled with ‘A’ status whilst 
becoming an accredited ICC member.309 This entails them to participate, contribute and 
influence the agendas and topics of discussion at such events as the Human Rights Council 
meetings.310 Institutions in Partial Compliance and awarded ‘B’ status are not granted the same 
level of access or participation to GANHRI and United Nations Human Rights Commission 
meetings as they are mostly limited to observer status. Institutions in Non-Compliance and 
awarded ‘C’ status may face temporary or even permanent suspension of their status, if their 
operations no longer conform to the Paris Principles.311 As of 2014, the GANHRI has 
recognised 106 national institutions with ‘A’ status classifications, while it has refused granting 
a status to several NHRIs and has withdrawn the ‘A’ status on some occasions.312 Hence, 
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conforming to the Paris Principles guidelines is of paramount importance for an NHRI to retain 
its accreditation.313 
Despite these measures it is reasoned that a substantial fallibility of the accreditation process is 
in its symbolic rather than legal implications. The criticism of the original frameworks 
produced in the early 1990s until the current period is that there has been no serious effort to 
enhance and amend the broad principles with concrete guidelines. A significant criticism of the 
Paris Principles is that the stated provisions are far too vague, unworkable and confusing. The 
‘guarantees of independence and pluralism, even though mentioned in the sub-heading of the 
Paris Principles, offer very little guidance to the states as to how to achieve this 
independence’314. 
Alternatively, it is also recognised that the stubborn resistance to expand and define the 
principles in detail are related to the reluctance of the involved actors, which entails a broad 
section of private and governmental agencies and individuals opting for guidelines instead of 
laws. A main critique is that GANHRI is not an independent organisation with policies and 
programmes of its own; but is rather a mechanism for coordination and liaison among national 
institutions.315 However, this perspective has not factored that attempting to enforce universal 
laws upon global governments is not only an onerous task but highly paradoxical. With 
consideration to the heterogeneous nature of nations and their cultural, ideological and 
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historical contexts the enforcement of universal law could constitute a major human rights 
violation. 
Furthermore, as noted by Gallagher, despite the differences, all national institutions in 
accordance to the Paris Principles and part of GANHRI share the explicit purpose of working 
independently from the government as administrative or quasi-judicial entities without any 
judicial or law-making capability.316 This implies that the members of GANHRI are utilising 
the Paris Principles to develop NHRIs to become responsible for instituting human rights norms 
through alternative channels. Analysing the Paris Principles from a constricted literal sense 
leads us to conclude that they are neither sufficient for the institution to promote and protect 
neither human rights nor do they enable us to gauge the effectiveness of an institution. 
However, in examining the principles from a developmental perspective they become an 
identified set of prerequisites that must be attained for the NHRI to function with its designated 
purpose. Once an NHRI has been established, the onus is on it to identify its place in society 
and to build relationships with all actors at every level and place in society. The Paris Principles 
explicitly emphasise the role of education and the expectation of NHRIs to work with 
educational institutions such as schools, colleges and universities. They are expected to work 
with the sanctioned education providers to integrate human rights education into the syllabuses 
of their institutions. The aim is to deliver knowledge that will raise the awareness of the issue 
of human rights. Furthermore, the educational programs are perceived to be a viable route by 
which the personal attitudes and opinions of future decision makers and the citizenry can be 
firstly gauged for its competency and then further informed with ‘real-world’317 data and 
analysis. The status quo, as perpetuated by GANHRI, appears to suggest the development of 
an acceptance and gradual socialisation of the human rights debate. Murray reflects that ‘there 
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is a need for a deeper discussion on the underlying concepts such as the relationship with 
government and the meaning of independence’318. 
 
3.4 Contextualising Human Rights Norms and NHRIs in the Arabian Gulf 
Region 
 
The United Nations regards the increasing adaptation and emergence of NHRIs by nation states 
to reflect a conscious recognition of the political and social benefits of promoting human rights 
issues and values.319 El-Fegiery reasons however, that not all governments are willing 
participants in the establishment of an independent organisation designed to monitor their 
activities. He argues that the establishment of an NHRI in itself does not automatically imply 
greater ‘respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms’320. NHRI credibility is dependent 
upon the political will, the social environment and the sincerity of the commitment on the part 
of governments to develop a human rights culture, which will ultimately determine the role and 
place of NHRIs in their societies.321 O’Sullivan contends that despite the importance placed 
upon the role of NHRIs there is a dearth in studies which examine the context in which they 
are to be established and their expected operability, especially in places where democratic 
processes may not be fully in place.322 Sidoti,323 in support of this contention, observes that the 
creation of an NHRI is based upon domestic laws, constitution and processes, whilst the Paris 
Principles take for granted the existence of a functioning democratic system prior to the 
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establishment of a NHRI. The NHRIs are designed by purpose to operate within a pre-existing 
democratic system such as independent courts, judiciary and fully functional and independent 
legislative bodies alongside non-government organisations.324 Consequently, States without a 
minimum level of democratic governance, political liberty, independent media and freedom of 
expression cannot assist nor further the work of NHRIs. Reif states that ‘The NHRI will find it 
extremely difficult to function in a state without a democratic system of checks on the exercise 
of power, where real independence from the ruling power is possible and where human rights 
are not respected in law and practice’325. This is extremely prevalent in non-democratic 
countries, where Abedin notes that the executive branch controls all other branches, naturally 
subjugating the NHRI under their authority and command.326 He observes that as a 
consequence, many ombudsman offices in the developing world that started with a classical 
model have now come under total control of the executive authority (e.g., Guyana). Some 
countries have adopted or retained the classical ombudsman system only as a symbolic gesture 
or as a showpiece for favourable publicity or even propaganda purposes.327 
Accordingly, O'Sullivan maintains that a democratic environment is a prerequisite for the 
efficient functioning of an NHRI.328 She suggests that nations without the necessary democratic 
reforms in place but seeking to establish an NHRI should be presented with two options. Firstly, 
they should either be allowed to establish their NHRI with full support of the international 
community but with a caveat in place that presses them to undertake the necessary democratic 
reforms at the same time. Secondly, they may only establish an NHRI on the condition that 
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democratic reform has already taken place or is in the process.329 
Abedin’s contentions upon the NHRI experiences across the world appear to suggest a middle 
ground between the two options presented by O’Sullivan. She stipulates that the success of the 
NHRI is dependent upon the prevailing social order and historical experience.330 Significantly, 
human rights are reinforced and prioritised within a democratic process as the culture fosters 
the appropriate attitudes and approaches towards upholding the liberty of the people.331 Abedin 
argues that the Commonwealth nations formerly under the British rule or mandate have 
inherited, to a degree, a stable bureaucratic structure, which has allowed for the general 
development of freedom of speech, political activity, the recognition of labour and trade unions 
alongside an independent judiciary.332 He states that these nations have a distinct advantage 
over many other developing nations, as they already possess the fertile socio-political 
environment to nurture a comprehensive ingrained attitude towards human rights and the 
establishment of NHRIs to further them.333 By contrast, in non-democratic nations, the 
executive branch enjoys complete authority over all extensions of government, including the 
legislative and judiciary branches. Abedin notes that in ‘these countries, NHRIs cannot flourish 
or even survive’334. The Fijian National Human Rights Commission (established October 1999) 
according to Abedin, became rather defunct after the Military coup.335 Of specific interest to 
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this study, the 2014 report on ‘human rights in the UAE’ by Amnesty International336 identifies 
the UAE authorities to have been responsible for: 
Unprecedented… arrests and detentions; enforced disappearances; torture and 
other ill-treatment of detainees; grossly unfair trials and the imposition of long 
prison sentences on government critics, and continuing harassment and 
persecution of their families. In some cases, depriving them of the rights and 
privileges associated with that status in the UAE and rendering them stateless337. 
The report adds that ‘at least two activists’338 have been exiled, the order to deport a number of 
foreign journalists has been issued and individuals barred from travelling overseas or harassed 
via the cancellation of personal bank accounts, termination of employment and university 
studies. Some individuals have been placed under ‘oppressive surveillance, or publicly 
denigrated... as in smear campaigns in the local media and on social media platforms that aim 
to delegitimise their calls for political accountability and reform’339. Amnesty claimed, as of 
November 2014, that at least 67 activists, including prisoners of conscience were still 
imprisoned. Furthermore, the action taken by the UAE authorities to clampdown on Non-
Governmental Organisations that had voiced calls for change is a cause for some concern with 
regards to the eventual establishment of an independent NHRI in the UAE. Amnesty observes 
that in 2011, the Independent Jurists Association and Teachers Association boards were 
dissolved by the authorities after they had requested on behalf of a number of Non-
Governmental Organisations discussions on reforms on governance. 
An Amnesty International report states that: 
           By summarily dismissing their executive boards and appointing government 
nominees to replace them, the authorities compromised the independence of the 
two organizations and effectively sent a warning to other Non-Governmental 
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Organisations to toe the line or risk opening themselves to similar government 
intervention.340 
Significantly, the specific case of UAE will be further examined in detail in chapter five, the 
objective here is to identify broadly both the workings of the NHRI and how it has been 
adjusted and received within the regional context. As can be gleaned from Amnesty 
International’s damning indictment of the human rights record of the UAE, it is notable that 
the rest of the Arabian nations fare little better. 
El Fegiery observes that NHRIs in the Arab world were established in two waves: 
The first during the 1990s (Algeria, Morocco, Palestine, Sudan, Tunisia, and Yemen) 
establishing such institutions as part of policy package that would shore up wavering political 
legitimacy at home and absorb social tension. The second wave came in the context of the 
international and regional debate over political reform during 2001, which pushed countries 
such as Egypt, Jordan, Qatar and Saudi Arabia to establish these institutions341. 
However, despite the establishment of the NHRIs, there appears to be a universal crackdown 
on human rights activists in many of the Middle Eastern and North African nations. Amnesty 
International has reported that in Egypt: 
          Well-known activists were usually released within hours, although some were 
beaten or harassed. Some detainees were prosecuted after being tortured and 
otherwise ill treatment in detention, including sexual and gender-based 
violence342. 
They note that the Egyptian ‘National Council for Human Rights did not intervene in any 
serious way’343 when authorities arbitrarily shut down many Non-Governmental Organisations, 
and ‘investigations have not led to those responsible for violations being held to account nor to 
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the victims receiving an effective remedy…’344 for individuals and Non-Governmental 
Organisations, including those working on torture cases and labour rights. 
The attitude and approach of these officials is rather well encapsulated in another 
Amnesty International report: 
           In a region where governments persistently fail to respect human rights, the role 
of human rights defenders is all the more crucial. Their courage, tenacity and 
commitment are a constant reminder to the authorities of their profound failure 
to meet their obligations under international law, and are fundamental for the 
introduction of long-lasting changes. It is when states endeavour to silence 
human rights defenders that their voice is most crucially needed345 
It can be argued that just by establishing NHRIs alone, human rights issues will not naturally 
disappear in the Arab world. While some nations have developed their NHRI in compliance 
with the Paris Principles, the institutions have been inoperable due to the socio-political climate 
(e.g. Palestine, Iraq, Sudan); the government is unwilling to follow their recommendations; 
Underfunded and Perceived to be part of the government.346 El Fegiery observes that ‘the 
relationship between these institutions and independent human rights groups is often tense, 
especially when it comes to subjects such as civil rights, political reform, and constitutional 
reform’347. 
Furthermore, he notes that the people do have any inherent sense of ownership or trust in an 
institution that they have not been consulted upon. 
As nations emerge from protracted civil wars and regional conflicts, national human rights 
commissions are increasingly becoming significant players in the implementation and 
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monitoring of peace agreements alongside post-conflict transitional arrangements. Durbach 
suggests that the creation of NHRI should become a pre-condition to the execution of such 
agreements.348 
For example, Morocco’s Consultative Council has ‘played a major role in forming the Justice 
and Reconciliation Commission through which the country has come to terms with its past 
human rights violations’349. Additionally, the international regional debates at the start of the 
millennium also instituted some human rights reform and change in places such as Jordan, 
Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Qatar.350 
However, it has to be recognised that ‘it will be much more difficult for an institution to win 
public legitimacy’351 because of the: 
          Sudden rush of national institutions… created through peace agreements… that 
too little attention is being paid to the difficult questions of consulting civil 
society in the creation of NHRIs and considering where they fit into the overall 
framework of new democratic structures in transitional societies352 
Good governance and practice from the Arabian Gulf region is exemplified by the Qatar 
National Human Rights Committee since they were awarded the highest status for compliance, 
‘A’ from GANHRI.353 The Qatar National Human Rights Committee often displays their 
promotion and support of a positive human rights culture through its organisation of 
conferences, seminars, lectures and training courses addressing different human rights themes. 
These ‘have entailed such topics as human rights culture, incorporation of human rights norms 
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in school curriculum, norms and mechanisms of international human rights law, and its 
mandate and responsibilities’354. These promotional activities, training courses and outreach 
work were targeted specifically to reach all segments of the society including law enforcement, 
teachers, journalists, students and medical personnel. In addition, the Qatar National Human 
Rights Committee has established a program for field visits every year to the Deportation 
Centre, the Qatari House for Shelter and Human Care, and Central Prison.355 Qatar National 
Human Rights Committee, also undertakes periodic visits to the provisional detention section; 
‘Search and Follow-up Department of the Ministry of Interior to identify the status of female 
detainees’356; psychiatric clinics in order to identify the status of patients and the problems they 
encounter alongside the quality of services provided to them; the Criminal Investigation 
Department, General Administration of Public Security, of the Ministry of Interior, ‘to identify 
the status of detainees’357. These field visits are a pioneering development in the drive to 
educate and protect the public on human rights in the region. The consideration of this particular 
experience is very pertinent to the establishment of a NHRI in the UAE due to it being derived 
from a nation with similar traditions, cultures and socio-political development. 
It is argued that ultimately the success of any NHRI will depend on the existence of a vibrant 
civil society that encourages or tolerates as a minimum, social and political activism. However, 
as Karajah observes, the establishment of civil society is not an inevitable outcome of the 
development of the state. It is an autonomous structure independent of the state. ‘It encourages 
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good governance in the modern state and mobilizes the power of democracy, namely public 
participation in decision making... It is, in sum, a measure of democratisation’358. 
If these conditions are absent, there is little to ‘prevent national institutions from becoming 
mere mouthpieces of the government’359. El Fegiery contends that in an era of shrinking state 
capacity and increasing pressures for democratisation, the resilient authoritarian leaders in the 
Arab world have used NHRIs as a political mechanism to respond to domestic and international 
criticism by Non-Governmental Organisations and regime critics.360 
In attempting to legitimise the purpose and existence of NHRIs, especially in the Arabian Gulf 
region, Risse suggests that the pull of compliance with regards to international human rights 
norms may have more impact than the push of norm violations.361 In identifying the notion of 
compliance by the State, Risse is implying the actions taken by the State that conform to 
international norms, whereas when State actions deviate from international norms this implies 
non-compliance.362 Moravcsik argues that, ‘while realists stress power politics and assume that 
states do what they are forced to do, liberals believe that what states want is the primary 
determinant of what they do’363. Moravcsik observes that, states are not obliged to adopt 
humanitarian norms since human rights regimes are infrequently enforced by interstate action. 
Rather, he notes, governments involve themselves in international commitments as it serves 
them to avoid future domestic political alternatives; that human rights treaties are adopted 
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primarily for domestic political survival.364 Shor explicates that ‘…both realist and liberal 
approaches are actor-oriented; they take actors (states) as the ontological givens and assume 
that their actions are guided by rational motivations and interests’365. This is further explained 
by Cortell and Davis who recognise that international pressure is only influential when a 
‘cultural match or normative fit’366 exists. This means that the States themselves in which 
human rights reform is called for actually accept the treaties and need for their implementation. 
Cardenas suggests that international pressure is likely to succeed when members of the 
domestic society support international norms and join transnational networks of activists. 
Transnational networks can then use ways of influence and moral entrepreneurship to place 
human rights issues on national plans, including lobbying by powerful governments.367 Shor 
agrees that States are compelled to comply due to the pressures from States with superior 
economic, military and political powers.368 
Cardenas argues that the pressure is higher if applied by a hegemonic state (e.g. United States 
in the contemporary era), which compels weaker nations to adopt their own moral standards.369 
However, international relations and public policy scholars and commentators criticise this 
approach, which suggest that States are compelled to comply due to the pressures from States 
with superior economic, military and political power.  For example, the Kingdom of Saudi 
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Arabia is a leading oil producer and not in receipt of any international donations or assistance 
but still faces constant criticism of its human rights record.370 Schwarz argues that, even though 
pressure from more powerful and superior States is vital: 
          Certain states are partially immune to moral pressure from non-state actors. Such 
states are considered to be geo-strategically important or politically or 
economically vital for major Western powers. According to these interests, they 
condone the pressure to improve human rights record. (E.g. China, Israel, 
Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Turkey)371. 
Cardenas reflects that a principal incentive for States to breech international human rights 
norms is usually a threat to their national security. The usual response from the States entails 
some measures which may violate personal integrity despite international or domestic human 
rights pressures.372 Cardenas believes that in such circumstances, the survival of a privileged 
group’s interests may be at stake. State elites who embark upon the violation of rights do so to 
hold on to power, regardless of the incentives or threats to comply.373 They then justify those 
violations by legitimising their actions in terms of the greater national good by claiming that 
personal liberty must be sacrificed for national security.374 What is significant, however, is not 
that the definition of national security is manipulated to suit the authorities, but the continuous 
threat perceived from other social groups to their status and power. 
It is argued from the Arabian Gulf context that the State authorities have already demonstrated 
their intent and commitments to human rights norms with the establishment of certain 
institutions to monitor these norms. However, the question being posed by this study is the 
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degree to which both the authorities and society at large wish these to be implemented and 
adhered to. In chapter five, the discussion will focus specifically upon the UAE context and the 
social constructivist model outlined in Risse and Sikkink.375 The spiral model seeks to explain 
the phases a State may progress through as it brings about domestic human rights improvements 




The purpose of this chapter has been to identify core objectives and to question the theoretical 
purpose of the NHRI, its operation within the guidelines of the Paris Principles and its place in 
the Arabian Gulf Region. 
In accordance to the UN, the NHRI as an institutional body must be established by the 
government within the mandates of its national constitution to promote and protect human 
rights. Thereby, its underlining purpose is to provide sincere advice and guidance to 
governmental bodies on the compliance with legislation and implementation of international 
human rights policies. 
However, it must be acknowledged that the broad generalist guidelines and standards of the 
Paris Principles imply a universal adherence, which as will be explored in chapter five 
contradicts the culturally specific norms of the UAE and the region. The literature in the first 
instance demonstrates that some nations are not willing participants in the establishment of an 
independent organisation designed to monitor their activities. It must be recognised that the 
credibility of the NHRIs is dependent upon the political will and the social environment. The 
established argument stipulates that in accordance to the Paris Principles the NHRIs cannot 
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function appropriately without the minimum level of democratic governance and socio-
political liberty. This could naturally prove to be an impediment to the eventual establishment 
of an independent NHRI in the UAE. Although from the perspective of the broader Arab world, 
NHRIs have been established in the region through two phases, there appears to be a universal 
crackdown on human rights activists in many of the Middle Eastern and North African nations. 
NHRIs have, in several situations, failed to intervene or condemn State authorised human rights 
violations. Thus, it is argued that the creation of NHRIs in itself does not promise to eradicate 
issues of human rights violations. Institutions in the region have been inefficient and inoperable 
due to such factors as the socio-political climate (e.g. Palestine, Iraq, Sudan); Governmental 
influence; lack of funding and being perceived to be part of the government. 
Therefore, it is essential to concede on the initial point that in order to establish a successful 
NHRI, there is a prerequisite for a democratic civil society that understands the place of social 
and political activism. The literature suggests that to prevent the mockery of the concept, these 
States should be subjected to the pull of compliance rather than the push of norm violations. 
This entails progressive social change through education and communication of these ideals 
through the media, international pressures through members of domestic societies collaborating 
with transnational networks of activists, lobbing governments of more powerful nation States, 
which can apply pressure for compliance with human rights policies without the use of claw 
back clauses designed in other articles to suspend human rights under the pretence of national 
security. 
The method by which this can be attained is also noted within the body of the Paris Principles, 
which explicitly highlight the role of education and the expectation of NHRIs to work with 
educational institutions such as schools, colleges and universities and other sanctioned 
education providers to integrate human rights education into the syllabuses of their institutions. 
Therefore, the overarching aim of the NHRIs should be to deliver knowledge to and educate 
the broad spectrum of civil society. There is ample evidence to demonstrate that exclusive 
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representation by and through elite minorities distorts and diminishes the integrity and value of 
the human rights organisation. 
In order for the NHRI to achieve this objective it should be established on the principles of 
‘Independence’ and ‘Accountability’, which entail that the UAE government, NGOs and other 
external parties refrain from interfering in the mandates, function, composition and competence 
of the NHRI. Although it is an accepted point that this will pose significant challenges as the 
NHRI is to be established under an act of government. The process should be transparent, with 
active dialogue between citizen and public official within the confines of a democratic process. 
In order to ensure the independence and accountability of the NHRI, its role should not be 
constrained or impeded due to funding issues. However, the paradoxical issue of the NHRI as 
a recipient of public funding indicates that it cannot be considered truly independent. The 
literature demonstrates that in many instances governments have systematically impaired their 
NHRIs’ operations by restricting their budgets. It is suggested that to ensure financial 
independence, NHRIs must have the means to ensure that their future operations remain 
independent from political decision makers and economic fluctuations. The first measure that 
the NHRI must ensure that its Membership and Staffing alongside its Appointment of 
Members, is conducted through an open and fair process, which encompasses perspectives 
from the broad segment of society. This will increase and enhance the credibility of the NHRI, 
as the institution should become a de-facto model for diversity, plurality and accessibility. 
Thus, NHRIs must not only be representative of the broad segments of society but be actively 
working to highlight the divergent issues and bring to justice those responsible for violations 
and abuses within its remit, as well as being available for consultation for the broad section of 
society in the UAE. 
However, remarkably as per the recommendations of the Paris Principles, there are no 
adjudication and investigatory powers given to NHRIs. The thinking here appears to be based 
upon the notion that the Paris Principles did not seek to endow NHRIs with 
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such formal powers of investigation and adjudication because it would turn them into 
specialised human rights courts, and that would naturally undermine their raison d'être. Their 
intrusions into the judiciary and legislative practices may cast suspicion and doubts into their 
allegiances and loyalty to civil society as they may be taken to be governmental agents. 
Therefore, as will be evident from the findings of this thesis, the NHRIs are perceived to be a 
promotional, educational, advisory, and investigative body. 
The next chapter discusses the results of the field work interviews conducted with individuals 




The Perspectives of the Emirati population and Human Rights 





The review of literature has revealed a significant gap in the study and exploration of the 
opinions and perspectives of the native Emirati population on human rights and the creation of 
a NHRI in the UAE. To date, there exists no study that has specifically sought to capture and 
analyze primary first-hand data from those involved in the process of developing, sustaining, 
maintain or ensuring human rights provisions in a professional capacity in the UAE. The 
requirement for an initial qualitative, exploratory study was deemed a necessity at this stage in 
order to directly uncover the perspectives of those involved in the human rights movement and 
provide the impetus for further research into previously unidentified areas. The sample of those 
selected must therefore be purposive, as those who possess the knowledge, experience and 
understanding of human rights issues can provide informed and constructive perspectives. 
Through a dialogical process, conducted through semi-structured interviews as the main data 
collection instrument, a rich quality of soft data can be captured. This can be analysed and 
categorised so as to address directly the themes and issues derived from the review of literature 
and the Semi-Structured Interviews (SSIs). The study, conducted within the bounds of the 
acceptable standards for academic and scientific research, ensures complete anonymity and 
confidentiality to the participants and provides the study with credence and credibility. 
The primary aim of this chapter is to present and discuss the findings of the ‘exploratory 
qualitative’ research with regard to the following central thesis question, namely: 
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What are the perspectives of the Emirati population and Human Rights activists on Human 




The practical structure within which research is undertaken is referred to as the research 
methodology. This defines an approach to a problem that can be put into practice in a research 
process.376 Banakar and Tavers (2005) observe that: 
Many socio-legal researchers would argue that their undertaking requires 
no special methods besides those already used in social sciences. Law is, 
after all, only a social institution, in the same way as religion, medicine or 
education, and can be studied using the same methods and techniques.377 
Therefore, methodology is understood to describe the rational and logic utilised by a researcher, 
which includes the fundamental knowledge with regards to the subject and research methods 
in question and the framework employed in a particular context. 
The objective of this study is to explore the establishment of a National Human Rights 
Institution (NHRI) in the United Arab Emirates. Therefore, it has been decided to directly 
engage with both those who are affected by the implementation of human rights laws and those 
who are responsible for its execution and legitimacy. ‘The research strategy (methodology) is 
based upon a qualitative methodology.  This implies the simultaneous collection and analysis 
of data, development of theory and a continuous reformulation of the research question’378. The 
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qualitative method provides the opportunity to explore the participant’s experience in a greater 
depth of detail and analysis, which provides the researcher with the opportunity to further 
investigate the participant’s perspectives from grassroots activists to those responsible for 
human rights provisions in the UAE. Sample groups are limited and focused upon a specific 
demographic of society and do not purport to present the views of the entire Emirati society. 
4.2.1 Research Design 
 
The research design provides a roadmap for how the study is to be conducted. This involves 
identifying the phenomenon to be investigated, the criteria for selecting a sample, the 
instruments being used to gather and analyse the data. This section presents the selection of the 
sample population, the instruments used, analysis of data before concluding with the ethical 
considerations and issues entailed in the collection of data. 
4.2.1.1 Sampling 
 
The participants were potential participants that were responsible for the preservation of human 
rights provisions, experienced violation of their human rights, or were commentators, jurists or 
activists in the UAE. The participants were engaged indirectly through acquaintances (3), 
directly (2), and through recommendations (1). The potential participants were provided with 
a study outline and the methodological discourse, research questions and then time was 
allocated to thoroughly explain the purpose of the entire project. The confirmation of 
participation was established and arranged via telephone and email services. Two of the 
interviews were conducted at a hotel in Dubai, a further two interviews were conducted at a 
university in the UAE and the remaining interviews were conducted at a private residence in 
the UAE. 
The data collected during the interviews was secured and utilised in various ways. Firstly, all 
interviews were recorded and fully authorised for use in this study as a declaration was signed 
before the interview began. Secondly, an audio copy was sent to the participant to review and 
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confirm that they were content with the views they had expressed. After transcription of the 
interviews, it was sent to participant; only once the interviewee signed off the transcript was 
authorisation and consent for use acquired. Next, each interview was analysed by the researcher 
and once again the analysis was sent to the interviewee for authorisation and approval before 
it was used as evidential data for this study. Finally, only six participants completed this process 
due to the enormous sensitivity and suspicion surrounding the issue of human rights in the UAE 
and the difficulties encountered in gaining the cooperation of professionals and experts to the 
SSI process to discuss human rights issues and the establishment of NHRI in the UAE in such 
a public and formal manner. The interviewed participants consisted of one senior member of 
government, one human rights academic, one human rights lawyer, an international NGO 
representative, a victim of human rights violation by the UAE State and a foreign national 
working as a professional accountant in Dubai. 
4.2.2 Data Collection 
 
The research method adopted for data collection was the Semi-Structured Interviews (SSI), 
which were used in conjunction with the review of literature to further inform the study. 
4.2.2.1  Interviews 
 
Semi-Structured Interviews (SSI) are an important data collection method as the information 
they provide is often instinctual and informative and unique. Hutter379 asserts that interviews 
are in fact essential for data collection in the legal field as they give an opportunity for 
interpretation of the legislation to be discussed and changes to institutions suggested. This is a 
sentiment supported by Yin380 who further suggests that SSIs enable both parties to further 
explore the subject and delve into details often limited by a fully structured interview, because 
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the interviewer has the option to probe the interviewee to elaborate or to investigate any 
concerns that may have been raised by the interviewee. Besides, if the interviewee has difficulty 
answering a question or provides only a brief response, the interviewer can use cues or prompts 
to encourage the interviewee to consider the question further. An acknowledged detriment to 
the SSI format is the dependency that arises when the researcher is left to vouchsafe the validity 
of the interviewee’s sentiments. In order to verify the responses, the researcher must adhere to 
strict observation of the interviewee and references from professionals associated with the 
interviewee. 
After reflection on the review of literature, the following questions were used as a general 
guideline to initiate discussion: 
                       What is your understanding of human rights law in general? 
Do you think the UAE has provisions within its constitution that 
guarantee the protection of human rights to all in the UAE? 
What is your view on the Paris Principles and the scope of enforcing 
human rights laws upon the UAE? 
Is the present monarchical system compatible with the establishment of 
a democratic system in the UAE? 
What are your perspectives on the criticism of UAEs human rights record 
by International NGOs? 
Is there a requirement for the establishment of an institution by the 
government that oversees human rights provisions in the UAE? 
            What are the barriers to its implementation? What are the risks, if any? 
            What are your suggestions and recommendations? 
4.2.3 Data Analysis 
 
The data analysis process will assist the study in making sense of the collected data from the 
review of literature, from the SSIs and from the secondary data sources such as the UAE 
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Constitution, the Paris Principles, the UNHRC documents and the human rights provisions and 
articles from the GCC, views of jurists and the case studies of human rights violations by 
international NGOS. 
4.2.3.1 Deductive Analysis 
 
Trochim observes that the deductive approach is akin to a waterfall, whereby the theory as 
identified through the review of literature, cascades into the hypothesis, which is presented as 
themes within the study. These hypotheses are then tested via the data collection instruments, 
in particular the SSI, the observation stage, which subsequently allows for the confirmation of 
the theory and hypothesis through the data analysis phase. 
These four stages are identified below as a top down model. 
Stages Descriptions 
Theory Review of Literature 
Hypothesis 
Defining and Understanding the concept of 
Human Rights 
Discussing the Requirement for a Human 
Rights Institutions in the UAE 
Discussing the role of Democracy and 
Governance in establishing a UAE NHRI 
The Role of Education in promoting the 




Data Analysis and Discussion of 
Findings 
          




4.2.4 The British Educational Research Association (BERA 2018) Ethical 
Guidelines 
 
The research and interviews were conducted in accordance to the recommendations mandated 
by the British Educational Research Association (BERA) which emphasise that: 
         ...educational researchers should operate within an ethic of respect for any 
persons involved in the research they are undertaking. Individuals should be 
treated fairly, sensitively, with dignity, and within an ethic of respect and 
freedom from prejudice regardless of age, gender, sexuality, race, ethnicity, 
class, nationality, cultural identity, partnership status, faith, disability, political 
belief or any other significant difference.381 
The following table outlines the Guideline used and the incorporation of principle into this 
study. 
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Educational research undertaken by UK researchers outside of the UK 
must adhere to the same ethical standards as research in the UK    
Researchers engaged in action research must consider the extent to 
which 
their own reflective research impinges on others, for example in the 
case 
of the dual role of teacher and researcher and the impact on students 
and 
colleagues. Dual roles may also introduce explicit tensions in areas 
such as 
confidentiality and must be addressed accordingly    
Openness and 
Disclosure 
The securing of participant’s voluntary informed consent, before 
research 
gets underway, is considered the norm for the conduct of research. 
Researchers must therefore avoid deception or subterfuge unless their 
 109 
 
research design specifically requires it to ensure that the appropriate 
data is 
collected or that the welfare of the researchers is not put in jeopardy. 
Right to 
Withdraw 
Researchers must recognize the right of any participant to withdraw 
from 
the research for any or no reason, and at any time, and they must 
inform 
them of this right. In all such circumstances researchers must examine 
their own actions to assess whether they have contributed to the 
decision 
to withdraw and whether a change of approach might persuade the 
participants to re-engage. 
Incentives Researcher use of incentives to encourage participation must be 
commensurate with good sense and must avoid choices which in 
themselves have undesirable effects and must also acknowledge that 
the 
use of incentives in the design and reporting of the research may be 
problematic; for example, where their use has the potential to create a 
bias 





Researchers must make known to the participants (or their guardians 
or 
responsible others) any predictable detriment arising from the process 
or 
findings of the research. Any unexpected detriment to participants, 
which 
arises during the research, must be brought immediately to their 
attention 
or to the attention of their guardians or responsible others as 
appropriate. 
Privacy The confidential and anonymous treatment of participants’ data is 
considered the norm for the conduct of research. Researchers must 





Table 4-2 BERA Ethical Guidelines382 
 
4.2.4.1 Insider Research 
 
The researcher identifies and classifies himself to be an insider researcher as his heritage, 
traditions and association are all directly traceable to the UAE. This implies that the researcher 
has an intimate understanding and connection with the UAE and the potential study participants 
for the field study. Although the insider-researcher status is often perceived to entail an inherent 
bias due to the proximity of the researcher with the subject under examination, the researcher 
has in the course of this study adopted the principle of reflexivity. This indicates that the 
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their rights to confidentiality and anonymity, unless they or their 
guardians 
or responsible others, specifically and willingly waive that right.     
Disclosure At all times the decision to override agreements on confidentiality and 
anonymity must be taken after careful and thorough deliberation. In 
such 
circumstances, it is in the researcher’s interests to make 
contemporaneous 
notes on decisions and the reasoning behind them, in case a 
misconduct 
complaint or other serious consequence arises.    
The Association considers it good practice for researchers to debrief 
participants at the conclusion of the research and to provide them with 





researcher has consciously documented his biases and presumptions throughout the field work 
phase.383 
4.2.4.2 Research Limitations 
 
This study in seeking to investigate a relatively new area of research within the area of human 
rights and NHRI in the UAE, was hindered by several issues that comprised: 
      Participation: Due to the sensitive nature of this topic in the UAE, the number of 
people willing to take part in the study was limited. There was an inherent suspicion 
of a study being conducted on human rights and the UAE on behalf of a Western 
educational institution. Due to the negative international media publicity 
surrounding human rights issues in the UAE most people who refused to participate 
did so citing this issue. 
       Retraction of interviews: A number of participants rescinded upon their 
commitments to the study with two actual interviews being totally disregarded and 
annulled. 
     Validation: The viewpoint of the study participants has not been authenticated via 
supplementary data or further studies and fieldwork. 
The next section discusses the analysis of the captured data. 
4.3 Findings of Empirical Field Study 
 
This segment discusses the data gathered from the study participants in relation to their 
perspectives on Human Rights and the formation of a NHRI in the UAE. The review of 
literature suggests that the manner in which the concept of human rights is understood is vital 
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The study sample consisted of six individual case studies. 
Name of Participant Age 
Status/Position/ 
Role in Society 
Time Frame (Date) of 
Interview Schedule 
Abdul (Sheikh) 
Sheikh Abdul is a native Emirati and 
works within the Ministry of Justice as a 
senior advisor with over 15 years of 
experience in his department. Prior to 
working for the Ministry of Justice he 
worked within the UAE Ministry of 
Defence. Sheikh Abdul completed his 
undergraduate work in social policy in the 
UK and his post graduate studies within 
the area of International Law in the US. 
He has attended numerous courses 
globally that were focused on human 
rights and has attended many high-level 
international meetings and conferences on 
Human Rights. He has also been a 
participant in the evaluation and analysis 
of the current human rights provision in 
the UAE. He contributed his 
recommendations and amendments to 
existing documents and policies on human 











Hassan is a qualified lawyer, who has 
been actively practising as a legal 
consultant for over 10 years within a firm 
based in Abu Dhabi. Hassan qualified as a 
solicitor from an educational institution in 
Paris. Hassan has decided to specialise in 
working within the field of human rights 
and has begun work with some 
government ministries to develop their 






Dr Noor is by profession a university lecturer 
and researcher within the area of social policy 
and human rights. He has 
received and attained all his academic 
qualifications from several universities in 
the UAE. Dr Noor has actively 
campaigned for a change in the political 
structure of the country and supported the 
calls for democratic reform and 
abolishment of the current monarchical 
system. In turn, he claims that the UAE 
government has prevented him from 
travelling abroad, placed him under 
constant surveillance and with the arrest 
and harassment of his colleagues he 
actively fears for his safety and future 
prospects. He is currently unemployed as 
his employers terminated his contract 
without any warning. Although he has 
applied to several universities, colleges 
and even schools he is constantly rejected 
without any explanation. 
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Professor Rashid is a native Emirati 
working within a university department in 
the UAE and has over 15 years of 
research and teaching experience on the 
subject of human rights. Professor Rashid, 
awarded his doctorate from a university in 
the UK, and specialist in the subject of 
international human rights, has conducted 
extensive research on human rights issues 
within the members of the Gulf 
Cooperation Council. Prior to his 
academic work he worked for an 
International consultancy firm based in 
Dubai. He has attended and addressed a 
number of high profile conferences 








Sophia, based in the UK, is employed at 
an international NGO. She has visited the 
UAE on several occasions for the explicit 
purposes of (extensive) further research 
and consultations and meetings with victims of 
human rights violations.  
 Sophia 
is originally from Egypt and has nearly 20 
years of experience in the human rights 
field. Sophia graduated from a university 
in Egypt before moving to the UAE for 
work within an international law firm. 
However, she decided to further her 
understanding and knowledge of the field 
and moved to the UK to complete a post 
graduate program in human rights law. 
After completing her studies, she was 
offered a post within an International 
NGO to focus exclusively upon the Gulf 









Table 4-3 Individual Participants for Semi-Structured Interviews 
Jamsheed 
Jamsheed is originally from Pakistan and 
arrived in the UAE around 15 years ago. 
Jamsheed is an accountant by profession 
and gained all his academic and 
professional qualifications in Pakistan. He 
had the opportunity to travel to the UAE 
for work after he spent two years 
unemployed after completing his post- 











4.3.2 Themes Overview 
 
The Semi-Structured Interviews process was the fundamental basis for the empirical field 
research due to its freedom and flexibility with regards to exploration and identification of 
participant’s perspectives. As the focus of the Semi-Structured Interviews was exploratory, the 
interview contained no fixed questions; rather a theme was extracted from the literature and 
explored with the participant. The table below lists the identified themes alongside their 
purpose. 
 
Table 4-4 Themes of Semi-Structured Interviews 
 
In order to derive an understanding of each participant’s narrative and perspectives on each 
theme, data was gathered through this dialogical interview process. 
Earlier, this study made clear that there is a dearth in contemporary scholarship on the UAE 
and the formation of NHRI. Therefore, no identifiable criteria for evaluating the participants’ 
Theme Purpose 
Defining and Understanding the concept 
of 
human rights 
Establishing participants’ definition and 
meaning of human rights. To explore the 
issue in the context of UAE. 
Discussing the Requirement for a 
Human 
Rights Institutions in the UAE 
To establish the viability and requirement of 
a UAE based NHRI and understand its 
effects on the safeguarding of human rights. 
Discussing the role of Democracy and 
Governance in establishing a UAE 
NHRI 
To understand participants’ perspectives on 
the significance of the system of governance 
and the place for democracy within that 
political structure. 
The Role of Education in promoting the 
value 
of Human Rights and Human Rights 
Institutions 
To decipher participants’ understanding of 
the place for education in promoting and 




perspectives has been firmly established, which underlines the value and importance of this 
exploratory study. 
The chapter is organised to discuss the individual themes through the dialogue conducted with 
the six participants. 







Defining and Understanding the concept of Human Rights Establish Participants’ 
understanding of human rights and explore the issue in the UAE context. 
Well it depends on what you mean by human rights…? Whose human 
rights…? Where are these human rights…? There is a lot of talk about human 
rights this and human rights that… but we forget that often in legal terms the 
very concept of human is open to debate… So, I don’t want to go into that… 
but I will say that yes, I understand what you are asking but I think it’s a 
slightly contentious term… if left undefined… (Professor Rashid) 
Professor Rashid rhetorically challenges the undefined notion of human rights by highlighting 
its rather ambiguous and broad understanding. He proceeds to demonstrate that the term can 
justifiably imply a plethora of definitions as taken within specific contexts and understandings. 
He argues that for there to exist a platform upon, which a discussion can be conducted, there 
must exist a common framework or understanding of the core terms, ideas and constructs. 
         If for the sake of eliminating argument we take the concept of Insan as 
mentioned in the Quran to be the same as the Latin word human then what 
we can say is that the immutable, undeniable rights given to man by God 
Almighty are part of the nature … the ancients called this the natural law… 
even in Persia, Greece and so on… so from the earliest days we believe that 
people have known about the rights of people and individuals… the Torah, 
the ten commandments given to Musa (a.s) freed the Bani Israel (children of 
Israel) from the Egyptian slavery… not just physical but mental… it was sent 
Defining and Understanding the concept of Human Rights Establish Participants’ 
understanding of human rights and explore the issue in the UAE context 
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by God Almighty to prevent the corruption in society… So human rights is 
really that thing we call the factors of relationship between people… society 
and the individual… the social responsibility the State has to protect the 
individual and in turn the individual has to uphold the values of that 
society… this what I can say is human rights… the right to mutually accept 
and respect each other’s values and freedom… (Professor Rashid) 
Professor Rashid perceives the entire notion of human rights to be encapsulated in the very 
purpose of the Abrahamic religious faith systems. He reflects that human ideals, morals and 
ethical norms were directly derived from these faiths based systems. 
According to Professor Rashid, human rights are “the protection of the freedom of the 
individual by society and from society”. He contends that the measures through which this 
freedom is safeguarded in a civilised society is through the legislative process. This ensures 
that as society encounters new phenomenon, it maintains and upholds its fundamental human 
values. 
Hassan appears to share Professor Rashid’s approach to the issue of human rights by firstly 
questioning its definition, understanding and contextual relevance. He then proceeds to argue 
the weighted importance of these points: 
…understanding of human rights these days is very much determined by the 
particular definitions that are used to define it… So, in some places it may 
mean one certain thing and in another it could mean something slightly 
different… but that slightly different thing is what means it has some other 
meaning under the legislative norms of a particular nation… (Hassan) 
Hassan takes a legalistic approach to defining the notion of human rights and seeks to impress 
the pertinence of a clear, concise and consistent definition. He contends that this will ensure an 
honest dialogue and understanding between both society and the individual. He then proceeds 
to demonstrate that the entire Islamic tradition was founded upon the value of human rights: 
The Sunna… The Hadith… The Fiqh and the entire Sharia as is all consistent 
with The Mother of the Books… Al Quran is all about what? People… 
arguing and looking here and there… and right in front of them is the 





Hassan provides a rather broad and overarching understanding of human rights. He relates the 
entire corpus of the Muslim tradition as a mass treatise on the discourse of human rights from 
the ancient to the contemporary world. This he argues demonstrates that every legal, 
philosophical and religious system is geared towards the preservation of human life in some 
form or context. 
This approach receives further credence and support from Sheikh Abdul. He assents and 
proceeds to support this perspective by linking it directly to the theological and philosophical 
heritage of his Islamic faith. 
When we are talking about the Human Rights (HR), what we are essentially 
saying is the right that every human being has... this include the living and 
even the dead… So this is not really a new concept… When we study the 
Quran and Sunnah of Prophet Muhammad (s) what we see is that from that 
time of Adam (a.s) and his sons… the first provisions of HR were sent by Allah 
sbt… Qabeel kills Habeel and then when he feeling… very sorry… 
remorseful… he doesn’t know what to do… Allah sbt shows him the crows 
and how it bury the dead… and so for Qabeel to make some amends… not 
great… not really too much… but something … Qabeel bury his brother 
Habeel by watching the birds and so you see the first provision for human 
rights is already there in the first human act, which is violating the human right 
as given by Allah sbt… to the human… The value of life itself… (Sheikh 
Abdul) 
He identifies his understanding of human rights to be directly equated to the preservation of 
life as commanded by the sacred Islamic text the Quran and through the Islamic tradition as 
exemplified by the prophet Muhammad (s). 
He then moves on to further to explain that the notion of human rights is an inherent aspect of 
the very society that he represents. 
So, when we are talking about the HR it is nothing new for us… it come with 
the Quran and Sunnah of Prophet (s) and it come to change the jahilia of 
society… which was the violation of the human right of the people… their 
dignity, their right to live in peace and worship and live their lives as they want 




Sheikh Abdul elucidates the role of HR in the formation of contemporary Arab and Muslim 
societies. He parlays the role of Islamic values as espoused by the Quran and the tradition of 
the faith to have civilised society, which implies that every human being is allowed his freedom 
of being and expression. 
Although Dr Noor, an alleged victim of human rights violation in the UAE, appears to agree 
with the Sheikh Abdul’s sentiments, he argues that the reason for this debate demonstrates the 
inept understanding and appreciation for the basic acceptance and appreciation of human rights. 
My understanding of human rights is that actually no one can give anyone a 
human right; this human right is being given by Allah (swt) God Almighty. He 
has sent every human being with His right to his life, his speech, right to his 
movement, to his earning. Everything Allah (swt) has guaranteed. (Dr Noor) 
Dr Noor presents an extremely defiant contention on the notion of human rights. He argues that 
the very notion of sharing or promoting an idealistic or utopian perspective that seeks to liberate 
the minds of the people will become anathema to those in government. He equates his own 
struggle with that experienced by the early Muslim converts under the oppressive rule of the 
Meccan Quraysh tribe. 
Now when somebody is taking that away from you or somebody is saying I 
am giving you this and calling it a human right, then I think there is something 
wrong with that. These are our inalienable immutable human rights which 
Allah (swt) God Almighty has given us and this is really something that is 
natural to us. Now what happens after that when people are trying to control 
you is a different matter that is when we get into the violations of human rights. 
But what is the human rights? It is the right of every individual to speak, to 
move, to think, to eat, to be as he pleases to be as long as he is not interfering 
or violating somebody else’s right or space or freedom. (Dr Noor) 
Dr Noor appears to be quite traumatised by his experience, although he did not suffer any 
physical abuse or torture of any nature, he feels as if his divine rights have been gravely 
violated. When he argues that the human rights provisions the International community is 
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enforcing upon the UAE is already preserved in the Islamic doctrines, this appears to be 
contrary to expectation. 
Jamsheed, an expatriate from Pakistan, also shares Dr Noor’s perspective and notes that his 
own understanding also stem from his Islamic faith ideology. 
Human rights are … the laws really that should guarantee me my freedom to 
live in some sort of dignity… these are guaranteed by the Quran and the Sunna 
of our Rasool… as long as I am not doing anything to anyone then I should be 
allowed to live my life…this is my right as a human being… (Jamsheed) 
Jamsheed presents a rather simplistic and literalist interpretation of his faith and argues that his 
faith is completely based upon his reliance and trust in Allah. He feels that his Creator will 
vouchsafe his rights and although he is aware of the demands upon the UAE government to 
safeguard and protect human liberty and rights, he contends that his faith is in God Almighty. 
         So, I pray to my Allah that He is looking after me and that only really He is 
The One who can protect me and provide for me… (Jamsheed) 
Jamsheed  does  not  express  any  vindictiveness  or  resentment  towards  the  UAE government 
at all and clarifies that no human being can protect another. Although he understands that it is 
an incumbency upon those in power to look after their subjects and citizens, growing up in 
Pakistan, he has lost all hope in the governmental and bureaucratic structures of national 
governments and perceives them all to be self-serving tools for the rich and powerful. He 
concedes however, that the UAE is already better in preserving his rights than his native 
Pakistani government was. 
Sophia, a foreign representative of an International Non-Governmental Organisation also 
recognises the argument posed by the other participants. She identifies the role of religious 
ideology to be crucial to the assessing the current state of human rights protection in the region. 
I think they are those rights and provisions which are given to the individual person 
by the mere fact that they are alive, so every individual is equal. Yes we know 
differences exist because of class, race, gender etc., but in theory, and when it is 
boiled down to the most basic facts, every individual is the same and so has the 
same right. Some of these rights man has recognised in their religious texts and 
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social laws and norms and we have also done that as a civilisation when, through 
the Geneva Conventions for example, we have a whole declaration of human 
rights, rights which are supposed to guarantee universal protection for every 
individual, just by the fact that they are a human being. That is what makes us 
special as a species and it is that right of every individual to be free, to move as 
they please to, to meet as they please to and to be who they are. That is what entails 
human rights, and I think that’s something that we are working hard to ensure that 
everybody enjoys. (Sophia) 
However, Sophia unlike the other participants does not explicitly associate her own 
understanding to be explicitly based upon the Islamic faith tradition. She describes her broad 
experience of  the  region  and  argues  that  although  the  Islamic  and  other Abrahamic  faith  
ideologies  are  more  prevalent  and  domineering,  it  is  the  ethnic cultural identities and the 
social norms and values espoused by them that are the real influencer. 
       I think because across the world, especially the Arab and Muslim World, they 
equate naturally the Islamic Teachings, the Christian teachings, the Jewish 
teachings, basically the teachings of the Abrahamic faiths, which are so heavily 
focused upon the relations in society and the law and order, that many people from 
this region especially assume that they have a grasp and understanding of those 
moral, ethical codes and conducts, but that is not usually the case, mostly these 
places are run by tribal groups, who’s only motive is to protect themselves and 
members of their tribe and then they organised in a social hierarchy…(Sophia) 
Sophia argues that the Arab societies are more informed by the Islamic faith then controlled by 
it. She identifies the tribal heritage of the region to be the real factor in dictating relationships 
and eventual social policy and governmental attitudes. She perceives the Gulf Arab societies 
to be to be dominated by an underlining paranoia and inherent suspicion of foreigners and 
outsiders. She maintains that although the Islamic faith ideology is a powerful driving force, 
it’s the tribal affiliations and brethren networks that effectively govern the UAE. 
So really it’s one tribe looking after the interests of the other. That’s pretty much 
what the entire Arabian region is built upon, all society is. So, we see a lot of 
issues with migrant workers coming into the Gulf States and suffering, having 
their human rights violated. This is because the entire ethos of the region is built 
upon a protection of each other and the factors which benefit each other, so they 
are protected and it comes down to economics and security. That is what is built 
into the mind-set of these people... (Sophia) 
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Sophia moves away from the argument related to the inherited Islamic faith culture of the 
region and instead identifies the cultural and traditional aspect  of  the  Arab societies to be a 
significant factor in determining relationships and forming new social policies and legislations. 
Sophia goes as far as to suggest that an unchecked form of nepotism and acceptable bias is the 
prevalent norm. 
Dr Noor further weighs into the debate by adding that the entire political structure has been 
established to protect the ruling elite, therefore, in discussing the notion of human rights and 
how they are perceived, Dr Noor observes that these rights are effectively designed to ensure 
that there is no threat from the citizenry, rather than protecting the citizens from the enormities 
of the government machinery against the public. 
              What we have really is a two-tiered system whereby the rules for the 
royalty, for those who rule above us are one and we the subjects, the 
citizens just have to go along with them while they usurp and take more 
and more of the wealth, the oil that belongs to all of us really. They take 
more and more control, they control more of the businesses, they invest 
abroad, they claim to be following the International conventions but really 
are violating many of them by supressing our voice… our ability to express 
ourselves and to be who we want to be. That is a great problem at the 
moment… So, there is no recognition of that, most people are happy with 
the tribal system and we are not progressing as a nation… We are content; 
people are not being pushed to challenge themselves, so society is 
stagnant… (Dr Noor) 
Dr Noor argues that this inverted approach to human rights has also had an impact on the 
development of the citizens as they are provided for and do not have the ability or desire to 
push themselves to improve or learn.  This, he argues, is also a  gross violation of the people’s 
human rights because although they live comfortably, they are being kept in an artificial bubble, 
which shields the public from the reality of the world and their society. 
Jamsheed, as a migrant worker, appears to have also noted this dichotomy in the Emirati culture 
and society. He shares his life experiences and compares his native Pakistan to his life in UAE. 
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       We must also remember that because of this tribal nature and the fact that the nation 
has just become independent, most of the establishment, especially in the UAE 
region, allows us to see that the people themselves are not really open to change as 
much because they see their own way of life being threatened... This is just like 
Pakistan in many cases… the landlords and traditional ruling class also do not want 
change as they have it so good at the moment... We really see the other side of it 
here… where society is created to naturally create a complex where the Arabs are 
superior to the non-Arabs and therefore hold naturally positions of authority and 
are above the non-Arab population… This is a clear sense of legitimised 
discrimination, but this also fits in with the heritage of the region... the question 
really for us to ask is how well do those Arab masters look after the human rights 
of their subjects…? In my experience, I have been treated well here in UAE… 
better than what I could have had in Pakistan… I feel as if I have some purpose and 
worth here… In Pakistan, I would have had to pay someone to give me a job… 
even pay my bills or live a life where I am dependent upon some rich or powerful 
VIP… (Jamsheed) 
Although Jamsheed identifies an open discriminatory policy against foreigners, which is 
prevalent in the Arab and Emirati society, he reveals rather surprisingly that he understands the 
need for it. He compares it to his native nation of Pakistan and contends that he still thinks the 
Emiratis treat him better than his own countrymen in Pakistan. Accordingly, it can be 
deciphered that the inherent discrimination actually protects his human rights as he knows his 
place in the cultural and traditional milieu of UAE, whereas in Pakistan he felt as if he had little 
value and belonging. 
These sentiments are validated by Professor Rashid, who argues that the cultural heritage, 
innate values and norms of the Emirati society are peculiar in their design but still maintain the 
respect due to human life. 
          …There is within our cultural traditions and heritage a tremendous focus upon the 
human relationship and what it means to be from a certain tribe or region… this 
idea of identity is interwoven with what we have defined human rights to be… 
Self- govern-ship, which is consistent with the idea of man as a Khalifa’ Allah or 
vicegerent of Allah upon the earth… like a manager… caretaker… so to respect 
each other’s perspectives has to be the basis for the understanding of human rights 
in any culture… (Professor Rashid) 
Professor Rashid argues that the influx of foreign migrant workers and their ever-increasing 
presence presents a credible threat to the future influence of the native Emirati population on 
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the governmental apparatus. He identifies this to have caused some initial suspicions 
amongst the conservative elements of Emirati society. 
However, Professor Rashid contends that the tenets of the Islamic faith alongside the inherent 
respect afforded to the outsider by the Arab culture have, over time, generated a great level of 
appreciation for the migrant workers in the UAE. He cites many studies and figures to prove 
that greater efforts have and are being made to accommodate and safeguard the rights of these 
foreign UAE residents. 
Here in the Emirates you have to remember that we have Islam as our cultural 
foundation and so from it comes the understanding of the rights of life and of 
course man… We have followed this custom for thousands of years and to a 
large degree even before the coming of Islam… it is a cultural heritage of the 
Arabs to respect one another and honour the guests… So here in the Emirates as 
we have developed we have sought to extend our custom and hospitality to the 
massive numbers of economic migrants… initially it cannot be denied there were 
some serious issues… but to give credit to the government it has acted… in the 
case of the child camel jockeys for example… so the nation is evolving and 
growing to adapt to its own position as a global hub and its societal infrastructure 
is already protective of the rights of all citizens and the global citizenry who 
reside and travel to and from the UAE… (Professor Rashid) 
Professor Rashid states that he has no fundamental disagreements with the definition of human 
rights as presented by the international community. Furthermore, he says he acknowledges and 
applauds the UAE government’s willingness to not only abide by but to also set itself the goal 
of becoming the leading proponent of human rights provisions not just in the region but 
globally. 
Sheikh Abdul from a governmental perspective is in complete support of Professor Rashid’s 
sentiment. He also argues that due to the immense growth and development experienced by the 
UAE in such a short period of time, which encompasses a significant influx of migrant labour 
force from all across the world, the UAE is adapting to the changes. 
…Of course, when you talk about the human rights, it’s not just about one Arab, 
Emirati, Muslim or what have you… every human being is a creation of Allah sbt 
and He says in the Quran that the protection of every life is like the protection of 
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all life… yes, we have had our problems, we will not deny that… but that is not 
what you call a flagrant abuse of human rights but the ignorance of individuals 
and the way they do their business… I mean the abused workers could be 
Pakistani, Indian, Bangladeshi or even other Emiratis it does not matter… what 
has happened is that a lot of international businesses have set up here and they 
were not made to uphold the rules and regulations but now we are more in control 
and as we develop so does our infrastructure, our policies, our rules, laws and 
regulations and now we are actively involved in ensuring that any human rights 
abuses are immediately noted and the perpetrators are instantly brought before 
the courts… we do not tolerate these kinds of things…(Sheikh Abdul) 
Sheikh Abdul argues passionately to reinforce the understanding that there exists an axiomatic 
relationship between the Islamic faith, which is the foundation of Arab and UAE society and 
the notion that each individual human being has inalienable rights. However, he accepts that 
with the rapid expansive development of the UAE and the initial chaos of … 
…Our Industrialisation phase… where it has taken nations centuries to get to, we 
go there basically overnight… (Sheikh Abdul) 
 
It appears hard to counter such a sentiment, which is from a socio-political and 
historical context, a remarkable feat. However, there are well documented cases of human 
rights violations in the UAE, by such International organisations as Amnesty International that 
document both high profile and publicised cases alongside those that have been seemingly 
covered up by the government. Sheikh Abdul does not seek to address the issue from just a 
purely factual perspective but seeks to engage the matter through a reflective lens. 
          …Mistakes will happen and we accept that mistakes have taken place… but we 
are only 40 odd years old… look at the United States… where slavery has only 
just been abolished in that time… Europe was wiping out the Jews and other non-
white and unacceptable peoples less than a hundred years ago… in just 40 years’ 
time with the growth we have experienced we have become a champion of not 
only strong economics but the people within that economic system… the citizens, 
the workers, the travellers… we have a long way to go but we are making 
progress… we are ensuring that each individual on the territory and sovereignty 
of the UAE is not only protected by our laws and regulations but enjoys his or her 
experience of being a part of our society… as long as the people living and 
working here respect the cultural and social etiquettes of our society we shall 
ensure with or without the UN mandated protocols on human rights that they are 
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safe, dignified and free to conduct their business… We must be doing something 
right… we have every nationality and business you can think of here... (Sheikh 
Abdul) 
There exists an air of confidence and authority in the manner in which Sheikh Abdul describes 
UAE’s ability to adapt and eventually uphold the mantle of standard bearer as he consents that 
the UAE, as an established trade capital of the world, has already moved to ensure a complete 
guarantee of human rights within its territory. 
However, although Hassan recognises and acknowledges the immense growth and 
development experienced by the UAE, he questions the broad relevance and 
understanding of human rights within the Gulf Arab societies. 
       In this region and country, we have what I think is a natural understanding of the 
human rights… Because of the tribal structure and how it functions as an extended 
family there is natural expectation to make sure everyone is looked after…not 
just physically but emotionally and spiritually… however, the problem arises 
when this assumption is challenged by outsiders… who expect the same treatment 
and acceptance… but this is reserved for their own people and not outsiders and 
so begins the basis for the contemporary debate taking place in human rights in 
the UAE or the Arab Muslim world… (Hassan) 
Hassan seeks to identify and provide an explanation for the underlining narrative that has 
shaped the course of human rights development in the UAE. He cites as per all the other 
participants, the great economic progress made by the UAE, which inevitably thrust the nation 
onto the world stage. He contends that even his own understanding of human rights and what 
they entail is evolving as he encounters new situations and phenomena.  Further still he argues 
that this is probably the case for all those responsible for human rights provisions in the UAE 
from the President and Prime Minister to the local regional officials. He concludes by arguing 
that he believes that the UAE is experiencing a steep learning curve, which when attained will 
set the UAE apart as a legislative and bureaucratic model both in the region and globally. 
Naturally at this stage there are a number of cases that are related directly to the 
aspect of human rights violation…In my experience, this means that the violators 
are usually guilty of misusing their power rather than any systematic program to 
abuse individuals… I have dealt with the government a lot and I can tell you that 
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in all truth they are more concerned with up keeping their human rights record… 
more than even the human rights organisation are campaigning for… they know 
that this will impact their image… their place in the global trading market and 
from what I have heard from both the President and Prime Minster they seriously 
believe that this constitutes a vital aspect of their faith and so is their duty… 
there are developmental issues and this has translated directly into the 
victimisation of certain people… but I think that is more political than a flagrant 
abuse of human rights… (Hassan) 
 






Discussing the Requirement for a Human Rights Institution in the UAE Establish the viability 
and requirement of a UAE based NHRI and understand its effects on the safeguarding of human 
rights provisions. 
Like I said, the institutions, or the notion of human rights being enshrined is, of 
course, part of our constitution, but its manifestation you can see into the results 
we have achieved… The progress made by the UAE… look at the three-year 
membership that we have on the UN Human Rights council from 2013… Thirty-
two countries from eighteen geographical groups. They all went for these seats but 
eighteen were available... We achieved the second highest votes by an Asian 
country of the region… 195 votes! That says something already, the recognition 
of where we are… (Sheikh Abdul) 
Sheikh Abdul appears to agree with the formation of a NHRI in the UAE in principle but then 
argues that the federal government has already taken the necessary steps to ensure that human 
rights provisions are not only maintained but implemented. He cites a number of initiatives 
taken by the government that has resulted in the UAE becoming a member of the UN Human 
Rights Council. He contends these counters the rather negative coverage and unfair criticism 
meted out to the UAE in terms of its human rights record. 
You want to talk about institutions? You want to talk about enshrinement... 
Manifestation of these things... EHRA, which we created under the Federal 
Discussing the Requirement for a Human Rights Institution in the UAE 
Establish the viability and requirement of a UAE based NHRI and 
understand its effects on the safeguarding of human rights provisions. 
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Public Interest Association Act number 6 of 1974… Already, from way back 
then we are raising awareness of the Human Right issues, which is what, 
according to our federal constitution and international obligations we have; we 
already working from our independence towards these issues! What these 
institutions that say the Paris Principles are calling for we are already on that 
same page since our independence! So, we are ahead of the game, we are not 
where we want to be, we recognise where we need to be, not where the people 
are telling us, okay that is a guideline, but we know where we need to be. (Sheikh 
Abdul) 
Sheikh Abdul is forthright in defending what the UAE has achieved so far.  He passionately 
shares the private view of UAE officials that although they (UAE government) are already 
working towards fulfilling all of their obligations by design. 
This implies their Islamic heritage and traditional culture; they (UAE government) are going 
above and beyond by instituting within their existing institutions the 
recommendations and transparency demanded by the various international human rights 
charters and recommendations. 
Hassan also agrees with Sheikh Abdul in principle by sharing his experience of working with 
the government and their clear objectives in ensuring that the UAE becomes a credible model 
of good governance within this area. Hassan seeks to dispel the belief that the government is 
against the creation of a NHRI by citing the conventions and treaties that the UAE has already 
become a party to. He shares his personal view that the creation of a NHRI will only enhance 
the UAEs stature within the International community. 
      Of course, we need the institution of Human rights to be established in the UAE. It 
is good for us in terms of our relations with the international world. It is good for 
us in terms of making sure our domestic policy of human rights is implemented and 
obviously it is good for us… because then we can champion something which we 
are already supporting in a lot of treaties and conferences and papers... We are 
already behind this and a lot of policies that we are developing will also allow us to 
negotiate better on the international level when we sit on the table because we are 
championing something with evidence and we must ensure that this institution is 
not only established as a showpiece, but is a fully functional institution… it is part 
of the structure of the UAE but not the government and is a functioning ombudsmen 
which can oversee the workings of the government and help them coordinate its 
policies on human rights and make sure those human rights violations which are 
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flagrant of the articles, especially as highlighted in the Geneva Conventions and the 
Paris Principles are instantly addressed. (Hassan) 
Although Hassan observes crucially that the establishment of an NHRI in the UAE may be 
taken as a governmental institution by the public, he argues that it can survive and function 
independently. 
We have this opportunity with the institution which is set up that it is operated and 
it has a big success especially in this region where it can just be seen as a tool for 
the government so its impartiality is very important. Important to make sure that 
the people are seeing it as independent, but this is very difficult thing to achieve 
as the government cannot win on this issue so it must do its best to uphold and 
then when there are violations for the institution to act. So, this is really the best 
possible way we can move forward on this issue. (Hassan) 
Hassan perceives that the creation of a human rights institution will  not  only safeguard human 
rights in theory but will in practice institutionalise the practice and provisions of human rights. 
He contends that this will actually improve best practices and attract more of the global labour 
force in all sectors of the economy. 
Professor Rashid concurs on this point and vociferously argues for the establishment of a UAE 
NHRI as it will add legitimacy to the UAE government’s argument that they uphold and defend 
human rights. 
            Well in the Arab states we need to ensure that the human rights are protected by the 
Constitution and legislative system, which they are in the UAE. Great progress has 
been made and this is well documented as you can see from these cases but going 
forward we need to ensure that this is enshrined and protected through and 
institutional mechanism where the Institution recognises that these laws and 
provisions on human rights must be enforced from the executive level, government, 
from the top, all the way down to bottom and the corporations that are operating 
here, both foreign and domestic, we need to ensure that the Paris Principles, the 
Articles that have been written on this are implemented… we are willing to 
contribute and work on this and develop this and to be honest with you we think it 
has the potential to become something of a standard in the region... (Professor 
Rashid) 
Professor Rashid believes that due to the broad and ambiguous nature of the Paris Principles, 
they must be implemented through an institutional mechanism funded by the government. He 
observes that although the independence of the institutions will be questioned, at the start the 
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government is the only mechanism that can establish and then sustain its functionality. So he 
perceives the argument centred upon the interference or control of the NHRI by the government 
to be a needless moot point. In his opinion, the government has actively sought the guidance 
and support of experts like him in the field, which has legitimised their sincerity and willingness 
to establish a (UAE) NHRI in the near future. 
        There have been other models which have been trailed and implemented by other 
governments, especially in the Gulf region but their effectiveness and working so far 
is questionable. Many, due to the pressure from the government, which is a problem, 
but again it is something we are working towards. We have very enlightened 
leadership in this country. Our President and Prime Minister are understanding of the 
problems… what is required on the international scene to make this work and what 
is required for a nation which has such global aspirations and is attracting many of 
the global corporations to work here and protection for their workers, protection for 
the migrants, it must now become an institutionalised process and we definitely 
support this… (Professor Rashid) 
Professor Rashid reveals that he is already working on a project alongside many other 
academics to suggest the framework for a NHRI. He has been conducting studies and research 
into the possible structural mechanisms of the organisation. He states that the governmental 
people he has worked with have sought his advice without providing any explicit instructions. 
This he cites as evidence of the government’s sincerity in allowing the policy makers to conduct 
robust research and design programs before initiating the development stages. However, a 
contrary perspective provided by Sophia, the representative of the International Non-
Governmental Organisation representative, stipulates that the UAE should be coerced into 
forming a human rights institute. She concedes however, that due to the broad nature of the 
Paris Principles a UAE NHRI could become an instrument of the government. 
       We have seen already seen this occur in the region… NHRIs just become a 
government tool or used to pacify the international community… but I think 
there is a need for these institutions because at least, at a minimum we will have 
some form of accountability for the government or at least demonstrate its 
human rights pledges that it’s made… There is a great need for these institutions 




Sophia highlights a salient point in that, as an International Non-Governmental Organisation 
representative, she would like to engage in some form of dialogue with the government. She 
feels that an NHRI would act as a form of access mechanism. 
Sophia argues that the UAE government has physically prevented them from meeting, 
contacting or representing alleged victims of human rights violations. This is she contends has 
given rise to the great air of suspicion with regards to UAEs human rights commitments. 
        …Really, we need an agency such as an NHRI, which allows us access into the 
country and allows us to deal with the people so that we can talk to them, find 
out what is going on, have a live feed on the ground and to be aware of what 
the issues are at the moment. But to be honest with you, we are not allowed that 
access as there is no real mechanism of delivery or accessibility… I think that 
a NHRI would allow us that mechanism to see what is going on in that country 
and interact with it to some degree… (Sophia) 
Sophia recognises the strategic advantage of establishing an NHRI, as it would allow for an 
access route into the government for International Non-Governmental Organisations and 
other independent humanitarian bodies.  She stresses the importance of open and established 
dialogue between them and the government and feels this will be greatly facilitated by the 
establishment of an NHRI. 
Dr Noor is not so optimistic however, and views any government sponsored or backed initiative 
to be questionable. 
…I don’t know what difference the institution will make really, to be honest with 
you, the country is not democratic at all for these types of institutions… where they 
hold the government to account…These institutions must have some sort of 
neutrality, some sort of impartiality, they must be free from the government… but 
the government itself is not democratic so it cannot create such systems… I have 
heard about this recommendation from the Paris Principles about the establishment 
of a NHRI but really I don’t see how a national institution which is set up by the 
government can have any real impact upon the government other than to act as a 
would be deterrent in the eyes of the world as a paper exercise. (Dr Noor) 
Dr Noor appears to possess little patience in discussing the possible place of a human rights 
institution in the UAE. He perceives it as a governmental mechanism to enforce policies as 
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terrorists or threats to national security and human rights. He shares candidly his perspective 
that has often got him into trouble with the authorities as being focused on only one issue. This 
calls for a change in the way the government is organised in terms of its political structure. His 
demands for a democratic reform include the establishment of an independent and transparent 
human rights institution. This he says, would be funded by the treasury and would be 
completely independent from all branches of the government. However, it would have access 
and supervisory powers to monitor all branches of existing government. 
I see the point of the institution and as we shared before… I would love to have a 
democratically elected government establish this… so as the governments change it 
maintains its impartiality… it’s not fixed to one party or people in the power… (Dr 
Noor) 
Dr Noor points out the example of the governments in the Gulf region, citing Qatar and Egypt 
as major examples of national governments utilising their influence to control what the NHRIs 
in their nations report and act upon. Although Jamsheed is not as familiar with the notion of 
human rights institutions, he contributes some valid points and provides some rich information 
from the perspective of a foreigner living and working in the UAE. 
         Look, I think there are many schools of thought and we must respect every 
culture, tradition and heritage for the knowledge that it brings with regards to 
how it creates its laws and society...So if the government has to create a special 
branch to make sure it is maintaining our rights, especially as foreigners then I 
welcome it… (Jamsheed) 
Jamsheed observes that with the development of the UAE and its modern society, it has had to 
develop many vehicles and mechanisms, which can cater for its growing requirements. He 
believes that the establishment of institutions is a sign of progress and institutionalising best 
practices will enable the UAE to become recognised for its human rights provisions. 
So, these laws and regulations that have come in, predominantly through the UN, 
and the bodies created after the Second World War are really there to help us create 
a sense of camaraderie and a sense of companionship where we protect the 
interests of each other and the individual human beings which comprise this 
relationship are the key tool to this. Their wellbeing or every individual’s 
wellbeing is the concern of every other individual if we are not to repeat the horrors 
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of the world wars that we’ve seen and the continuing conflicts that are going on, 
especially in today’s world. Human rights may become the first victim of a global 
or localised conflict which threatens to disrupt the security and stability of nation 
or the region... (Jamsheed) 
He thus maintains his broad perspective that the creation and enforcement of universal laws 
and provisions will, from the angle of the international community living in the UAE, be 
protected and guaranteed and it will provide great assurance and mental satisfaction. 
Sheikh Abdul provides a foreign migrant resident of UAE like Jamsheed with great comfort by 
arguing that the UAE is already a significant player and member of the International 
community due to its human rights provisions. He contends the government recognises that 
establishing a human rights institution would enhance the UAE’s international reputation. 
However, he points out again that their sincerity and commitment to the global human rights 
agenda is demonstrated by refusing to rush into establishing an institution under duress or to 
make itself look good at the expense of its credibility. 
…I know that these NHRIs as advocated by the Paris Principles in the nineties 
and their revised versions, we have been looking into that heavily since 2009… 
Just because something has a banner on its head that says, you know, Human 
Rights Institution, Human Rights Institution it doesn’t make it legitimate, 
legitimacy is when it translates into the actual workings of the people on a daily 
basis and you see it here…We have been looking into how to reform our federal 
national council which we have already done, as you know, and the things we 
have discussed on that. We are already there! We already have had the first 
women to be elected as you know. They now occupy something like 30% of our 
higher leadership in the UAE since maybe December 2012. It is now compulsory 
for our organisations and corporations, government agencies to have the woman 
on their board of directors. So maybe 2/3 of the jobs in government belong to the 
women! We have nine serving women ministers… The new Ministry of State for 
Happiness and the Ministry of State for Tolerance were both appointed to women! 
(Sheikh Abdul) 
Sheikh Abdul is full of facts on reform and how the government has begun the process of 
transition. He cites a number of government initiatives, which entail full-scale reviews, study 
and discussions on the drafting of possible future human rights articles and principles. This has 
also been coupled with ensuring that all foreign and domestic businesses are completely in line 
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with the existing domestic and international human rights provisions.  Hassan appears to 
support Sheikh   Abdul’s claims of government expediency and efficiency on the human rights 
agenda. He asserts that the UAE government has pushed the agenda as it has actively moved 
to discipline several large domestic and foreign corporations that abused the rights of their blue-
collar labourers. Furthermore, Hassan argues that the government should be given due credit 
as evidenced by its recent attempts at reform. 
          …The government we know is also very interested in assuring that happens. They 
themselves have pushed many of the agendas as you know, so you know we are 
moving in a good direction but of course there are problems in the sense of what 
these people may perceive the institution to be but so far, as you can see with the 
FNC, although there is criticism of it, we can see that the FNC has been an honest 
effort by the government to make some radical changes to the government and the 
way it functions… we are moving in the right direction and of course there are 
problems but there is change which is going on and we are seeing it and we can’t 
really judge it until it is implemented. (Hassan) 
Hassan expresses his personal conviction in the sincerity of the government in seriously 
assessing the requirements for the establishment of a fully functional NHRI. He agrees that 
although the government will attempt to aim for complete neutrality and impartiality, it is only 
human nature that at the start there will be issues. 
Professor Rashid also searches to answer the core questions that he has identified to be related 
to the purpose, design, implementation and evaluation. Although Professor Rashid 
acknowledges the Paris Principles and their broad articles, he maintains that the UAE must 
define its own NHRI by taking into account its own unique context. 
…So, we need to be implementing those values within how the institution is 
constructed from the ground up and that is sort of the focus for people like myself 
to be looking at this. We have gone past the viability stage, we know it is viable 
and feasible and there is a requirement for it. Now we have to look at what is the 
best possible way forward and we are at that stage. We must take our time, there 
is no rush, we must take our time to do it properly and we get the job done and 
the thing does not fall over flat before it has learned to walk. Other nations have 
tried it and failed and we do not want to be in that shoe. We want to do things 
properly in this country, there are many mistakes that have been made in areas, 
but we have learned lessons like there is no need to rush. We are going to study 
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this problem properly and then come up with the right solution at the right time, 
but there is definitely a need for it. (Professor Rashid) 
Professor Rashid concludes that the onus is on the Emirati citizens tasked with the initial 
research details to undertake their work with due diligence and take ownership for their 
findings. He attributes the government’s recent human rights initiatives to instigate a national 
discourse on the topic. Sophia however, contradicts Professor Rashid and shares that although 
the government has established some organisations in the country, which address the issue of 
human rights, they are not really independent. 
She claims that the government controls them and they (human rights bodies) ensure that all 
government wrongdoings, such as the cases highlighted by Amnesty International are 
ushered under the table.  However, she sees some change and approach in the behaviour of 
the government towards International Non-Governmental Organisations and other human 
rights organisations. 
         …Although we don’t have a trusting relationship with the government… I have to 
say that the government has recently become more open, accessible and fair with 
us in terms of the information they have released or they are willing to share with 
us... There was a significant issue during the FNC stuff… when the elections took 
place and we suggested that they allow international observers… however, we 
have to remember that even those elections only really only allowed a small 
proportion of the population to be involved and then some of the voting was very 
questionable... (Sophia) 
Sophia perceives there to be many issues with the current democratic reforms, such as mass 
participation. She states that the current system has become more customer-friendly and 
approachable.  She contends however that for the UAE to demonstrate commitment and 
dedicated funding towards upholding human rights pledges a NHRI must be established. 
Although she feels its credibility will be questioned due to the UAE’s previous human rights 
record and authoritarian governmental structure. 
Dr Noor in mirroring and expanding upon Sophia’s statement expresses strong sentiments, 
which demonstrate his complete lack of faith in any national or international organisation or 
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treaty. He argues that the UAE is too politically and strategically important to force to comply 
with human rights laws. The UAE government has according to Dr Noor a free reign to operate 
as it wishes with no repercussions. 
There are many international protocols, starting with the Geneva Conventions and 
many conferences that have been held all across the world. The many reports by 
global NGO, like Amnesty International and the group of nine who went to the 
UN to ask the UAE government to alter its form of governance and stop the 
blatant human rights abuses and arrests of people and the hiding that many people 
are under and the talking undercover, such as myself here, to express these views. 
It is very dangerous for us to express these views and we have suffered. It is not 
to say we are for the destruction of the nation, we just want to change it, not in a 
radical way but for the people to have representation and to be able to attain or 
aspire to have positions of leadership within the government. If this is a closed-
door shop, then what is the point of us? We are just like cattle; this is like a 
communist country, or a feudal lordship. This is the way we feel at the moment, 
we have no rights, and we have no freedom of expression, freedom of movement. 
Yes, as long as we comply, with everything that the government does then it is 
fine but to criticise to go against its policies is suicide… So the UN must itself 
establish an NHRI that monitors the UAE… but will they? No way… it would be 
a political disaster… (Dr Noor) 
Dr Noor believes that the UAE is part of an international conspiracy to create a global hub, 
which benefits the rich and powerful. Thus, he argues that it has no legitimacy in monitoring 
itself and must be superseded by a global body. However, due to his rather traumatic experience 
and lack of support or aid from foreign bodies he has resigned himself to accepting his fate 
under the current regime and system. Jamsheed on the other hand is more optimistic and views 
the current UAE governmental policies to be improving as is reflected from his own daily 
experience. 
I remember when I first came over… even at the airport the Emirati customs 
guys treated me roughly and rudely…even dealing with the bosses at work and 
then the visa people and the police were actually very scary and frightening… I 
thought I would get deported every time I spoke to an Arab in uniform… but no 
Alhamdulillah … apart from the citizenship I feel like I belong here, and the 
airport staff and the officials are not scary at all… in fact they all speak Urdu… 









It’s not about really what is being championed with such verbosity these days, 
the idea that democracy this, democracy that, an election and another election, 
politics, voting etc. We know buzzwords and catchwords, but we have a 
tradition here in the Gulf, we have a heritage, a history, which has worked for 
us for centuries. It feeds direct into our family system… in fact the root of it is 
in our tribes and in our families, from every house this is where the power is 
extended and grows in a natural democratic process, which is really about the 
families helping and sustaining each other to grow and survive within a very 
harsh and inhospitable climate… this is the heritage of this place, this is where 
from the people have risen… (Sheikh Abdul) 
Sheikh Abdul identifies the overarching structure of the government to be directly responsible 
for the remarkable growth and development experienced by the UAE nation. He equates the 
idea of democracy with the tribal family system. 
You have seen our leaders… they have always given… Why? Not because they 
are angels or something like that… because the leaders of the people are from the 
peoples and the people are their family… their relatives! This is the type of 
relationship we have, and this is why there is respect and almost unanimous loyalty 
to the family and to our leaders. It is not about he is the leader and he is from this 
family or that family because that family is our family. We are his brothers and 
sons… he is our brother, he is our father, this is the way this system works… 
(Sheikh Abdul) 
He argues that the UAE’s own native system of governance has generated the high level of 
intensity and unity required to navigate the nascent nation through some turbulent stages in the 
early stages of their development. Hence, he argues that the Monarchical system is best suited 
to the Gulf region, due to their context and cultural heritage. 
…Even the West, I mean if you look at Britain and most of Europe they have a 
monarchy system, the monarchy system has never been abolished! Why do they 
exist? Are they just a status symbol or what?... Because they are functional, they 
Discussing the role of Democracy and Governance in establishing a UAE 
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have a purpose, they keep a nation united, they keep the nation straight. In our 
case, we don’t hide the fact that our Kings and our Sheikhs are our rulers because 
they are there to do a job, this is not easy… You know basically in our Islamic 
faith, the leader is someone who is a servant of the people, and they are no bigger 
servants than our Sheikhs… They have ruled this nation with the love they have… 
like we are their children. (Sheikh Abdul) 
Sheikh Abdul describes the native democratic process to reside in the Arab notion of 
community and tribal customs. 
So really when we are talking about democracy, upheaval and change who is going 
to take over? People who have been conditioned to look after their people and the 
system… and to know how it should run, or those who have no idea… are in there 
to profiteer and then being pushed by foreign powers or actors with funding…The 
viciousness of their attacks on our country is tantamount to treason against the 
nation… they promote democracy but we see them buy those positions… in 
democratic countries, no names mentioned, where everything is basically run by 
lobbying powers with their millions and millions of dollars…So they buy into 
power positions by putting those people that will serve their interests… What we 
have here is allegiance to leadership which is proven over centuries and so what 
we have is a stability and understanding and accountability to the people…
 (Sheikh Abdul) 
However, he perceives this native way of life and governance to be under threat by foreign 
agents. He cites the examples of Tunisia and Egypt as examples of manufactured attempts to 
destabilise their respective nations and throw them into chaos and turmoil. He argues that the 
current equation of human rights violation with the UAE’s system of governance is based upon 
generalisations. He expresses his disgust at media reports and articles, which use examples of 
South American and African dictatorships as comparable models with the UAE. This 
demonization of the UAE is according to Sheikh Abdul a gross violation of the human rights 
of the entire Emirati population. Although Professor Rashid agrees with Sheikh Abduls 
lamentations on the criticism of the governmental structure and its operational methods, he 
begins by identifying and acknowledging the criticisms leveraged against the UAE. 
…We are still following a monarchical, hierarchical and tribal structure. A very 
paternalistic structure which basically signifies a hereditary system and that there 
is no room essentially for the election of leaders, but the leader is elected due to 
their heritage or due to their social position within the ruling families... We can 
criticise this system and there is much to criticise about this system and much 
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literature on this in terms of not allowing the masses to partake in the political 
system and process and are alienated from it. This is firstly from the Emirati 
citizens themselves and then of course the migrant workers who are here and 
cannot gain citizenship for example and be part of the process. There is much 
criticism about that and rightly so. (Professor Rashid) 
Professor Rashid recognises that there must be some basis to the constant condemnation of 
its governance and human rights record by outside observers. 
However, he argues that this exists due to the ignorance of the outside world with regards to 
their appreciation for the cultural and traditional heritage of the region, which is the driving 
force behind the success of the nation and region. 
…But if you look on the other side you will see clearly that the system is part of 
the tribal heritage of this region and that it has worked for the survival and cohesion 
of the nation. There is much respect and allegiance given to the leader himself, so 
people are willing to follow what the leader prescribes because it is in the interests 
of the leader to lead his people well because they are the ones supporting him…in 
the Gulf support is coming from all the other ruling families. (Professor Rashid) 
Professor Rashid identifies the existence of the contemporary pro-democracy movements to 
be an anomaly, which he claims have been shut down on the behest of the citizens. He recalls 
that it was the Emirati public themselves, which viewed these movements to be immoral and 
intrusive. The result of which has generated such negativity around the governance of the UAE. 
He argues that the country is passing through a great period of transition and is actually moving 
away from a very feudal kingship-based system into a much more democratic system. 
…You can see that with the establishment of the FNC, this has come about after a 
long time, but the fact that it has been established is a great sign. Things do not 
happen overnight especially in nations which want to develop with some sort of 
stability. The UAE has been careful, it has studied its neighbours and yes there are 
ruling families here, but it is a unique system in the sense that all of the rulers of 
each Emirate are ruling their Emirate and they still come together and collaborate. 
(Professor Rashid) 
He reveals that a majority of the native Emirati population do not have a problem with their 
government because the model has worked for them. His personal opinion is that the 
government and its governance has led the nation through great change and turmoil and has led 
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them to becoming a prosperous and influential nation on the global stage. He argues that there 
is in fact great change taking place. It can be considered democratic from a Western 
understanding if they could appreciate the Shura or  Majlis processes. 
We are becoming more formalised as I said, creating institutions etc.… however, 
we have our own established processes such as the hosting of the Majlis and the 
consultation… the Shura… the people are happy with that and they help create the 
strong leadership, recognised leadership, people who they can trust, people who 
can lead them through this time when there is great suspicion of the message of 
human rights coming from international organisations, which basically implicating 
the UAE as a human rights violator. To protect the nation against such attacks and 
especially at such troubled times, it is imperative the government maintains a 
strong stance which it has and it has clear leadership, and they understand the 
direction that the nation is going in. (Professor Rashid) 
Professor Rashid contends that the nation is heading towards a much more democratic process 
throughout its entire structure. However, by comparing the UAE to the UK he observes that he 
can see the monarchy slowly fading into the background once the country is safeguarded. 
Accordingly, he discusses the processes which have already been initiated. This includes the 
greater participation of the public in the governance process including the role of women and 
the rights of foreign workers. Hassan, although in complete agreeance with Professor Rashid, 
seeks initially to present the other side of the argument. This stipulates that due to the 
authoritarian nature of the government, it has a direct influence on the functioning of every 
institution it creates or establishes. He recognises the claims of nepotism and partiality, in that 
a human rights institution will be an instrument of the government and therefore be controlled 
by it. 
We are seeing that this could be a problem as we have seen the examples from the 
region itself… where the NHRIs have become vehicles for government 
mouthpieces, in many cases. We also accept that governance based on democratic 
principles will ensure that people are always serving the best interests of the 
majority, which in our society is the interests of basically everyone … so the 
political players are gaining and getting the rewards from the people, which is their 
vote… and this is what democracy is about, carrying the favour of the people by 





Hassan then proceeds to concede on this notion and reflects on real world examples of the 
failures of so called established democratic nations in the West. He argues that in theory the 
principle of mass public participation in the political process is the only credible system of 
governance. He stipulates however, that it is how they participate, which creates the tension 
between the predominantly Western way of understanding and their native natural process. 
So there are two sides through which we can understand this argument… 
democracy has in theory, the ability to ensure there is mass participation and 
protections of the peoples including, maybe, the protection of the minorities… Our 
form of democracy, which is conducted through the social networks of the families 
and tribes is as democratic if not more than the casting of anonymous votes…we 
support our leaders openly and there cannot be charges of fraud or nepotism as 
most discussions are conducted openly… and decisions taken with the knowledge 
of the senior elders and people of every tribe and family... (Hassan) 
 
He identifies the contextual development to have significantly affected the way in which the 
Western and Gulf Arab understood the political process. He cites the European experience of 
colonisation to have bureaucratised and dehumanised the entire political process. However, he 
also recognises that this has allowed the Western European nations to evolve their political 
systems. Due to their broad experience of administrating nations across the world, they learned 
to integrate the functioning of diverse cultures and peoples into their bureaucratic systems. 
Now what we have here is we are undergoing a similar sort of process but in a 
different way, we have global trading hub here in the UAE so what we have is a 
stable governmental system which is helping the country transition from its 
independence only 40 years ago to now where it is going heavily through a 
bureaucratic change. (Hassan) 
 
Hassan believes that the globalisation process has accelerated the development of the political 
system as the requirement to become a major hub in the region and trading world imply that 
the government operate with greater efficiency. He contends that the UAE is already party to 
many international treaties on trade and economics, thus its efforts to uphold human rights 
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provisions are not beyond its capability or desire. He states that the UAE’s election to the 
Human Rights commission has galvanised the new generation of Emiratis in the political 
system to work towards greater change. 
…The governmental and democratic system will help with democracy and as I 
have said before, is recognised and is now coming through. At the sublayer it is 
already taken place, it is already becoming part and parcel of the way things are 
done in this country. At the top you may have the stable leadership, kinship system 
but at the moment it is providing for the unification and the stability of the country 
so we are seeing it. We see it at the ground level, we are seeing it in the middle of 
the country, the democratic process is already taking place, with mass participation 
already coming in, the rights of workers coming in. So a lot of change is taking 
place but it will happen slowly as we do not want this to be an uproar and upheaval, 
we have already seen this with the Arab Spring… (Hassan) 
Hassan states that through his own professional and social networks,  the  native perspective  
welcomes  change  in  the  country.  However, he states that they also understand that only 
through experience and education, will the nation develop its institutions in line with the 
developed world. So far he believes that in the Gulf region, the UAE has the most balanced 
system, which has worked to safeguard the citizens, maintain political stability and now with a 
thriving and growing foreign work force, the introduction of new legislations and reforms in 
policy. He concludes that a balanced perspective will consider the challenges faced by the 
existing government and its response to them. Sophia however disagrees with the rather 
optimistic and pro-governmental perspectives shared by Hassan.  She observes that an 
undemocratic government by definition prevents the participation of citizens and residents in 
the political process. This in itself proves and justifies the severe criticism levied at the UAE 
government. 
... For any human rights policies or institutions to function you really have to 
question whether it is possible to function under something which is very much an 
autocratic system. It is rule pretty much by a dictatorship and really you have to 




Although Sophia argues for the formation of a UAE NHRI, she states that the role of 
governance and democracy will be crucial in terms of the plausibility of the institution and 
establishing its credibility within the international community. Sophia however is cynical and 
cites the undemocratic nature of the UAE government to be enough evidence of the resistance 
and likely possibility that impartiality or operation will not prevail in a NHRI established 
independently from the government. 
…Unless… the government suddenly decides to use the NHRI as a mechanism to 
whip people that have violated human rights… then maybe it might have a chance 
to work whereby the government itself becomes a benevolent overseer and then 
they try to oversee the issue of human rights from a very neutral perspective…
 (Sophia) 
However, she concedes that even this approach is dangerous as it allows the UAE government 
to dictate the very definitions and understanding of what entails the concept of human rights. 
This she argues may allow the government to decide the very humanity of individual’s and 
their right to live or even exist in the UAE. 
…From a Non-Governmental Organisation perspective, which operates all across 
the world we can see that the UAE has mastered, behind its clever economic policy 
and its subsidised investments and attractive trade policies the ability for the rest 
of the world to forget about its human rights violations of its migrant, or slave, 
population, who have built much of this place… (Sophia) 
Sophia is adamant that the problem lies not just with the UAE but the entire international 
community. She cites their complete disregard for reports demonstrating the human rights 
violations and the election of the UAE to the human rights council which have completely 
discredited, for her, the legitimacy of that body. She argues that for a nation that is openly 
discriminatory and makes no effort to hide it, the international community has placed great 
responsibility and trust upon its shoulders. 
To be honest with you they are not even interested in looking after the rights of the 
people that have built the entire place… it is more about looking after Emirati 
rights… It is not even a case here of the Emiratis being unhappy… many from the 
migrant labour force are being abused systematically by the government… 
because it all comes from the issue of a nondemocratic autocratic governmental 
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system that can do whatever it wants… These are Faros of the modern world… 
(Sophia) 
Sophia concludes on the point by noting that the unfettered power and control wielded by so 
few of the Emirati society will inevitably lead to gross inequality and marginalisation of the 
Emirati populace itself. She perceives an Orwellian future whereby the use of ‘double speak’ 
will imply that the protection of human rights provisions will actually mean the abuse and 
violation of them. 
Dr Noor reflects on the rule of the tribal elders before the formation of the UAE and recognises 
it as an appropriate system for its context. He observes that it was a good system within a 
specific locale and tribal setting but now as they were part of an international community and 
dealing directly with international political and economic agents and processes they had to 
adapt their governance to not only compete but also survive in the international market. 
…What you are trying to do systematically is to control the people using your own 
tribal mentality…Without democracy and without the involvement of the people 
there is no Shura, there is no  Majlis, there is no coming together, this idea that we 
have tradition system, this is a fanciful form of dictatorship… This is what this is, 
this is a tribal mentality, to have control, to have people agree with you as long as 
you are looked up to and after… (Dr Noor) 
Dr Noor argues that there is no room for growth and development of the mind under the current 
system. He contends that what is prevalent and continually reinforced is the tribal mentality, 
which effectively overrides the open, transparent and flexible approach required to operate in 
the 21st century. He states that he understands this to be the undemocratic process. 
The democratic process, whereby the people are invited or part of the system to 
contribute their perspective and their opinion, to develop it, to be a part of the 
process to make the change and actively vote to take ownership, to take something 
that they can say they are a part of …we don’t see this in our current system. What 
we are seeing really is a bunch of sheep being herded here or there and we are 




Dr Noor seeks to make the point that the government is operating a calculated program to keep 
its citizens and residents uninformed and in constant fear of repercussions. This way he alleges 
the migrant workers are too scared to demand any rights and the natives are pacified with the 
argument that they are being sent to study abroad and thus receiving the best education. 
However, the result of this he contends is that native unqualified Emiratis are being employed 
without the required skillsets, so they don’t learn to take ownership for their own self-
development. In raising this issue he has been victimised by the government. 
When this argument is made to them they feel very threatened and take it very 
personal which makes me feel that there is some element of truth. I am an academic 
so I like to bring the facts and the facts are really that when the call is made, they 
act in a very barbaric way and in an irrational manner… (Dr Noor) 
Dr Noor claims that for the simple act of calling for educational reform and to make more 
Emiratis accountable for their actions, he has suffered great abuse at the hands of the 
government. Although he is unwilling to discuss his case in detail he states that other 
intellectuals accused of nothing more than thought crimes are not only locked up but have 
disappeared. So he argues passionately that the notion and understanding of human rights 
should entail the protection of the individual from the powers that be. 
…What we have here in the Arab world especially is a kingship system, which is 
gone on since the death of Muhammad (pbuh), we have seen that… And the four 
Rashidun Khalifas, since the death of them we have seen nothing but a kingship 
system, where the king decides and everybody follows. So in asking for reform 
here, we have really suffered, we are punished in fact you can do promiscuity, 
haram, and get away with it but to call for change or to challenge the leadership of 
the King is tantamount to heresy and this is what we are suffering… this is the 
oppression… (Dr Noor) 
Dr Noor concedes on seeking any change or reformation of the governmental system as he is 
resigned to the fact that the current system has effectively eradicated any opposition or 
dissenting voices against its governance. He states that unless there is significant change of 
heart the current rulers will ensure that they use human rights provisions to suppress and negate 
any grassroots movements or influences calling for change. Jamsheed provides a unique 
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perspective as an outsider to the predominantly Emirati participants. He effectively contradicts 
the views of the human rights activists by refusing to critique the government, as he attributes 
his successful career and comfortable lifestyle to the policies of the government. 
Look the first thing for me as an ordinary migrant professional is that I know I 
would not be enjoying the position and responsibility I am having here… So, I 
know there is a lot of talk about the democracy and how that is the best way to run 
a country… I am from Pakistan and we are trying to run the democracy but it is 
not like the one in Europe or West… it is corrupt and run by dirty politicians who 
are gangsters… here they are proper people with pedigree… they have their rules 
and they stick to it… but they are not saying we are a democracy and yet their 
system functions the best… (Jamsheed) 
Although Jamsheed is full of praise for the UAE government, he acknowledges the suffering 
endured by his fellow countrymen, working as labourers.  He observes however, that the 
majority of the cases we’re not specifically the fault of  the government but the actual 
organisations employing the personnel. He states that if the government had not acted to rectify 
the poor and substandard conditions experienced by the labourers then it could be held to 
account but the fact that new legislation and laws have been passed and enforced demonstrates 
their commitment to human rights. 
Here you can see that they act and change stuff to make it work… In other places 
the bureaucracy is so bad that people are writing reports and reports and nothing 
seems to get done… here they identify the problem and then straight away they 
decide to deal with it… if this is not democracy than I don’t know what is…? 
(Jamsheed) 
He brings to light an important point that was not expressed by the other native Emirati 
participants. Jamsheed’s observation of the inherent efficiency and ability to change is 
cognisant with the literature on the survival qualities of the nomadic Arabs. He shares a number 
of personal encounters to prove the impartiality and rapidity with which the government 
agencies had acted to resolve his own personal issues. 
In dealing with a car accident… An Arab guy hit me from behind and he claimed 
to the police that I had braked hard and he had no choice… just before that he was 
shouting and swearing at me… I also wanted to shout back but I was a little scared 
because I heard that if you talk back to the Arabs or confront them then you go to 
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jail and police never take your side… well… when the police arrived… the Arab 
guy started to accuse me of saying this that and the other… he was being very 
arrogant… but the police officer then took me to the side and began to ask me my 
version… I told him everything… and he then went and booked the Arab guy and 
gave him a ticket for dangerous driving as he must have been speeding to have hit 
me as I was traveling at the speed limit… and for the use of bad language and 
aggressive behaviour… I was shocked and my whole attitude and belief about 
these people has changed… they are trying to their best to implement the true 
Islamic teachings of justice… (Jamsheed) 
These rich accounts, exonerating the government of its apparent negligence and abuse of 
human rights of foreigners justify the passionate arguments presented by Sheik Abdul. 
Although this represents a single individual’s perspective and experience, nevertheless it is 
significant in presenting the very best of UAE’s society and functional bodies of its governance. 
Although Jamsheed is extremely content with his life in the UAE, the issue of foreigners being 
unable to acquire citizenship and permanent residency is a cause for concern. However, he does 
not perceive this to be related to the issue of democracy or the monarchical system of 
governance. 
We could have a democratic system here… two or three parties … whatever the 
number it doesn’t matter… and what happens when an extremist or nationalistic 
party comes to power… we would have no privileges whatsoever… the way I see 
it is that… the world has built a relationship with the ruling families… who in turn 
have looked after the workers coming in… this relationship is building and I 
believe that in time … it will be possible to get permanent residency if not 
citizenship…I can see why they would want to protect their own population 
because it is small… Yet they keep a fine balance, which is satisfying their own 
people and the foreign people like me… (Jamsheed) 
 





The Role of Education in promoting the value of Human Rights and Human 
Rights Institutions to decipher the participants’ understanding on the place 




…Education is very important, in fact it is the de facto important thing, in order to 
get this message across, to remove the inherent mistrust around the message which 
is basically castigating the UAE government and its people in terms of their 
isolationism, their elitism, whereby they see themselves above the majority of the 
people that reside in the nation with them. So, we need more programs of 
education… Although I am aware that the government has actively launched 
programs in schools, colleges and universities and now within the police force they 
are actively trying to educate people… (Professor Rashid) 
Professor Rashid observes that the UAE government is already in the process of undertaking 
significant educational undertakings with the aim of introducing the notion of human rights 
into schools and colleges. This is in addition to its projects to initiate a greater appreciation for 
human rights provisions and issues within the established police and security apparatus. He 
states that the design of the curriculum and material is extremely useful in that it addresses 
directly the relationship and inherent notion of human rights with the Islamic faith, the native 
Emirati and Arab culture and traditions. Professor Rashid argues that even the perpetrators may 
not be aware that they are committing human rights violations. The security services for 
example may be utilising methods or tactics to gain extra information that constitutes unlawful 
and excessive interrogation of potential suspects. However, he contends that these factors are 
now being identified through a systematic program of education and research. 
For now, I think there is a robust program of education and understanding that will 
naturally go a long way towards helping the people understand their duty and 
obligations to their fellow citizens…Of course people in authority… to who this 
really applies will be taught not to abuse their power but use it wisely to make sure 
those within their jurisdiction are looked after… they are not devalued or 
dehumanised and maybe this will ensure greater results and working… This is 
something that has been worked on and is systematically being implemented 
through the different channels and mediums to the general population and I think 
we are moving in the right direction with that… (Professor Rashid) 
Professor Rashid admits that although more effort is required by the government to increase 
the awareness of human rights, it is up to people like him in positions of authority and 
knowledge to not only guide the government but to educate the public at large. He shares that 
from a personal capacity, he needs to engage more with society and work with organisations to 
help them understand the benefits of complying with the rules and regulations not only in terms 
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of economics but from a social human perspective. Sheikh Abdul parlays the common rhetoric 
with regards to education in terms of its place, importance and vitality to the nation. 
We recognise that to reform our society, to create the understanding of the 
universal human rights laws, their provisions and how that they fit into the system, 
we have had to obviously look at the whole system and the underlying principle 
by which everything is understood and delivered through the education system… 
so we have developed a very comprehensive program and package that we are now 
delivering to the secondary schools… They are actively receiving this training as 
modules and lessons within their classes at the grade levels… Then you are seeing 
this in university level courses and of course in our police, security and 
government jobs and departments they are also receiving specialised courses to 
make them understand the issues, the vulnerabilities and the sensitivities around 
what is these issues and what is required in terms of their upkeep and to ensure 
that before a violation occurs these provisions are respected and understood so that 
there is no need for the violation to occur in the first place. (Sheikh Abdul) 
As per Professors Rashid’s identification, Sheikh Abdul refers to the recent educational 
programs being rolled out across the UAE as a sign of progress. Sheikh Abdul states that an 
additional benefit of the programs has been the feedback it has provided. This entails that most 
cases handled by the police and security services did not automatically constitute a violations 
of an individual’s human rights. The feedback by both the alleged victims and perpetrators 
suggest that a majority of times, it is usually a matter of political, social and tribal difference. 
Often times, he claims the people have issues with each another or governmental agencies, 
which have dealt with them in a particular way and they have perceived this to be a violation 
of their human rights.  He states that more often than not, there is no violation of an individual’s 
human right other than the way they have acted with the officers or government officials, and 
the response they receive is perceived to have violated their human rights, when in truth it has 
only damaged their ego. 
You will see that a true human rights violation is rare, especially in this country. 
The way we operate, the diaspora that we have here, the multicultural atmosphere 
we have here; it is not possible for us to violate human rights, it is more a case of 
divergent cultures, work ethics etc.… mixing and for that disharmony of those 
forces. So really education is key in order to reduce the misunderstanding on both 
levels, for the people to respect the laws and customs of this nation that is also very 
important and once they can understand and become a part of that, they will 
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become natural defenders of society and therefore defenders of each other and 
human rights… (Sheikh Abdul)  
Sheikh Abdul believes that the UAE is not only duty bound to uphold human rights in 
accordance to the Islamic Sharia and their own cultural heritage but due to political and social 
prudency. In seeking to become the leading global trading and business hub, the UAE must 
ensure it has an unblemished human rights record if it wants to attract the best talent and 
business and so there is actually no real reason for the UAE to not be working towards 
establishing itself as a model par excellence on human rights governance. 
Hassan is in complete agreement with the others in citing the importance of education as a tool 
for development and greater appreciation of human rights provisions. 
…The people are needing to be educated about these issues and we are talking 
about people in the government and ministries, so in one way when people are 
talking about the system of democracy… one way is to educate and to teach people 
that they have roles and responsibilities and this the right way to be conducted. 
…Of course, there is a broader picture; the implications of violations of the human 
rights must also be discussed within the global context… (Hassan) 
Hassan reveals, as per the other participants, that he has already witnessed the induction and 
implementation of human rights courses in schools, colleges and within both police and border 
forces. Speaking from personal experience, he says that there is already a greater awareness of 
the issue now, that didn’t exist when he was growing up and passing through the UAE 
education system. He adds that he is also involved in many programs explaining the laws and 
their implications to both domestic and foreign businesses operating in the UAE on hiring 
foreign worker and the rights. 
I am seeing this first hand on the ground and companies are now actively taking 
an interest and changing the way that they are doing the business to make sure that 
they comply fully with the rules because the government is really starting to clamp 
down on those violators. So, we are seeing active change in this field and it has all 
come about through education because people become more aware of it and the 
younger Emiratis that are coming through are becoming aware and more socially 
responsible because they want their country to fit in and be seen amongst the best 




Hassan concludes on this point by highlighting that because so many of the younger Emiratis 
have experienced some foreign exposure they are eager to implement the same level of 
standards in all fields. Consequently, he sees great change, which will result in the eventual 
institutionalisation and inclusion of human rights studies as the main priority of a human rights 
institution in the UAE. Although Sophia agrees with the importance of education and 
acknowledges the government’s initiatives in introducing human rights educational programs, 
she also questions the type and delivery of that education. Sophia claims that the content of the 
programs she has gained access to is very general with no viable method to enforce the 
mentioned principles of ‘goodness’, ‘harmony’ etc. She adds further that there is no way to 
measure them and their impact. 
There is talk of systematic programs… but how well they have been conducted or 
received we just don’t know yet. It is the right move, we do give the UAE credit 
on what they have attempted to do here we encourage it, we would like to be a part 
of it, we would like to help the government in terms of what it is doing and not be 
a hindrance as they have seen us before. Rather we would like to support and aid 
them in their transition from the period they are going through… (Sophia) 
Sophia believes that an International Non-Governmental Organisation like hers would be an 
ideal partner in delivering these courses, as this is what her organisation does all across the 
world. However, due to the UAE’s attitude and general approach to International Non-
Governmental Organisations she finds it rather contradictory that a government promoting 
human rights values will not work with a human rights educator. She states that despite this 
issue she is hugely supportive of the initiative as it is at the very minimum introducing the 
debate to the broad public the government itself and the personal involved in leading the 
institutions and Ministries of the government. 
This is a good start… it’s a bit basic and questionable in areas but I think there 
needs to be a systematic overhaul of the education process within the region 
anyway… as I think this is a good way for human rights education to be 
incorporated into the main syllabuses and within the governmental bodies… and 
for there to be a broader range of study and acceptability of perspectives, which 
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will show that the education system itself is having the impact and is actively 
becoming a vehicle to change society. (Sophia) 
Sophia recognises the UAE’s efforts through its educational programs but feels they are still 
too narrow and designed to fulfil pledges rather than attain real change. She argues that for that 
to occur the UAE government must reform its own structure and demonstrate its commitment 
to human rights by giving everyone in the UAE a right to dictate their own lives and the systems 
that govern them. Dr Noor elaborates on the status and requirement for a sound educational 
program in countering human rights violations. 
The education programs are a good thing… and I know it is being implemented, 
although it is limited at this stage but you know at least something is going on… 
At least we give a credit to that aspect where nothing has happened, something is 
happening right now but what it is, what its content is, what its impact is, what it 
is meant to be; that is something which we have yet to see. I cannot comment other 
than to say that the other education that is needed is about the violations that are 
going on here. There is too much quietness. The international media, we feel is 
scared to really explore and exploit these issues. It is their job, it is incumbent on 
them to really take these issues and really highlight our plight to signify some of 
the great people that have been shut down by the government, who have 
disappeared or systematically undermined… (Dr Noor) 
Although Dr Noor supports the government’s human rights educational programs and 
initiatives, he also identifies the biased manner  in  which  they  are  presented.  He personally 
recommends that if the government were to engage someone like himself then he would 
develop a systematic program to help them root out the problems at the most fundamental 
levels. He argues that there are two aspects to the whole human rights educational programs 
that the government is currently missing. The first entails what the government is already doing, 
in that it is raising the awareness of the public to these issues. The second aspect he identifies 
to be missing from the program is the causes of human rights violations. He says this can only 
be addressed via serious in-depth research that involves dialogue with the perpetrators and 
victims alike. He says that most of the studies and research are nothing but paper based 
exercises and battle of intellectualities between scholars and commentators. He states that the 
solution lies in the sincerity and resources devoted to undertaking this type of work and its 
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effects. However, what he is seeing at present even through the conduct of the educational 
programs are in itself a gross violation of human rights. 
Yes, I agree that…education is everything, but education is also a tool… and 
whoever controls the tool, controls the mind, controls the young minds of the 
children, teenagers and adults… Whoever controls education is in control of a 
great power, so education is a powerful tool…Just because someone is educating 
it does not always mean a good thing… you need to ask… educating how and 
what? (Dr Noor) 
Dr Noor saliently observes the duel nature of education and the possibility for it to be used to 
corrupt, indoctrinate or brainwash the public and especially the young minds of impressionable 
children.  He states that his sincere hope is for the education programs in the UAE to have 
…woken people up… However, he also laments in the same breath that the government is 
incapable of such sincerity by design, as it is against their personal interest to see such change 
in the people. His last remaining hope is that the educational programs will at least introduce 
the concept and instigate the desire within the people’s hearts to research further and eventually 
begin to see the discrepancies for themselves. Jamsheed, as a foreign worker with little 
exposure to the internal workings of the government and processes, says that he is unaware of 
any government initiated human rights campaigns or educational programs. However, he 
believes that education will prove to be the best method by which people can be informed and 
trained to ensure that they do not violate the laws and principles due to another human being. 
He makes an interesting point in that he feels it’s the duty of the religious leaders and normal 
school teachers to actually promote this message through their classes. 
I think the whole issue is the lack of education in these matters… society is so fast 
these days that no one has the personal close relationships, which would naturally 
build that respect for other human beings… Although we seem to have more 
Islamic classes and schools, they don’t seem to be really teaching the kids the 
proper tarbiya and adab of how to behave in society… I think it’s the job of the 
schools actually to teach the human rights stuff and not just governments … but 
the governments could force the schools or include it in their curriculums as part 
of their mainstream courses… (Jamsheed) 
 155 
 
Jamsheed argues that although the government needs to do more in terms of updating its 
educational curricula, the problem is with the people who are not interested in learning such 
things. He uses his native Pakistan as an example, whereby he states that there is racism 
between Pakistanis in terms of their colour, caste, race, tribe and region. So, he concedes that 
human rights have historically always been an issue and maybe the entire religious and 
education process was to develop a better understanding of human rights and values. 
No matter where you go in the world, there are issues and people complaining 
about their governments… I think the fact that people don’t get any education, 
can’t read and write is the biggest violation of human rights especially considering 
that we are in the 21st century… Ok so everyone should be able to vote and chose 
their leaders and have the right to say what they want… but no-one ever questions 
why it’s not ok for someone to learn how to think for themselves or to be taught 
how to be independent…Personally I don’t think you can just say like a zoo 
animal… here is the animal and this what it does and what it likes… a human being 
just like any of Allah sbt creation is complex and to be honest it takes a lifetime to 
understand one single individual… how can a course really teach you about human 
values and issues… you have to live them and experience them… so that they 
become a reality in your mind and you can actually understand it… just like if you 
never seen snow before… you need to be in the snow to know how it feel and 
taste… (Jamsheed) 
 
4.3.7 Participants’ Recommendations and Suggestions 
 
The participants’ advice and proposed future recommendations and suggestions: 
…Well what I would say is that in the future, going forward on both sides is that 
we all need to open our channels of communications in a better way. There needs 
to be greater trust and understanding between all of the parties, right now we feel 
like we are slightly victimised by the international media and the Non-
Governmental Organisations; they see our success and they try to translate that 
into the way social norms and policies should be playing out in accordance to what 
maybe they are used to or where they are originating from, which is predominately 
in the West but really we have our own ethos and culture here which needs to be 
respected and before the respect needs to be understood so that a lot of the 
misunderstandings can be eliminated straight from the source, we need to have an 
active recognition of what we have achieved so far, so we are not constantly 
harangued and criticised and victimised by the peoples and that they can see 




Sheikh Abdul contends that the UAE is now beyond comparisons with other Muslim and Arab 
countries and should be viewed within a global context as a major International influencer. He 
argues vociferously that the media and other social commentators need to acknowledge the 
eradication of barriers and the processes created to ensure the mass participation of women and 
foreigners. He even challenges the researcher to compare any other Muslim or Arab country 
with the UAE in terms of its economic and social development and success. 
…We are a very desirable place to live, it is a destination for a lot of expats, 
Europeans, a lot of tourism from all across the world and I think it is a model, a 
global model for the 21st century of how we can coexist as a humanity, break down 
our barriers. Yes we must respect our individual identities but going forward we 
have a model where we can live in peace and harmony, especially in these 
troubling times. (Sheikh Abdul) 
Sheikh Abdul states that the UAE must consolidate its successes and now focus upon the issues, 
which have the potential to sow the seeds for destabilisation or chaos in the future. 
…Well the contemporary formalisation, study and eventual implementation has 
come predominantly from the West… But this is not to suggest that the theories 
or the idea behind them are the exclusive works of European or Western thinkers 
only… We should take the approach presented to understand these ancient ideas 
through the contemporary modern lens… this is where the West has excelled… it 
has redefined old notions in a new language and so created a renewed interest and 
understanding of the oldest principle… this right of man… since the creation of 
man, itself. (Professor Rashid) 
Professor Rashid maintains that the broad notion of education is crucial in the eventual 
successful implementation and safeguarding of human rights in the UAE. He calls for more in-
depth educational programs, for both the professionals in government and private corporations, 
both domestic and foreign. He also identifies the need for greater studies, conducted by Emirati 
and UAE based scholars and researchers, which are sponsored and then utilised by 
governmental authorities, departments, ministries and universities. He stipulates that academics 
and students studying abroad for higher education should act as a bridge for those with limited 
travel and outside world exposure and share their experiences. This must also be coupled with 
utilising the enormous wealth of global talent already presents in the UAE. 
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…And the final thing I would say is that the world should have patience, to have 
patience to see the growth of the UAE and its understanding of the rapid 
economisation of the country and its development and the infrastructure which 
hasn’t yet developed but will develop in time. The mechanisms of delivery are 
developing alongside a rather fast and emergent economy. So, they have to keep a 
pace… this is where we are at… (Professor Rashid) 
Although he admits that the UA is playing catch up with its more advanced competitors in the 
West, it has time on its side and must not be rushed into policy and decision making at the 
behest of non-governmental actors and the media. He concludes by identifying the progress of 
the UAE to be nothing short of miraculous, which has led to it experiencing the inevitable 
problems and issues associated with change, development and transition to new paradigms and 
systems of governance. 
All I would say, going forward, especially from a legalistic perspective there are 
many ways to look at these provisions and Articles, but I think the best way 
forward is to look at the spirit of what they are trying to achieve and the 
technicalities…Unfortunately some global corporations will just look at the 
technicalities to get out or not fulfil their social responsibility because they are 
always trying to look for the way out, so we really need to tighten down on some 
of the broad provisions and make sure the clauses for escape for some of these 
firms and international actors is reduced if not eliminated completely… (Hassan) 
Hassan recommends that the government tasks itself to firstly ensure that any violations of 
human rights are dealt with adequately so that examples can be made of the perpetrators. 
Secondly, he argues that for the human rights provisions to be on par with the international 
standards and expectations, the UAE government must be given more credit for the work it has 
already begun and supported by its international partners. 
…It makes the UAE government’s work easier if other nations for example that 
supply the labour ensure that the people they send over are not criminals for 
example…we cannot check everyone as we would like… our partners can help us 
on that front…We want to see not only the UAE succeed but the other nations in 
the region and in the Muslim world… but for that to happen… core policies must 
be implemented and followed by all players… those who are punished for 
violation in the UAE must face global repercussions and should not be able to hide 




Hassan concludes by arguing that the UAE has, unfortunately, become a victim of the human 
rights violations it is accused of. He states that there are many perpetrators that are not being 
punished accordingly by the international justice system for their practices in the UAE. This 
results in the UAE being blamed for the actions of some rogue players and actors and further 
tarnishes the image and opportunity for the UAE to progress and to become the global hub and 
trade zone that it should be. 
I would recommend that the UAE government start engaging now with all the 
international actors and partners that are involved in the human rights struggle, 
especially for it to engage with the Non-Governmental Organisations and invite 
them to work with the government in terms of its education programs and its 
awareness… and to actually help deflect a lot of the negative criticism the 
government faces which may be unfair… (Sophia) 
Sophia recognises government’s initiatives but reveals that their unapproachable attitude is a 
barrier for them to gain the credibility and  recognition  they desire internationally. She argues 
that the government in totally refusing to negotiate hold discussions or deal with the Non-
Governmental Organisation actors actually fosters a tainted picture of the UAE and justifies 
the arguments that seek to portray the UAE as being grossly neglectful of their duties. 
There are some very good people there, but they need to be allowed to engage with 
us so that we can carry their story and maybe there are misunderstandings, maybe 
there are cultural differences, which haven’t been understood properly. My 
recommendation is a greater engagement and honesty and open debate on and 
around the human rights issue… (Sophia) 
Sophia concludes by requesting that the UAE government open up its channels of 
communication to engage with a greater number of non-state actors that will actually champion 
its progress and defend it from false accusations and criticisms. 
I would recommend and urge the international community to pressurise the UAE 
government to implement and establish a human rights institution in the UAE… 
this will tell us how serious they are about the human rights provisions and their 
sincerity in development of their NHRI as recommended by the Paris 
Principles…Rights under the Geneva convention must become part of the system. 
I urge them to really highlight and question the UAE government, put them under 
a spotlight and make them answer for their crimes because now they are acting as 
they want to and they will not be subjected to any punishment, instead they have 
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been rewarded with a seat on the Human rights council which is a joke and laughs 
in the faces of those who have been victims themselves… (Dr Noor) 
Dr Noor places a great deal of the blame for human rights violations in the UAE on the 
International community, which he states ignores the government’s misdeeds because they rely 
on the UAE’s vast reserves of oil, its ports, its flexible and questionable finance market. He 
argues that if the International community alongside the transnational institutions such as the 
UN were sincere, then the UAE would be placed under economic embargos and sanctions. 
However, Dr Noor concedes that due to the economic and strategic power of the UAE it has a 
free rein to behave as it pleases. 
If the International community doesn’t bring the UAE to justice the nation will fail 
miserably and I think the only people to blame for that is the International 
community because they have consistently supported a non-Democratic 
government with vast control of resources and a global migrant population for the 
benefit of itself… (Dr Noor) 
Dr Noor argues that despite all the UAE’s memberships and associations with human rights 
council, accords and treaties, the educational program it is conducting within the nation, and 
its promise to establish a domestic NHRI, will amount to very little in actual practice. The 
reason he provides alludes to the desperate desire for a small body of elite families to rule and 
pillage the natural wealth. He concludes that unless powerful enough nations decide to bring 
the UAE to task it will continue to pretend to the world that it is a defender and champion of 
human rights values, which the media promotes because they are owned by the corporations 
that operate freely within UAE’s borders. 
I would say that the government should engage more with the labourers and blue-
collar workers… they have a tougher life and so their demands are sometimes not 
being met…other than that I have no other advice for the government… they are 
the government and so know what is going on… it’s always easy to suggest from 
outside but inside it’s a lot harder…maybe they can think of allowing permeant 
residency for people who have been here for a long time and some sort of national 
pension plan for those people whose companies don’t provide it or to make these 





Jamsheed’s real focus is on his own career aspirations and eventual retirement and settlement 
plans. Thus, he is actively seeking any advantage that could secure him a higher level of income 
or savings. Jamsheed states that he is apolitical and refuses to go into much detail or discuss 
the government and its human rights policies in any great detail other than to suggest that it 
could reward long term residents and workers with permanent residency status. Although he 
misses his family and home in Pakistan he really wants to settle in the UAE and believes that 
if this was made possible then his only major concern would have been alleviated. 
I actually love this country… my cousins are in UK, US and some places in Asia… 
yes I would love to visit those places one day… but to live in an Islamic country, 
which is rich, developed, civilised and looks after you is truly a blessing here on 
Earth… so why would I complain… after coming from Pakistan this is heaven… 
at least I can earn halal income and don’t need to bribe people or lose my dignity 
even paying my bills and fighting with the idiots behind the desk, in the ques on 
the roads… this is beautiful… peaceful…lawful and it is where my human rights 
has been protected… (Jamsheed) 
Jamsheed concludes with a revealing statement that  does not account for the 
perspective of all foreign workers. However, as a foreign economic migrant from a third world 
developing nation, the UAE has already proven to be better than anything he has experienced. 
He claims that in his own native land he was at the mercy of corrupt officials and bureaucrats 
but here in the UAE his human rights have been safeguarded by the UAE government. 
4.4 Discussion of Findings 
 
This section offers a critical reflection on the key findings derived from the empirical field 
study, which are supported by the review of literature 
4.4.1 Finding 1: Government is the Human Rights Institution 
 
The first finding derived from the data analysis procedure suggests that the participants 
perceive the overarching role of the government to be inherently to safeguard human rights and 
promote their best interests through its ministries. 
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A significant aspect of the literature on human rights within the Gulf States identifies the 
inherent values contained within the Islamic faith to have directly formed or influenced the 
peoples understanding of human rights in that region.  The study participants gave further 
credence to this notion as they were unequivocal in their views that human rights formed an 
axiomatic norm ordained by God Almighty. The participants supported this assertion by 
initiating their understanding of human rights with references to the Islamic scriptures and 
tradition. They contended that Islam was revealed in order to eradicate the abuse of human 
rights in the region at that time. So historically the region had already undergone a significant 
revolution based upon the safeguarding of human values, whereby human rights are equated 
with the Quranic values of dignity, identity and the freedom to express, speak, move and 
associate with whomsoever one chooses. However, as per the literature all the participants 
understood that the freedom of an individual is curtailed by the prevailing norms and standards 
of the broader society in which the individual resides. Accordingly, an individual is free to act 
as they please within their own private domains, providing this does not entail any criminal 
acts or activity such as gambling, murder, prostitution etc. but they must act in accordance to 
the prevailing social norms in the public domain. Sheikh Abdul, a senior government 
representative identifies the UAE government to be a custodian of the Islamic faith, thus its 
entire purpose is to propagate the Islamic doctrines (ideology) through its institutions and 
ministries. He perceives the broad role and purpose of the government to be realising the 
Islamic faith articles and societal functions through the various apparatus of the government. 
Professor Rashid, as a scholar and academic supports this assertion and also identifies the 
government’s purpose to be upholding the Islamic values. He argues that the government and 
specifically its leaders are the vicegerents of Allah and thus have the authority for self-
governance and self-regulation. This does not imply that they are unaccountable or independent 
from the will of Allah, rather they are duty bound to protect and ensure the growth and 
development of their societies. Hassan, as a jurist, argues in the same vein and perceives the 
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entire legal structure to be formulated on the Islamic Sharia, which the government must ensure 
is not only enforced but made relevant to the contextual situation of the people’s reality and 
circumstances at the current time. Jamsheed, a foreign white-collar worker from Pakistan, 
provides a somewhat surprising addition to those perceiving the government’s role to be 
innately responsible for the preservation of Islamic values and human rights by default. He 
refuses to critique the government and cites the role of the UAE government to exemplary in 
the balance it has maintained. Although he argues that the government may have a specific 
understanding of Islam, which is not shared by a majority of the immigrant population, it 
nevertheless ensures that the nation functions efficiently and effectively by preserving law, 
order and security of the people. In comparison to his native Islamic Republic of Pakistan, he 
argues that the UAE government is clearly a defender of Islamic values and norms, whilst his 
own nation created upon the name of Islam is clearly in violation of the Islamic values. He 
reveals that the Pakistani people do not believe their government to be credible or representative 
of the Islamic tradition, which is contrary to the perspectives provided by the UAE populace. 
Sophia speaking from the perspectives of an activist and representative of an International Non-
Governmental Organisation, although highly critical of the government, also recognises the 
influence of the Islamic faith in determining the role of the government. She contends that 
despite the broadly accepted narrative of separating religion from state, the UAE and Gulf 
region maintains this relationship and views it as a divine relationship. Although she argues 
that this is a problem as it effectively allows the government to become the judge and jury on 
religion, curtailing any alternative opinions and arguments. However, she acknowledges that 
the government is and has always been viewed by the natives of the region to be responsible 
for maintaining the socially accepted Islamic norms and customs. Although Dr Noor is an 
alleged victim of human rights violation by the UAE government, he also identifies the UAE 
government to be an instrument for promoting the Islamic ideology. He is highly critical of this 
however, and perceives the government to have usurped the functionality and purpose of 
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religion to provide legitimacy and justification to suit its own needs. He argues that that no 
government can justify its role and status to be divinely ordained as this will inevitably create 
a dictatorship and authoritarian style of governance. Nonetheless, he accepts with great 
trepidation that in the UAE, the government is perceived to be the upholders of Islam and thus 
by definition human rights. 
The review of literature alongside the data derived from the study participants further revealed 
that the native and immigrant population perceived the national federal government to 
comprehend and be representative of the native culture, heritage and tradition. Although 
dissenting voices amongst the participants can be discerned (Dr Noor, Sophia) they 
nevertheless accept that the governmental structure is an extension of the tribal heritage and 
culture of the region. As we have seen, many researchers argue that the United Arab Emirates 
has experienced an exemplary level of continuity, with no significant reformations in the 
political structure or institutions since its inception. Although critics (e.g. Amnesty 
International) have used this fact to highlight the undemocratic and autocratic nature of 
governance, it has according to the study participants articulated a fundamental reason for the 
political stability and social harmony experienced by the UAE. Sheikh Abdul, Professor 
Rashid, Hassan and Jamsheed cite the initial rule of the late Sheikh Zayed, the ruler of Abu 
Dhabi and president of the UAE since its inception in 1971 (up until his death in 2004) and 
now Sheikh Nahyan (2004-present) as the primary example of the prevailing tribal structure 
that dominates UAE society. Sheikh Abdul relates this tribal structure directly to the concept 
of community and family. This implies that every Emirati individual is part of a local family, 
this is his or her own emirate, which is subsequently linked to other families or emirates through 
inter family relationships and treaties. The welfare of the national family has become the 
collective responsibility of the seven rulers comprising the Supreme Council. Hassan observes 
that the government officials and the leaders in particular of each Emirate and the nation itself 
are engaging directly with their public through the hosting of regular Majlis. Whilst the leaders 
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enjoying the collective support of their tribes then act through the Shura process to make 
collective decisions on the local and national levels. Professor Rashid identifies the UAE’s 
approach to social politics to be an equivalent to Western style democracy and cites it to be 
appropriate for the context and cultural heritage of the region. He summarises the current 
situation in the UAE as a continuation of the heritage of the people, which entails the intimate 
relationship between the rulers and their people and he argues that the government is a 
representative of the families, whereby the interests of the people is vested in the rulers and the 
rulers in the people. The members of the public are loyal and place their trust in the government 
to deliver on their demands. Professor Rashid further contends that the Emirati citizens feel 
more secure and are more informed as to the workings of their government. This is because the 
public will have some direct connection to the government due to family relationships or 
personal dealings. This he argues is not the case within the Western democratic nations, as they 
are too bureaucratic and the people are alienated from the system and thus are treated as mere 
objects that work to contribute to the economy and cast votes. Jamsheed supports the previous 
argument by further providing evidence for the flaws in the modern democratic nations. He 
states that his native nation, despite being a democracy, is corrupt and the rulers, usually from 
one or two particular regions, frequently engage in rampant nepotism and steal the country’s 
resources for personal gain. Jamsheed is however enamoured with the federal structure and 
functioning of the UAE government. He identifies it to have a legacy and heritage, which has 
given it a pedigree to take the responsibility to organise and manage a new nation to prosperity. 
This he observes is due to the government being formed of tribal families that have the interests 
of the people at heart because they are from them. However, some (as exemplified by the 
comments provided by Dr Noor and Sophia) argue that the tribal nature of the national and 
local governments justifies the accusations levied against the UAE, that it is an overtly 
autocratic and undemocratic political structure that has effectively enslaved its populace. Dr 
Noor and Sophia agree with both the literature and the other study participants regarding the 
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notion that the organisation of the modern UAE is influenced by its traditional tribal heritage. 
However, they note that the seven rulers of the Supreme Council are the only people authorised 
to communicate decisions with regards to the federation. Sophia believes this highlights the 
fundamental problem, whereby the Supreme Council is an effective court of kings, who has an 
audience with their subjects within a Majlis setting to provide them with material comforts. 
She recognises this practice to have effectively paralysed the Emirati citizens as the nanny state 
fulfils their daily needs. News of any wrongdoings or inhuman treatment by the government, 
especially against foreign workers, is suppressed and the Emirati citizens, being unaware and 
unconcerned, fail to bring the government to account. Dr Noor again furthers the point that the 
tribal heritage and customs of the region have naturally created a situation whereby the 
government is accepted to be the guardian and confidante of the native population. However, 
Dr Noor argues that any individual seeking to speak to authority and challenge the exiting order 
is made an example of, thus ensuring that all dissent is effectively eradicated. Dr Noor accepts 
that whilst an NHRI is required, it will be a government-controlled institution as the 
government is in effect the only institution that is able to monitor and regulate itself. Although 
he concedes that this is highly improbable he observes that with the establishment of an NHRI, 
it will represent for him a symbolic rather than actual change. 
4.4.2 Finding 2: Role and Purpose of NHRI to provide Human Rights Education 
 
The second finding derived from the data analysis procedure suggests that the establishment of 
a UAE based NHRI would be for the exclusive purpose of conducting research and 




The review of literature (Decara384; Murray, 2007385; Morten Kjærum, 2003386; Reif, 2000387) 
asserts that a significant aspect of the NHRI’s function should entail that it is involved in the 
education of human rights to the governmental bodies, public and private bodies, alongside 
educational institutions and the general population. The findings from the data analysis phase 
also suggest that the participants were unanimous in their perceptions of the NHRI’s purpose 
and function to be exclusively that of an educational institution. The argument presented in the 
first finding above has already revealed that the participants do not envision the creation or 
successful operation of a NHRI functioning independently in the UAE. All participants 
envision the role of the government to be inherently to protect the rights of individuals both 
native and foreign. However, they also recognise the requirement for establishing an 
independent NHRI due to UAE’s commitment to international agreements and initiatives; but 
state that due to the socio-political climate, the primary function of the NHRI should be to 
provide education. Sheikh Abdul, Professor Rashid and Hassan argue that the UAE is ready 
and willing to implement International Human Rights norms, thus implying the establishment 
of an NHRI as per the Paris Principles. However, they also contend that this cannot be at the 
expense of destabilising their own socio-political structures and tearing apart the fabric of their 
societies by undermining the work of their governments. Sheikh Abdul reflects that an NHRI 
created specifically to oversee and monitor the government will inherently create a culture of 
suspicion and inherent mistrust. He argues that a government that is being judged by 
international observers and commentators is acceptable as long they are fair in their 
assessments and present all evidence for their findings. He admits that a NHRI created and 
                                                                
384 Danish Institute for Human Rights, ‘NHRI Will Play a Strategic Role in Education’ 
<https://www.humanrights.dk/news/national-human-rights-institutions-will-play-more-strategic-role-
education > accessed 15 August 2017. 
385 Murray, ‘National Human Rights Institutions. Criteria and Factors for Assessing Their 
Effectiveness’ (n 196) 189-220. 
386 Kjaerum (n 305). 
387 Reif (n 324). 
 167 
 
established by the government cannot fulfil its pledges for autonomy, impartiality and 
independence. Notably, whilst Sheikh Abdul accepts that the idea of an NHRI is feasible and 
plausible, he argues that its role should be educational so that it can prepare and ensure that the 
future generation of leaders and people in positions of responsibility and authority are fully 
cognisant of and willing to ensure human rights provisions. 
Professor Rashid takes this point further and argues that officials who are educated to 
appreciate the value of their own Islamic faith and apply them to the modern-day notions of 
human rights will naturally ensure violations are curtailed or eliminated. This is, he observes a 
long-term strategy, which the international community needs to acknowledge and the domestic 
public support by actively becoming involved in the programs and disseminating the received 
knowledge. Hassan states that the government has already initiated these educational programs 
with great success. The formation of a NHRI would only consolidate and unify the entire human 
rights agenda and educational programs in a systematic and coherent fashion. Hence, he is in 
agreement with Sheikh Abdul and Professor Rashid in that the establishment of an NHRI would 
ensure that the entire debate upon human rights becomes institutionalised through an 
intellectual dimension. Hassan argues that through this process the entire Emirati society can 
be impacted organically and the minds of the younger generations trained to appreciate and 
understand the notion of human rights in real-world scenarios. Jamsheed again provides a 
unique point of comparison and although he possesses little knowledge on the notion of human 
rights institutes and NHRIs specifically. He states that an institution developed to educate 
society upon the value of human life in all areas will inevitably eradicate the systematic abuse 
of people. He argues that laws and regulations do little to prevent those in power from abusing 
their privilege, as he has witnessed in his own nation. In fact, he believes that those ordaining 
the laws in his native country are usually the worst offenders with open flagrant demonstrations 
of their abuse and perversion of their authority. So to prevent such attitudes from developing, 
Jamsheed identifies the formation of a NHRI to be positive and useful for the nation if its role 
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is concentrated solely upon education. He reflects that an institution created to regulate the 
government will only become a vehicle for political and social control. 
Although both Dr Noor and Sophia accept that the establishment of a UAE NHRI cannot be in 
practice separated from the institution of government, they further add that the NHRI can be 
used effectively not only for research and dissemination of human rights education and training 
but also as a medium for rehabilitation for those deemed to have violated the human rights of 
those placed under their charge. Dr Noor argues that he grudgingly now accepts that the 
perpetrators to his abuse will not be brought to account, because it involves the entire machinery 
of government. However, he argues that those officials and senior members of the leadership 
should have to undertake some form of human rights education and remedy rights training, so 
that they can be made aware of their actions and the harm caused by them. Sophia agrees with 
Dr Noor’s assertions and further adds that the UAE could actually use the work and advice 
provided by the International Non-Governmental Organisations as material for their NHRI. 
This will also help to create partnerships with International Non-Governmental Organisations 
so that both parties can establish a mutually respectful and beneficial relationship. The 
International Non-Governmental Organisations could help the UAE establish the NHRI and 
deflect any unwarranted criticisms levied at the UAE government. However, she concludes by 
stating that the entire process is at the behest of UAE’s leaders. If they were to establish an 
NHRI and utilise it as a mechanism for change then the UAE government, which has been 
much maligned due to its poor human rights record could instantly become the de-facto model 
for other states to follow. 
4.5 Conclusion 
 
The aim of this chapter was to use an exploratory qualitative methodology to consider a core 
thesis question: What are the perspectives of the Emirati population and Human Rights activists 
on Human Rights Issues and on the need for an NHRI in the UAE? This entailed the direct 
 169 
 
engagement with both those who are affected by the implementation of human rights laws and 
those who are responsible for its execution and legitimacy. 
The chapter was organised into three major sections to address this query. The first section 
discussed the chosen methodology, whilst the second section focused upon the analysis of the 
captured data and the third section examined the findings derived from the data analysis phase. 
The purpose of the first section was to establish the firm fact that, this was an exploratory study. 
Aa an examination into an extremely delicate subject matter with at times unpredictable 
consequences, the field work proceeded to respect the sensitivities of the State of UAE and the 
Region by explicitly and implicitly declaring that it had and has no intention to undermine the 
Government’s position or stance on human rights in the UAE. The conversations with the 
selected study participant sample, reflects this approach. The primary targets of the fieldwork 
research were all individuals that were, in some capacity, either directly responsible for striving 
to preserve human rights provisions, experienced personally human rights violations, 
commentators, jurists and/or activists in the UAE. 
The analysis of the dialogical process unearthed a rich narrative that the researcher has 
categorised under two major findings of the study. Although, it must be clarified that the study 
fully acknowledges the possibility that other arguments could formulate as part of or instead of 
the identified major findings. These arguments encompass the rights or voices of migrant 
workers as opposed to natives or residents, implying that there exists an inherent contradiction 
in society, which discriminates against the ‘other’, the foreigner, the outsider. The nature of 
this disparity between host and guest has resulted in many government-owned firms treating 
their migrant workers as an enslaved workforce. This then extends to the tradition and practice 
of the local Majlis and Shura councils. They are a natural innate part of the fabric of a deeply 
tribal society, which naturally caters for its own people. This highlights the ambiguity of 
universal terms and the deep misunderstanding they create. In the UAE the concepts of Shura 
and Majlis are built upon familiar, tribal understandings. This naturally creates what is termed 
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an autocratic leadership model. However, this represents the accepted and desired model of 
governance. The citizens of the State perceive their leaders within familial relationships and 
thus every Emirati has a direct connection to the rulership. This is a unique situation that is not 
without its flaws. There is ample evidence from the interviews that outsiders are not privy to 
the inner workings of UAE society. They have no viable channel through which they can 
challenge the workings of a Governmental agency. International human rights organisations 
argue that temporary workers and non-residents have little or no rights and their rights are 
deliberately flaunted. However, due to the economic and strategic value of the UAE, these are 
often overlooked or ignored by both the mainstream media and international political bodies. 
All the aforementioned factors could qualify to be identified as major findings of the study. 
However, the reason for not selecting them was because they are not new findings. They have 
already been cited by the literature, some of the study participants merely supported, reiterated 
or referenced facts and accusations that are already documented. The objectives of this study 
are construed from the perspective of identifying the factors that are required to establish and 
NHRI in the UAE. The purpose here is not to focus exclusively on human rights abuses but 
rather the remedy for it.  
The first identified finding therefore reflects this approach and reality. It is a unique and 
pioneering encapsulation of the concept that the role of the government is intrinsically that of 
a human rights institution. The public perceive the overarching role of the government to be 
inherently safeguarding human rights and promote their best interests through its ministries. It 
can be argued that human rights are already an innate aspect ingrained in the UAE culture, 
faith, society and tradition. The argument stipulates that the participants perceive the existing 
societal structure to be an institution in itself, which is self- governing and self-regulating. This 
is a unique approach towards interpreting the role of the government and the formation of an 
independent NHRI. In UAE society, the establishment of an independent body to monitor 
governmental actions is unfeasible. Therefore, the government must establish and support an 
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NHRI, with its role concentrated solely on the awareness and education of Human Rights. This 
formulates the second finding, the establishment of a UAE based NHRI would be for the 
exclusive purpose of conducting research and disseminating education and training to 
governmental, public and private institutions in the UAE on human rights compliance. 
The next chapter seeks to explore the existing provisions and required criteria for the 




The Requirements for Establishing an NHRI in the UAE 
 
The discourse on human rights norms is a strategic instrument utilised to deliberate and ensure 
the concurrent dissemination of progressive policies whilst repudiating the essential causes. 
Derived from either the realist or liberal schools of thought it proposes human rights to be either 
universal, whereby human rights are a common human factor and imposed through the threat 
of force, or culturally specific, whereby each nation must adapt the rights to fit in with their 
society. Within the purview of this cultural perspective, the Spiral model as proposed by Risse 
and Sikkink388 suggests that nations traverse through five designated phases, whereby the last 
phases suggest that they are fully compliant with international human rights norms. The 
establishment of a fully operational and functional NHRI is a core indicator of this progress. 
Therefore, the primary aim of this chapter is to discuss what is required for the establishment 
of an NHRI in the UAE? 
5.1 The Normalisation of Human Rights 
 
Adopted by the United Nations General Assembly, The Universal Declaration on Human 
Rights389 is, initially, a statement of principles, which have now become the fundamental norms 
of Human rights and are used as part of binding treaties for international agreements and 
treaties.390 
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International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (CCPR) and the International Covenant on 
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This reflects the development of the contemporary International socio-political culture and 
practices, which demands that States comply with best practices in order to uphold their 
international commitments.391 Ramos and Falstrom392 note that every signatory to a binding 
treaty or protocol, which contains Human rights clauses must at the very least be fulfilling the 
minimum criterion otherwise they would be in violation of their agreements. However, 
although Schwarz acknowledges the points made, he observes that the eventual imbuing of 
these Universal Declaration on Human Rights principles by Governments may allude to their 
professed commitments to protect ‘and promote human rights standards but at the same time, 
they have …massively defaulted on their normative commitments’393. 
Schwarz argues that there is a discrepancy between the human rights norms as propagated by 
the Universal Declaration on Human Rights and adherence and application by national 
governments. He further contends that there exists a disjuncture between the translations of the 
legal theoretical discourse into actual political behaviour.394 
 
5.2 The Role of Human Rights Discourse 
 
Gordon and Berkovitch observe that discourse operates simultaneously to promote the positive 
and productive acts whilst seeking to negate and prohibit its essential causes. 
 
On the one hand, discourse constitutes society's social norms by creating fields 
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of knowledge, to produce identities and interests, thus influencing and shaping 
one's world view and behaviour. On the other hand, by defining objects, spheres 
of inquiry and fields of research, discourse sets limits, creating a system of 
exclusion, interdiction and prohibition395. 
Human rights discourse is perceived to be a strategic tool, which both introduces and 
consequently shapes the perspectives of individuals and communities. Gordon and 
Berkovitch396 identify human rights discourse to be encapsulated and embodied within the 
entire corpus of international and regional covenants, treaties, declarations and protocols. This 
discourse is then propagated through conferences and meetings by organisations such as the 
United Nations alongside other international and regional institutions. They further contend 
that the nature of the discourse usually encompasses at the domestic level, the formation of 
regulatory bodies or Non-Governmental Organisations, which promote the introduction of new 
laws, policies, and their own role as intermediaries between the victims of human rights 
violations and the accused, which is usually the broad machinery of government or specifically 
the security forces for example. Gordon and Berkovitch397 argue that the formation and 
existence of this discourse furthers the ability of the people to identify repressive practices. 
(These are considered to be those that not only contravene domestic and international law but 
also effectively undermine the ethical and moral codes of their societies.) Although, they 
shrewdly note that the dissipation of the content and impact of this discourse upon the local 
domestic society used to take years or even decades, now with the advent of social media, the 
awareness of human rights violations is almost instant.398 
They assert that mass public access has uncovered and verified accounts of human rights abuses 
from every single place on the planet and they stipulate that the discourse on human rights has 
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itself become public, local and global, as the very notion of human rights discourse and its 
language is imported from nation to nation via social and mass media channels.399 
         …The global processes affecting the domestic can't be restricted to the 
international human rights discourse or international institutions… Global 
processes also include actual events that were taking place in different 
countries during the same period… for the first Palestinian uprising… the 
collapse of the Soviet Union… the dismantling of the apartheid regime in 
South Africa… the failed student revolt in China, etc.… Moreover, these 
events were covered extensively in the Israeli newspaper, and the term human 
rights was employed in their portrayal400. 
Shor reasons that once the human rights discourse has entered the domestic public sphere, it 
will extend to all geographical regions and spheres of public and private life. 
He argues that although the degree and intensity of transmission is influenced by the underlying 
social factors, the level of democratisation of the nation’s institutions also impacts it.401 This 
means that a crucial aspect of the phenomenon of human rights violations is to understand the 
nature of the discourse and its formulations on the nature of compliance. 
5.2.1 Discourse on Compliance 
 
For the purposes of this study, the discourse around human rights apply to the establishment of 
an NHRI in the UAE which, it is argued by Shestack, are dependent upon perspectives derived 
from either ‘radical individual universalism or radical culture universalism’.402 Shor observes 
that the notions of individual and cultural universalism are a reflection of the realist and liberal 
approaches to human rights: ‘Both realist and liberal approaches are actor-oriented; they take 
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actors (states) as the ontological givens and assume that their actions are guided by rational 
motivations and interests…’403. 
State compliance is any action taken by the state in conformation of the international norms, 
thus naturally they are compliant, whilst any State actions that deviate from the accepted and 
agreed upon international norms is deemed to be non-compliance. Moravcsik404 however, 
negates this assumption by arguing that governments involve themselves in international 
commitments to counter any possible future political alternatives that may arise domestically. 
Hence, he observes that to maintain the survival of domestic politics, human rights treaties are 
adopted or ratified. He contends ‘that while realists stress power politics and assume that states 
do what they are forced to do; liberals believe that what states want is the primary determinant 
of what they do...’405. 
This debate leads Cardenas to question the effect of the relative role of external pressure in 
comparison to the internal commitment of States to comply with the human rights norms.406 
Cortell and Davis had earlier expounded upon this point by noting that international pressure 
should be expected to be most influential when a ‘cultural match or normative fit’407 exists. 
Their argument stipulates that human rights reforms are dependent upon the internal domestic 
acceptance of international norms. They perceive State compliance to be part of a much wider 
dynamic process, whereby even limited actions and half-measures can potentially contribute to 
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profound social change.408 
Habermas had earlier contended that the human rights discourse must diffuse to the general 
domestic public via mass communication mediums such as newspapers, periodicals, radio, and 
television also, for him at that time, the introduction of the internet.409 His argument remains 
relevant as he advocates members of a domestic society to support international norms and join 
transnational networks of activists. Cardenas, in support, notes that international pressure is 
likely to succeed when transnational networks use their influence and moral entrepreneurship 
to both lobby and place human rights issues on the national plans of powerful governments.410 
Whilst Susan Burgerman's work on the role of the UN in promoting human rights reforms in 
Central America, identifies five conditions to be taken into consideration when human rights 
compliance is examined411: 
1. The existence of relevant international norms 
2. The material interests of a major power 
3. Transnational network activism 
4. Domestic allies in target states 
5. Domestic political elites, who are concerned with their international reputations 
Although, Burgerman’s analysis exemplifies the trend towards a broad and multifaceted 
examination of international human rights concerns, the onus for this study is on a specific 
region and nation State. The analytical perspective provided by Shor allows for a more focused 
and in-depth exploration of the factors required to implement a NHRI in the UAE. Shor 
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identifies two significant sources of compliance, which are derived from either the radical 
individual universalistic (strategic calculations) or the radical cultural universalistic 
(normative commitment) perspectives.412 
 
5.3 Radical Individual Universalism (Strategic Calculations) 
 
This perspective recognises the notion of human rights to be driven by common universal 
values. Donnelly observes that advocates perceive human rights to be a universal phenomenon 
that is common to all societies.413 He argues that the very understanding of human rights is 
based upon the liberal tradition, which accords rights to the individual as a priori; therefore, the 
concept of human rights is universal as it applies equally to all human beings.414 Winston, in 
support, states that human rights ‘belong to all people, at all times, in all situations and in all 
societies’415. 
Henkin summarises this perspective by noting that: 
…In other words, human rights should be available to all and applied 
irrespective of citizenship, race, religion or gender. They must not differ with 
demography or history, culture or ideology, political or economic system or 
the stage of the societal development416. 
The argument stipulated suggests that the implications for this approach are centred on State 
compliance due to the pressure from powers with superior economic, military and political 
power. Shor observes that compliance is supposed to increase when pressure is applied by a 
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stronger state and the target state is weak internationally.417 
Krasner argues ‘…the content of human rights issues that were at the forefront in various 
historical periods reflected the concerns of those states which possessed a preponderance of 
economic and military power’418. The idea presented reinforces the notion that compliance is 
greatest when dominance is applied by a hegemonic state (such as the United States), which 
compels weaker nations to adopt their moral and ethical standards. Cardenas, citing the work 
of International relations and politics scholars discerns, ‘…that in the case of human rights a 
target state's vulnerability is the most important factor explaining the impact of international 
pressure’419. 
However, a major contention against this argument as noted by Cardenas is that the violation 
of human rights and compliance are two sides of the same coin; she maintains that whilst some 
States are far too insignificant in terms of their international clout, there are other States that 
cannot be so easily cajoled by international powers.420 
Cardenas argues in a more recent paper421 that the pressure applied may produce a reaction, 
which could be a cause for confrontations between States but is more likely to be ignored by a 
State that feels no overwhelming desire to change its traditional practices; this, she contends, 
is not surprising however, as some of the contemporary practices that constitute a violation of 
human rights have been established practices for centuries. Furthermore, as Alhargan cites, the 
case of Saudi Arabia, States that are not in receipt of any international donations or foreign aid 
are able to resist the pressure placed upon them by human rights organisations and States 
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advocating greater measures for human rights.422 As Schwarz asserts, there are certain State 
actors that are immune to international pressure due to their strategic and political status: 
…Determining whether a state’s human rights record will improve or 
deteriorate, certain states are partially immune to moral pressure from non-
state actors. Such states are considered to be geo-strategically important or 
politically or economically vital for major Western powers. According to 
these interests, they condone the pressure to improve human rights record. 
Example, are: Turkey, Pakistan, Israel, and China…423. 
Cardenas suggests that this explains the underlying reason as to why international norms tend 
to stipulate a package of obligations. She notes that this provides States with the flexibility to 
comply with human rights obligations as they deem to be appropriate.424 Cardenas argues that 
in situations where the survival of a privileged group's interests is at stake, for instance in mass 
protests, uprisings and general anarchy, the violation of international norms will almost likely 
trump the costs associated with human rights pressure. Significantly, she notes that State 
violators have a tendency to legitimise their actions in terms of the greater national good. As 
they always claim that personal liberty must be sacrificed for national security.425 
An emergent point identified from this discussion is that certain social groups realise others to 
be of such threat that they consider it necessary and appropriate to violate their rights of 
personal integrity. In the specific case of the UAE, it can be argued that the State recognised 
the necessity and value of human rights in its international commitments from its formative 
period. This is evident in its agreement to the International Convention on the Elimination of 
Racial Discrimination of 1965 on 20 June 1974 with its emphasis on migrant workers.426 For 
example, Article 1(2) provides that the ‘Convention shall not apply to distinctions, exclusions, 
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restrictions or preferences made between citizens and non-citizens’427. Whereby, the 
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination the body responsible for the treaty’s 
application has identified human rights to be a principle that is enjoyed by all individuals and 
the institutions of the State are obliged to uphold these norms.428 The 
1995 UAE Constitution dictates in Paragraph 30: 
The Constitution affirms that foreigners residing in the United Arab Emirates 
are entitled to enjoy the rights and freedoms provided for in the international 
instruments in force or in conventions and agreements to which the Union is a 
party429. 
Furthermore, Article 5 of the Convention the Members of the Committee demonstrates its 
foresight by discussing whether foreign workers were entitled to have their children join them 
and to have them educated in their own language, and whether they were free to practice their 
religion and culture.430 
They also re-examined the content of all bilateral agreements with regards to the status of 
foreign workers and explicitly expressed particular concerns for women within Asian 
countries.431 All notable International agreements and conventions that the UAE has signed are 
listed in chapter two, with recent focus upon equality, gender discrimination, equality of pay, 
organised crime, trafficking of human slave labour, prostitution and children. A recent example 
of the evolution and development of the national mind-set is the introduction of Law No. 2 (15-
07-2015) whereby the UAE federal legislation explicitly recognised and forbade all forms of 
discrimination in terms of religion, belief, sect, faith, creed, race, colour or ethnic origin, each 
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being a Protected Characteristic.432 
The treaty-based bodies of the UN human rights system cite this as further justification for 
UAE’s continuing progress.433 Furthermore, there is a great deal of evidence for this on the 
ground from the data collected during the field study. From the governmental perspective 
Sheikh Abdul notes the role of the UAE government in upholding international agreements and 
actively seeking to implement the human rights norms in all new policies and procedures. He 
has actively witnessed and implemented this change in a diverse number of sectors from the 
civilian authorities to the defence and security sector. Professor Rashid in support 
acknowledges the role of international human rights discourse in helping to raise both the 
intellectual and societal awareness about human rights norms. This he observes has led to a 
direct change in the laws and policies of the nation with greater changes planned through a 
systematic program. Whilst Hassan, a specialist and professional working in this area testifies 
to the actual number of cases he has personally encountered. He is aware of his colleagues 
working on a number of draft papers with regards to human rights norms that the government 
desires to include into new policies. Jamsheed, the foreign blue-collar worker provides a 
particularly interesting analysis. He claims that the laws and policies of the UAE have not only 
improved in his experience of living and working in the country but have become central factors 
in him continuing to live and wanting to permanently reside with his family in the nation. 
It is evident from the discussion on UAE’s international incumbency to human rights norms 
that it has taken some great measures in not only acknowledging but actively committing itself 
to their implementation. This is encapsulated in the speech delivered by the honourable Sheikh 
Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum434, to the Arab Strategic Forum (Dubai.2004). Sheikh 
                                                                
432 ‘Federal Law of against Discrimination and Hatred ’ <http://ejustice.gov.ae/downloads/ 
latest_laws2015/FDL_2_2015_discrimination_hate_en.pdf >. 
433 UAE Interact (n 138). 
434 Vice President and Prime Minister of the UAE and Ruler of Dubai 
 183 
 
Muhammad shared his personal and sincere concerns with the audience: ‘I tell my fellow Arab 
leaders if you do not change, you will be changed…’435. 
He also went on to state that if Gulf Arab nations failed to initiate radical reforms and uphold 
the principles of transparency, justice and accountability then there was a danger in the 
current political climate of great resentment from the public.436 
This also demonstrates the basis for the criticism levied against the UAE by Amnesty 
International437,  which  claim  that  the  UAE  authorities  are  actively  involved  in 
presenting a compliant and entirely desirable international image of themselves as a vanguard 
for human rights. However, Amnesty International claims that they are actively responsible 
for the: 
…Unprecedented arrests, detentions, disappearances, torture and other 
ill-treatment of detainees… grossly unfair trials and the imposition of 
long prison sentences on government critics, and continuing 
harassment and persecution of their families. In some cases, depriving 
them of the rights and privileges associated with that status in the UAE 
and rendering them stateless…438 
The Amnesty International claims are supported by Sophia, who argues that the Arab societies 
are dominated by an underlining paranoia and inherent suspicion of foreigners and outsiders.  
Likewise, Dr Noor utilises his own example and alleged suffering at the hands of the 
government to argue the insincerity of their actions. He completely rejects the notion that the 
current rulers of the UAE are even remotely interested in promoting or adopting a democratic 
system that seeks to liberate the minds of the people. He alleges that the overt compliance with 
International treaties and conventions is a smokescreen to appease its international partners. In 
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conclusion Sophia’s point is crucial in leading us to the subsequent section on cultural 
universalism. ‘The entire ethos of the region is built upon a protection of each other and the 
factors which benefit each other, so they are protected… That is what is built into the mind-set 
of these people’439. 
 
5.4 Radical Culture Universalism (Normative Commitment) 
 
In contradistinction to the radical individual universalistic (strategic calculations) this angle 
argues that human rights discourse should be focused upon culture specific values.  Mathews 
calls for a culturally oriented analysis and formation of human rights norms and analysis.440 
Diana, in support, identifies the necessity for human rights norms and policies to be reflective 
of the cultural, social and ideological diversities that exist not only globally but also within 
regions, and specifically within nations.441 The argument stipulates that normative 
commitments can be achieved through a process of socialisation, as the State governmental 
agency interacts with societal institutions and individuals to develop a greater appreciation of 
human rights norms. It is proposed that as general society awakens and understands human 
rights norms, they will become more aware; thus the common identity of that society will be 
transformed to demonstrate this new understanding. The burden of obligation is however 
placed upon the State to facilitate this process through its governmental mechanisms. Whilst at 
the international level, there is a requirement by the international community to collectively 
demonstrate its commitment to human rights norms by actively instituting those measures, 
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which counter the opportunities for violation. This establishes benchmarks and standards that 
individual States can aspire to attain for greater access and active participation in formulating 
global policies on commerce, trade, politics and security etc.442 
This focus of this section is to introduce and use the social constructivist model outlined in 
Risse and Sikkink443 to addresses the broad development required for State compliance. The 
spiral model essentially seeks to explicate the phases a State may experience as it attempts to 
inculcate human rights norms into domestic society in response to pressures from a network of 
domestic and international actors. 
 
5.5 Spiral Model 
 
Risse and Sikkink define socialisation as ‘the process by which international norms are 
internalized and implemented domestically’444. 
The spiral model suggests a socialisation process by which international human right norms 
are included in domestic practices of states, and claims to present causal mechanisms of norm 
implementation, which are ‘truly universal and generalizable across regions and domestic 
structures’445. 
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The spiral model, consisting of five-phases (Repression, Denial, Tactical Concessions, 
Prescriptive Status and Rule-Consistent Behaviour) illustrates how an organisation of 
transnational human rights networks, in coordination with national human rights institutions 






The phase is characterised by negligible domestic oppositions, which 
are too weak to present a significant challenge to the government, thus 
resulting in the deterioration of human rights. This phase entails a 
tremendous suppression of legitimate independent news and 
information and possible severing if any of links between domestic 
Non-Governmental Organisations and International Non-
Governmental 
Organisations. Schwarz observes that the time it takes a TAN to gather 
evidence and place it upon the international agenda effectively 
determines the transition to the second phase.446 
In this phase the violating government rejects the legitimacy of 
                                                                





international human rights norms.447 TANs are activated to assemble 
and assimilate information on the target state. This phase is 
characterized by the initial activation of domestic and transnational 
networks that apply some pressure, denunciation, and shaming. Risse 
and Sikkink cite the examples of the suppression of the 
demonstrations in Tiananmen Square by the Army under orders from 
the Chinese 
government and the response of the Guatemalan government to 
human rights pressures in late 1970’s.448 Whilst, Alhargan449 
highlights the 
case of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in its oppressive actions towards 
the suspected Islamists following the Second Gulf War. The success 
of 
a limited number of governmental opponents in disclosing the role of 
the Saudi Arabia government to international media outlets led 
directly 
to the establishment of the Committee for the Defence of Legitimate 
Rights (CDLR) on 3 May 1993450, which brought the issue to light. 
However, the Saudi Arabia denied the allegations on the basis that 
human rights were an internal affair. Moreover, the state argued that 
the international criticism infringed upon national sovereignty, and 
that 
such criticism constituted an illegitimate intervention in its internal 
affairs.451 According to Risse and Sikkink the process of socialisation 
has already been initiated by this phase. 
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During this phase the increasing domestic and international 
pressures upon the violating State impels it to seek cosmetic 
changes in order to pacify the international community. This is a 
vital phase as it dictates whether the State will uphold its 
commitments to International human rights norms or renege 
completely from its pledges. This phase is characterised by the 
tactical concession from the regime, such as the release of 
prisoners whilst continuing to deny the failure and the illegitimacy 
of their policies. However, this phase allows for a much broader 
decimation of human rights discourse across society, therefore, as 
the tactical concession phase begins to transition the governments 
are no longer in complete control of the dialogue. As human rights 
violations occur, domestic and transnational networks are 
activated to coordinate and place the government under domestic 
and international scrutiny.452 At the juncture whereby States 
begins to institutionalise human rights standards into domestic 
practices, this signals the start of a changing political and social 
order. However, Risse and Sikkink observe that a regime change 
becomes more likely when oppressive governments are confronted 
with a fully mobilised domestic opposition that is supported by 
transnational networks.453 
 
                                                                
452 This terminology is taken from  A Brysk, ‘From above and below Social Movements, the 
International System, and Human Rights in Argentina’ (1993) 26 Comparative Political Studies 265 
cited in; R Schwarz, ‘The Paradox of Sovereignty, Regime Type and Human Rights Compliance’ 
(2004) 8 The International Journal of Human Rights 199, 201 See also; T Risse and K Sikkink, ‘The 
Socialization of International Human Rights Norms into Domestic Practices ’ (1999) 66 Cambridge 
Studies in International Relations 26. 






This phase is depicted by the negligible discussions on human rights 
violations, although oppressive practices may still be in practice. 
However, there is a recognition that the process of change will be slow 
and gradual and will be manifested by the prescription of the norms 
within the constitution of the new laws, the establishment of 
institutionalized mechanisms to register human rights violation and 
further into the long term a change in actual behaviour. This implies 
that the State accepts the validity of human rights norms and ratifies 
human rights conventions, institutionalising norms in the constitutions 
and/or domestic law, institutionalising mechanisms for citizens to 
register human rights violations and refrain from denouncing and 
perceiving all external criticism as an interference in its internal affairs, 
and engaging in a dialogue and discursive practice with critics with 




This phase is epitomised by the institutionalisation and 
enforcement an upholding of human rights norms through 
legislation. Risse and Sikkink warn however that even at this stage 
Government may still continue to commit occasional human rights 
violations, For example imprisoning people without trial. It is 
important to maintain domestic and international pressure on the 
government, particularly in view of the fact that with decreasing 
human rights violations and with the absence of gross violations in 
the target state, international attention tends to decline.456 
 
Table 5-1 Adapted and modified from the five phases of the Spiral Model as expressed by 
Risse and Sikkink457 
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The overarching purpose of this model is to demonstrate how a gradual process of socialisation 
may influence a particular State's identity, interests and behaviour.458 
Risse and Sikkink argue that changes in the strategies of repressive governments result from a 
combination of pressures from below (domestic opposition in the form of civil movements and 
Non-Governmental Organisations) and from above.459 Keck and Sikkink identified this 
interaction of pressures to be ‘a boomerang effect, whereby domestic groups in a repressive 
state bypass the State’460 to develop alliances with international agents to pressure the State 
from the outside. 
Marsh and Payne perceive the spiral model to provide a realistic and workable framework for 
the socialisation of human rights norms through domestic human rights improvements. These 
are they note a causal response to the pressures from a network of domestic and international 
actors. Furthermore, they contend that nearly every country in the world can be placed into one 
of these five phases, making the model quite valuable for cross-national empirical research.461 
Jetschke and Lies in support of these assertions, observe that the spiral model remains the 
reference for most studies on multi-level human rights politics and compliance with human 
rights norms.462 They also explain that Single-case studies that have used the spiral model as a 
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framework have confirmed the major mechanisms of the model. They conclude that the model 
remains valid for the cases for which the model was designed (authoritarian, repressive states 
with little political legitimacy and no experience of transnational advocacy).463 
However, there are serious criticisms made of the model such as it being over-deterministic. 
Shor argues that the model fails to explain the causal relationship between the factors, which 
lead to a deterioration in human rights provisions and increases in violations.464 
Moreover, Shor appears to be confused by the lack of reference to the exact point at which the 
governments are expected to endorse and accept human rights norms and discourse that is 
responsible for this course of action.465 
Schwarz shares this concern and adds that the transition point between phase 4 (Prescriptive) 
and phase 5 (Rule-Consistent Behaviour), whereby an enduring respect for human rights is 
attained can only occur in the case of a democratic transition. This is a transition from a non-
democratic to a democratic polity, and subsequently to democratic consolidation. Additionally, 
he contends that only in the exceptional instance of a democratic transition can a linear 
movement of human rights improvements along the five phases of the model be expected.466 
He cites the example of Tunisia placed within the second phase of denial as being contrary to 
the spiral model. Whilst the spiral model expects the target State to practice instrumental 
progression, Tunisia showed a clear regression following its initial advancement towards less 
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repressive actions.467 Risse and Sikkink have defended this as an anomaly to the rule, which 
was a direct result of the absence of TANs to develop, organise and mobilise a weak and 
disparate domestic opposition.468 
Risse and Sikkink state that the model is universally applicable across all countries irrespective 
of their cultural, political and economic differences.469 They argue that the expected outcome 
from the socialisation is the agreement on the internationality of the human rights norms. Whilst 
Landman disagrees and concludes that the model is too ambitious and unrealistic in its attempt 
to provide these types of universal generalisations.470 Jetschke and Lies, in support, explain that 
that the model has not been able to capture all the nuances encapsulated within the formation 
of generalisations.  They assert that whilst ‘the spiral model makes a fundamental contribution 
to the study of human rights norms and practices, it does not provide a truly complete or 
universal explanation of the domestic internalisation of human rights among all norm-violating 
states’471. 
Moreover, Pace argues that the spiral model may be limited to smaller, less powerful states 
rather than more dominant ones in the international system.472 Alhargan disagrees with this 
point however and utilises the example of Saudi Arabia as a powerful and influential State 
without any reliance upon foreign aid, which recognises human rights norms and has pledged 
to uphold those norms that it deems consistent with its own culture and tradition. He notes that: 
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The domestic internalisation of human rights proves that it is applicable to the 
Saudi state… Its applicability proves the validity of the spiral model, as many 
characters of the first, second as well as the third phases are present in the Saudi 
case… Saudi Arabia does not rely on foreign aid, which represents a heavy 
challenge for the human rights network in seeking to influence the Kingdom, 
yet it cannot escape their advocacy and dispense of its human rights record… 
Nevertheless, states that are not in receipt of foreign aid can resist the human 
rights network in trying to bring about significant improvements, as evident in 
the Saudi denial phase, which lasted for 10 years473. 
Shor perceives this form of compliance demonstrated by Saudi Arabia to be an example of the 
model’s inability to determine the decrease in some violations, whilst increases in other form 
of violations and abuse.474 Cardenas furthers this point, as she does not perceive States that 
violate human rights to all respond to domestic pressures for social change instantly or fully. 
Cardenas concedes that the gestures and concessions States make to appease critics often 
constitute partial compliance or steps on the way to fuller compliance.475 
Consequently, the model does not allow for modifications in changes, and differentiation 
between separate violating practices. This perspective limits the capability of the model to 
account for decreases in some violations that are not echoed by parallel declines in others. For 
example, Rupp and Sikkink report that in Guatemala, during the mid-1990’s the practices of 
torture, disappearances, and extrajudicial executions significantly decreased, but arbitrary 
arrests and detention without trial remained abundant, and in some of the years have even 
increased.476 
Similarly, from the end of the twentieth and early twenty-first century, Morocco formed its 
own human rights institutions, began to cooperate with human rights organisations, ‘abolished 
the practices of executions and disappearances, improved women’s rights, and dramatically 
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decreased the use of torture and arbitrary arrests’477. However, terrorist attacks in Morocco led 
to the death sentence and torture to be reinstated in a wave of new anti-terrorism laws. 
The final critique of the model is based upon its incapacity to adequately identify the role of 
genuine clashes and security threats in shaping a State’s repressive policies and subsequently 
impeding human rights norms. In the current socio-political climate, the significant terrorist 
and subversive threats from a number of transnational actors provides States with the legitimate 
excuse to undertake repressive measures.478 
Although the argument that the spiral model is too deterministic, generalised and has not 
accounted for the upsurge in transnational terrorism is extremely informative, it has to be noted 
that the spiral model still offers useful insights into the gradual changes that must take place 
within specific repressive States before the norms of human rights can be appreciated and 
practiced.479 
As noted by Risse and Sikkink, the key to the socialisation process are the transnational human 
rights networks, which can exert moral pressure on norm-violating states and the eventual 
establishment of NHRIs, which actively monitor, preserve and further the understanding and 
practice of human rights in the nations. 
5.6 Role of Transnational HR Networks and NHRI in the UAE Context 
Keck and Sikkink define Transnational Human Rights Networks as a: 
…Network of actors bringing new ideas, norms and discourses into policy 
debates …They also promote norm implementation, by pressuring target 
actors to adopt new policies, and by monitoring compliance with international 
standard480. 
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Keck  and  Sikkink  assert  that  their  studies  have  demonstrated  that  transnational Coalitions 
between international Non-Governmental Organisations, International Organisations  and  
domestic-level  activists  and  Non-Governmental  Organisations, were effective in pressuring 
norm-violating governments to change. The underlying reason for this was due to the 
establishment of a network for effective communication amongst the citizens of different 
regions.481 
In this context, Transnational Human Rights Networks comprised of Non-Governmental 
Organisations, international agencies and members of the displacement collate, document and 
utilise all evidence pertaining to the intentions and actual violations by their governments. Risse 
and Sikkink482 had explicitly noted that human rights Transnational Human Rights Networks 
were tasked with the careful documentation of abuses, as well as raising the States awareness 
with respect to their accountability for those abuses under international law. 
Keck and Sikkink identify the power and authority of a Transnational Human Rights Networks 
to be in its organising mission of fomenting the appropriate conditions for sustainable change 
within the practice and promotion of human rights. They contend that Transnational Human 
Rights Networks must strive to bring the case of norms violating States onto the international 
agenda. This may entail some form of shaming both the violating State and the international 
community into taking action. 
Cardenas adds that Transnational Human Rights Networks are also effective at lobbying 
powerful international actors to exert pressure on states and thereby altering their possible 
strategic calculations and foreign policies.483 Keck and Sikkink had already envisioned 
Transnational Human Rights Networks to serve as vehicles for forging relationships, 
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transmitting international standards, exchanging best practices, and replicating identities. 
Thereby they construed that Transnational Human Rights Networks could shape state 
compliance by helping to reconstitute both states strategic calculations and their compliance484 
and they concur that Transnational Human Rights Networks are characterised by their purpose 
to empower, defend and rally, ‘domestic opposition, social movements and Non-Governmental 
Organisations into challenging governments from above and below’485. 
A regional conference hosted in Cairo (2013) by the Arab League declared that the region 
needed to develop its civil society so that it could make a viable impact upon the social, 
economic and political activities of their nations. They identified the importance of civil society 
in concert with domestic Non-Governmental Organisations to instigate the changes required to 
advance greater appreciation and awareness of basic human rights.486 
Within the UAE it is evident that there exist no independent civil society associations, other 






This Association was established pursuant to the 
Federal Public Interest Associations Act No. 6 of 
1974, as amended, to raise awareness about and 
explain the rights and obligations of individuals in 
society. It operates within the framework of the law 
and in cooperation with government institutions to 
promote the principles of respect for individual 
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rights, curb human rights violations, safeguard 
equality and prevent discrimination among members 
of society based on origin, religious & intellectual 




The Union plays a key role in the formulation of general policy on 
women, the creation of plans for the promotion of women’s issues in 
all domains and the establishment of plans and programmers to 
integrate women into overall development plans and empower them to 




This Association was established on 25 September 1980 to promote 
human rights, defend freedoms and the rule of law, raise professional, 
cultural and social studs among jurists and cooperate with Arab and 
international human rights associations and foundations whose work 
has a bearing on the Association’s aims. 
 
Table 5-2 Government Established Associations488 
Amnesty International claims that the UAE does not allow the establishment of independent 
Non-Governmental Organisations or trade unions.489 ‘There are no political parties and 
political dissent is not tolerated. Islamists or those critical of the human rights or political 
situation in the country are often targeted for arrest, arbitrary detention and unfair trial’490. 
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Additionally, Human Rights Watch reports that sixty-nine suspects with alleged links to 
Islamist groups were randomly arrested and systematically tortured within the States security 
facilities and then convicted by the authorities.491 Hence there is evidence to suggest that the 
UAE authorities have demonstrated their indifference towards the notions of justice, freedom 
of expression and free association. In addition, there are reports, which claim that the authorities 
have harassed and threatened lawyers and refused legal assistance to prisoners.492Although, 
there only exists one Non-Governmental Organisation in the UAE (UAE Human Rights 
Association), according to Freedom House’s report493, it is completely controlled and operated 
by the government. 
Moreover despite the existence of transparent standards governing visits from international 
Non-Governmental Organisation representatives, Amnesty International observes that the 
UAE government does not allow human rights International Non-Governmental Organisations 
to establish offices or presence in the country.494 They may allow International Non-
Governmental Organisation representatives to conduct limited short-term visits that are 
confined to certain designated jurisdictions.495 However, it must be noted that under Article 30 
of the UAE Constitution, freedom of expression is a guaranteed right but it states explicitly that 
it must be ‘within the limits set by law’496. In seeking to address the establishment of a NHRI 
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in the UAE it is argued that within the context of the spiral model the UAE is traversing between 
the denial and socialisation phases. The absence of independent domestic and international 
Non-Governmental Organisations or civil society associations in the country nullifies any 
possibility or opportunity for TANs to become a viable partner to bring about the necessary 
change to the subsequent phases. 
Risse and Sikkink describe the transition to the third phase as ‘…the biggest challenge for the 
transnational human rights network…’ because ‘…the domestic opposition is too weak to be 
able to mount a major challenge to the regime…’497 
However, it has to be acknowledged that in seeking to pursue this transition from the denial to 
the socialisation phase, the UAE must transform its entire socio-political culture. It must take 
as its role model Western style democracies, which operate under a different ontological and 
epistemological model. It is established, as witnessed by the responses of the participants in 
chapter four, that a proportion of the native Emirati society perceives its political and social 
system to be reflective of its Islamic and tribal traditions, making the notions of canvassing 
voters, garnering political allegiances and electioneering antithetical to its heritage as it is 
confrontational and seeks to displace and destabilise society. 
Alhargan cites the example of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in defending this perspective. He 
observes that Saudi Arabia has always refrained from rejecting or opposing universally 
recognised human rights laws but requested the UN General Assembly take into consideration 
the concept and notion of cultural diversity. Abdurahmān Alrassi, second secretary at the 
Permanent Mission of Saudi Arabia, stated, that ‘…Saudi Arabia believes that when defining 
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human rights, the international community should take into consideration the diverse and 
specific historical, religious, cultural and social connotations of these rights’498. 
In the UAE, the inherent socio-cultural value of the tribal system and the allegiance due to it 
alongside its religious orientation provides the essential stability and legitimacy to the social 
authority of the rulers of the various Emirate states and the federal governance itself. 
This innate aspect of the Gulf and UAE society is encapsulated in the notions of Shura 
(consultation) and Al Majlis (gathering). The leaders or sheikhs host open communal meetings 
or gatherings, whereby any citizen or member of that tribe is invited to attend and express their 
opinion openly or in private. It has already been noted that even today the current President and 
Vice President of the UAE still host their own  Majlis, which is open to all from their specific 
Emirate.499 Additionally, the findings from chapter four suggest that the general consensus of 
the people is that the government is perceived by the public to be in itself both responsible and 
to act as a Human Rights Institution. 
These derived perspectives alongside the review of literature suggest that the entire Gulf region 
identifies the innate tenets of the Islamic faith to be a significant influence upon the 
expectations and understanding of human rights. The interviewed participants were forthright 
in identifying human rights to be a norm ordained by God Almighty, as vouchsafed by the 
sacred texts and traditions of the faith. It was revealed that a significant aspect of the faith 
entailed the safeguarding of human values and quality of life, thus this idea of human rights 
norms as propounded by the international community was not a new ideal. 
There was also an explicit recognition that although the individual was free to act as they 
desired in private, the public domain required that everyone must act and behave to a set 
standard of acceptance to maintain equanimity and harmony for all. It is with this spirit that 
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Sheikh Abdul, (senior government representative); Professor Rashid (academic), Hassan 
(Lawyer) and Jamsheed (foreign white-collar worker) identify the UAE Government to be 
upholders of the Islamic faith tradition. They contend that its overarching mission is to preserve 
the Islamic ideology through its institutions. 
Moreover, as noted in chapter two, the literature alongside the collated data from the field 
suggests that the UAE has experienced an exceptional level of permanence, with limited 
changes to its political structure or institutions since its formation. Although critics have cited 
this as evidence for the undemocratic and autocratic governmental system, the study 
participants argued that this has helped maintain the high levels of political stability and social 
harmony in the UAE. Accordingly, both the indigenous and foreign residents contend that the 
national federal government comprehends and is representative of the native culture, heritage 
and tradition. 
For example, Sheikh Abdul, Professor Rashid, Hassan and Jamsheed utilise the examples of 
the national leadership to suggest that the tribal structures in place at the very top represent the 
concepts of community and family. They argue that every Emirati individual is inherently a 
part of not only his locale but also the wider national family with each individual alongside the 
rulers having an equal stake in the prosperity, stability and progress of the nation. 
Although dissenting voices in the form of Sophia (International Non-Governmental 
Organisation representative) and Dr Noor (Activist/Victim) criticise the governments for acting 
as judge and jury, they nevertheless recognise the authority of the Islamic faith in defining the 
role of the government and conversely the government’s role in promoting and protecting the 
faith ideology. Further still, they recognise that the governmental structure is an extension of 
the tribal heritage and culture of the region. However, both are critical of the lived experiences 
and realities on the ground with regards to the UAE government’s actions. They argue that the 
government has utilised the notion of religion, faith and tribalism to justify and consolidate 
their power and hold over the people, which has lead them to enslave their own populace. 
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Dr Noor and Sophia argue that the Supreme Council is nothing more than a ‘court of kings’ as 
only the seven rulers comprising the Supreme Council have power and authority to make 
decisions with regards to the federation. They accommodate their subjects with an audience at 
the Majlis to either pacify or gain their support through a display of their authority by providing 
for them their material needs. Dr Noor and Sophia identify this to be the effective paralysis of 
the Emirati citizens as the nanny state, fulfils their daily requirements, meaning that any 
violations or abuses of human rights are not only ignored but are self-suppressed by the 
government and people. 
A second finding from the data collated in chapter four suggests, as per the perspective of 
radical culture universalism that the primary purpose and role of the NHRI is to provide 
education around human rights. 
The unanimous findings from the data analysis phase suggest that the NHRI’s function is 
exclusively that of an educational institution. Sheikh Abdul, Professor Rashid and Hassan 
contend that although the UAE is prepared to accept and instil International Human Rights 
norms, it cannot be at the expense of the stability of the socio-political structures and 
undermining of the government. They argue that an NHRI established to monitor the 
government would innately introduce a culture of distrust and scepticism. They suggest that an 
NHRI should instead be established upon the premise of furthering human rights education and 
awareness. This will then act to prepare the next generation of leaders to be appreciative and 
supporters of human rights provisions; although they concede that this is a long-term strategy, 
which must be acknowledged by the international community. 
They maintain that the government has already instigated these educational programs. These 
include for example the Administration of Human Rights Care at Dubai Police Department500; 
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The Dubai Foundation for Women and Children.501 Thus, the establishment of the NHRI would 
combine and amalgamate the human rights agenda in its entirety whilst educational programs 
morphed into a systematic institutional endeavour. 
Jamsheed observes from the experiences of his own country of origin that laws and regulations 
have failed to prevent those in power from abusing their privileges. He notes that an institution 
formed solely to regulate the government will only become a vehicle for political and social 
control. Dr Noor and Sophia appear to vouch for this opinion as they both contend that an 
NHRI will not only become a tool for educational awareness but become the mechanism for 
remedy and rehabilitation for those who have violated human rights norms and for those who 
have been victims of it. Sophia suggests that the UAE should work with International Non-
Governmental Organisations to establish its NHRI and prepare its educational programs. This 
will not only help the UAE develop its international partnerships with International Non-
Governmental Organisations but allow them to use these organisations to counter the negativity 
the UAE government encounters in the international media and reports. This strategy, if 
adopted by the UAE government, would allow it to become the role model for the region and 
for other developing states across the world. 
 
5.7 Formation of NHRIs in the UAE 
 
In discussing the role or NHRIs it has to be acknowledged that although there exists no 
homogenous model or structure of an ideal NHRI, its establishment demonstrates within the 
context of the spiral model a State’s transition from the Prescriptive phase (4) to the Rule 
Consistent Behaviour phase (5). There is an explicit recognition by the parties to the Paris 
Principles that due to the influence of such factors as the prevailing legal system, culture, 
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tradition, political and socio-economic milieu the human rights models must reflect the nation 
states’ own individual contexts. Pohjolainen perceives these factors to account for the 
‘considerable differences in the legal basis, jurisdiction, functions, powers and the structure 
and composition of national institutions’502. Therefore, at present there exists a wide variety of 
organisations purporting to achieve the same mandate as stipulated by the UN for an NHRI. 
The 1993 World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna confirmed the prerogative right and 
obligation of the individual nation states to implement NHRIs that best reflected their societal 
contexts.503 Hence, the classification of NHRIs into specific and uniquely identifiable models 
is challenging as many NHRIs incorporate many features from other models. Nonetheless, 
classification assists in highlighting the strengths and addressing the weaknesses of any 
particular model.504 For analytical purposes, Aichele suggests the formation of classifications 
in order to identify the similarities and ‘differences in the formal characteristics of these 
institutions’505. 
Muller observes that these organisations can be referred to as: ‘Human Rights Commission 
(Committee or Council); Ombudsman (or Public Defender); Advisory Human Rights Institutes 
or Specialized Commissions’506. 
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5.7.1 National Human Rights Commission 
 
Beeman contends that the ‘predominance of this globally dominant NHRI model in 
Commonwealth countries, which were greatly influenced by the drafting of the Paris Principles 
implies that it is also referred to as the Commonwealth model’507. The model’s most defining 
features are its accurate representation of the community and its pluralist structure. Eren 
observes the notion of pluralism is designed to ‘prevent national human rights commissions 
from becoming mere governmental mouthpieces’508. Additionally, it features a mandate for a 
quasi-judicial investigatory authority to protect and promote human rights. In theory, it ‘has 
the power to investigate human rights issues and individual complaints, thereby addressing 
human rights’509 concerns in a meaningful manner. 
Although the ‘mandates accorded to human rights commissions vary in scope, in general they 
are responsible for a wide range of functions, but with special emphasis on proactive and 
preventive tasks’510. The National Human Rights Commission should uphold its investigative 
role alongside offering assistance to the governments and the provision of expert advice in 
monitoring and implementing human rights and legislation. ‘This advisory and research 
capacity is often limited to cases where the government has specifically requested the 
institution’s assistance’511. Further still, the human rights commissions ‘may engage in 
educational and awareness-raising activities’512. 
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Eren summarises the central purpose of the human rights commissions to be in their 
‘consultancy function to the government on issues related to human rights’513. 
5.7.2 The Human Rights Institute 
 
In terms of their function, Human Rights Institutes appear to be similar to the National Human 
Rights Commissions in that they disseminate material and training on human rights discourse 
through educational programs, social activities, public awareness campaigns and monitoring 
governmental practices with relation to human rights. However, the Human Rights Institute 
does not possess any investigate powers to explore human rights abuses. The sole purpose of 
this type of institute pertains to programs designed to provide human rights education, 
information, research and documentation.514 
The ‘Danish Institute for Human Rights (DIHR), established in 2003’515 exemplifies this point. 
Its essential role entails conducting independent and ‘autonomous research on human rights 
and presenting its recommendations before the Government and Parliament’516 with regards to 
their obligations. Another recent successful example includes the German Human Rights 
Institute, established in 2001. Its primary function is to bridge the gap between general society, 
the government and the International bodies and TANs. It has ‘16 members elected from civil 
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society, academia, media and politics and houses a human rights library, which is open to the 
public’517. 
5.7.3 The Human Rights Ombudsman Model 
 
The Ombudsman as established by the Swedish Parliament in 1809 entailed a single appointee, 
elected and empowered by parliament to monitor and investigate administrative process as a 
result of a complaint or off their own initiative. In addition, they were tasked to offer solutions, 
provide legal redress and monitor unfair conduct whilst issuing ‘annual and special reports 
detailing their findings’518. Hertogh reflects that the classical Ombudsman model is conceived 
to be ‘an institution that uses soft powers of persuasion and cooperation to control conduct, 
rather than coercive or adjudicative means’519. Some schools of thought ‘regarding common 
law and administrative law refer to the ombudsman as a non-judicial alternative for overseeing 
public administration’520. Similarly: 
Comparative law scholars occasionally reference the ombudsman in discussions 
of comparative administrative law, essentially using it as an example of a public-
sector institution that has been successfully transplanted in different legal systems 
around the world521. 
Establishing the ombudsman is a mechanism that monitors the conduct of public authorities is 
legal and fair. The legislature appoints the ombudsman in order that he may investigate the 
process and functionality of the executive branch of government.  However, the conduct of the 
courts and legislative branch is often outside his investigations. As Eren argues, the classical 
model of the Ombudsman seeks to ensure ‘conformity and accountability of the government to 
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the laws of the nation’522.  Moreover, as Ayeni notes, the ombudsman ‘is not a judge or tribunal 
and has no power to make orders or to reverse administrative action; they seek solutions to 
problems through a process of investigation and conciliation’523. An ombudsman’s authority 
and influence are generated by having been appointed by a principal organ of the state (usually 
the parliament) before, which they are accountable. Reif observes that the classic Ombudsman 
model 
      …has the power to launch investigations on receipt of a complaint or of their own 
volition, conduct an impartial investigation into the administrative conduct in 
question, make recommendations to eliminate the illegality or unfairness if faulty 
administration is uncovered and report to the government and legislature on the 
activities of the office524. 
Since  the  1970’s,  governments  have  established  the  Human  Rights  Ombudsman version  
of  the  ombudsman  institution  by  giving  them  the  mandate  not  only ‘to monitor the legality 
and fairness of public administration’525  but to protect, promote and consolidate public sector 
human rights whilst monitoring the consolidation and administration of human rights 
education. The Human Rights Ombudsman is often formed around the appointment of 
independent and impartial individuals chosen by the executive branch of government ‘to 
monitor the compliance of the governmental bodies with domestic and international human 
rights norms, laws and policies’526. 
Tigerstrom  highlights  the  similarities  between  the  ‘classic  Ombudsman  and  the Human 
Rights Ombudsman’527: 
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The ombudsman institution is founded on the principles of human dignity and 
justice… As such, it is devoted to the fair and equitable treatment of all 
individuals in a society. A core function of the institution is to bring a balance in 
the powers between the rulers and the ruled by providing people with the means 
to complain about and rectify a failure of the rulers... All these are also 
fundamental to human rights528. 
With both the ‘power to investigate, to report and to make recommendations about individual 
cases, administrative procedures, and relevant system-wide changes’529, the ombudsman keeps 
a close rein on administrative injustices. By appointing an ombudsman, time and expense are 
reduced and cumbersome and protracted processes are significantly reduced if not eliminated. 
Furthermore, the ‘judicial process is also highly impersonal and formal’530, with Frank noting 
earlier that in many cases, the citizens are willing to accept the injustice because they cannot 
afford to or do not desire to take the litigation route. By contrast the process of investigation 
by the Ombudsman is informal and flexible with due consideration and care provided to the 
abused victims at a fraction of the cost. Sawer observes that ‘…the Ombudsman provides a 
much cheaper justice system’531. 
Reviewing the classical ombudsman model and the human rights ombudsman model it is clear 
there exists compatibility and the creation of hybrid ombudsman institutions since the 1970’s 
helps to illustrate this symbiosis. Fundamentally, ‘at its core, the ombudsman is an institution 
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Ombudsman in Developing Democracies: The Commonwealth Caribbean Experience’ (2010) 23 
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designed to monitor illegality, unfairness, and injustice in public administration’532. As Frank 
notes: 
the classical ombudsman plays a role both in human rights protection and in 
the implementation of a state's domestic and international human rights 
obligations, therefore, breaches of human rights laws have always been part of 
the ombudsman's mission533 
 
5.8 Proposed Model of the UAE NHRI 
 
In seeking to suggest an ideal type of NHRI institution for the UAE, it is argued that the 
ombudsman model has an already established history within the Islamic tradition. Pickl 
observes that the precursor to the contemporary Ombudsman model was the Turkish Diwan-
al-Mazalim.534 Escovitz notes that this type of model appears to have been established upon 
the earlier archetype, as instituted by the second Caliph, Umar (634–644), which was generally 
referred to as the Qadi al-Qudat.535 
However, with regards to contemporary requirements, it is argued that a significant issue with 
the human rights ombudsman model is that the appointed candidates for the post are nominated 
exclusively by either the executive, usually in the person of the president of the republic, or by 
a group of parliamentarians. 
Appointing a single individual to oversee the entire machinery of government is not only an 
overwhelming task but also compromises the requirement for pluralism. The overt drawback 
of such an option may also mean that the anointed individual will only be representative of the 
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majority populace which will reduce the institute’s credibility and value amongst the general 
populace of society. Consequently, when leadership is placed within the remit of a single 
individual member, as is the wont of the ombudsman-type human rights institution, they may 
also become easy scapegoats for perceived failures or seen as government mouthpieces, as they 
are dependent upon them for their own survival. 
For example, in Trinidad and Tobago, home to a multi-racial populace, complaints of 
tribal/racial bias were brought against the Ombudsman. The impartiality of the entire institution 
was questioned and therefore its worth to the nation and the people was suspect. The arguments 
made suggested that a pluralistic system was required, whereby the office of the Ombudsman 
would be alternated ‘between an Afro-Trinidadian and an Indo-Trinidadian’536. Whilst the 
UAE is also compromised of many differing tribes and now immigrant resident workers, it may 
benefit the nation to adopt an institution with more pluralistic characteristics to represent all of 
society and offset any claims of prejudice, bias or appeasement to the government forces. 
It is argued and suggested that the UAE should consider a more pluralistic based institution, 
such as the Human Rights Commission which adheres to the fundamental standards of the Paris 
Principles. Abdurrahman argues for the Human Rights Commission to be established with a 
‘pluralist structure and wide representation of the community and that it assumes consultancy 
function to the government in the issues related to the human rights’537. He argues that pluralism 
prevents national human rights institutions from becoming mere mouthpieces of the 
government.538 
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The Minister of State for Foreign Affairs and Chairman of the Standing Committee,539 Doctor 
Anwar Gargash, who is also responsible for the Universal Periodic Review (UPR) process since 
2013, cites the voluntary pledge articulated in the UPR report (no. 7) ‘To consider the 
possibility of establishing a national body for human rights in compliance with the Paris 
Principles,’540 to suggest that the.. 
…UAE is currently working on establishing a National Commission for Human 
Rights. A detailed study on the project was carried out in consultation with the 
concerned national authorities to create a Commission in compliance with the 
Paris Principles, which will be the official body to deal with all human rights 
issues in the country541. 
 
Hence, this thesis recommends that the UAE NHRI is based on the Human Rights Commission 
model with an express mandate to: 
…Protect and promote human rights. It is composed of a number of 
members who should have human rights experience and expertise in the 
particular field. It has broad mandates to promote all human rights. What 
is more relevant than the label attached to an institution is the fact that its 
mandate, functions and powers accord with the letter and the spirit of the 
Paris Principles542. 
 
                                                                
539 National report (2013) submitted in accordance with paragraph 5 of the annex to HR Council resolution 
16/21. Para (5 and 6) the committee took a series of steps to prepare the report in the framework of a 
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the country’s first national report was included and information was provided on the pledges and 




540 Ministry of Foreign Affairs (UAE) (n 127). 
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‘Www.Ohchr.Org’ <www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/UPR/Pages/UPRMain.aspx> accessed 19 April 
2016. 
542 United Nations (n 169). 
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5.8.1 UAE NHRI: Proposed Structure and Features 
 
The discussion has thus far noted especially from the radical cultural universalist (normative 
commitment) perspective that the ‘…task and shape of… human rights institutions vary from 
country to country, which is due to the diverse local culture, legal traditions and political 
systems in which these institution operates’543. 
As discussed and introduced in the second chapter, the UAE has established a federal and 
regional system based upon its tribal heritage, which owing to its tribal heritage can cause 
intrinsic problems.  NHRIs are  established  with  a  broad  mandate  that perceives the entire 
nation to be within their jurisdiction.544 For the formation of a UAE NHRI and for it to operate 
independently the federal government must ensure that regional individual Emirates submit 
and accept its jurisdiction and autonomy. 
For this to be viable and applicable independence from the executive and legislative branches 
of government is essential. However, the potential NHRI ‘must have a legislative foundation, 
either through a constitutional provision or ordinary legislation, or both’545. This implies that 
an ‘official process designed to lead to the establishment of an NHRI must involve the 
Government and is usually led by it’546. 
Although both Articles 110 and 114 of UAE constitution delineate the process of legislation,547 
Article 115 stipulates that the: ‘…Supreme Council may authorize the President of the Union 
and the Council of Ministers collectively to promulgate, when the Supreme Council is not in 
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session…’548 confirming that the UAE constitution provides the framework for the immediate 
formation and establishment of a NHRI. 
Hamid Benhaddou, Head of the CCDH Division of International Organisations, recognises this 
salient point in the UAE legislature and observes that for this establishment to be successful 
and immediate the aims and ambitions of the future UAE NHRI should be advisory. He argues 
that to achieve this, the new institution should have a transparent structure and clearly defined 
terms of the functions and duties of the Institutions, they should be explicit within the 
constitution or legislation that governs the establishment of institutions in the UAE.549 
The United Nations advises that NHRIs will enjoy greater opportunities for success and 
sustainability when their establishment directly involves crucial national stakeholders. 
They further suggest that the ‘knowledge and experience of international experts can and 
should also be utilised’550, but ultimately the institution must reflect the national consensus. 
The suggestion presented by Reif supports this assertion and is directly applicable to the UAE 
in: 
...Establishing, strengthening, and diversifying a network of state and civil 
society institutions, the particular design of which will depend on a 
country's makeup. In the realm of human rights protection an independent 
and trained judiciary, reduction of barriers to human rights litigation, 
human rights training of police and armed forces, fostering a free press, 
and strengthening human rights Non-Governmental Organisations are 
some of the other institutions and processes that should be developed at the 
same time that national human rights institutions are established551. 
 
                                                                
548 UAE Constitution, art 115
 
 
549 H Benhaddou, ‘Head of the CCDH Division of International Organisations’ 
<http://www.cndh.org.ma/an/bulletin-d-information/nhris-role> accessed 30 September 2016. 
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Consequently, it is argued that the UAE must undertake a systematic process of research that 
seeks to understand the relationship between human rights, development and core freedoms.  
This will provide greater insight into the inter-dependability between human rights, democracy 
and pluralism, at both the national and international levels. 
As examined before, effective domestic protection of human rights requires a network of 
complementary norms and mechanisms.  This requires the establishment of the new human 
rights institution in the UAE to be based on broad-based consultation and dialogue amongst all 
stakeholders in the nation. The process must be underpinned by a national will for attaining the 
common goal. This will further highlight the precise structural reforms required within the 
various organs of the government at both the regional and federal stages. For example, the 2008 
Law on Associations, especially Articles 16, 17, 18 may have to be revised or even repealed, 
to ensure that civil society organisations can function free from state interference.552 Otherwise, 
the newly established NHRI in the UAE will be prone to suffer from structural problems, 
functional deficiencies and lack of adequate mechanisms for the enforcement of human rights. 
Hamid Benhaddou identifies some core issues that the UAE government must address before 
it can begin the process of establishing its NHRI. He observes that the nation is lacking overall 
in indigenous trained experts on the issue of human rights who can: develop national reports; 
conduct media campaigns; participate in international conferences; research and create a 
national human rights database; provide training opportunities for people responsible for 
human rights matters; and monitor and ensure that government agencies are fully informed and 
compliant with human rights norms.553 
                                                                
552 UAE Government, ‘Federal Law No (2) of 2008’ See Article (16,17,18) ; ‘Www.Icnl.Org’ 
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Davidson provides further advice and supports the assertion that the production of annual 
reports could be utilised to disseminate and promote the culture of human rights at a national 
level.554 The role of the NHRI could also entail that it both conducts and produces more focused 
studies on what is required to promote awareness in the field of human rights to all sectors of 
society in the UAE and include such information in its annual reports. These reports can also 
provide an effective critique of the overall effectiveness of the UAE’s approach and policies 
intended to promote and protect of human rights. 
Furthermore, Davidson argues that the freedom of press is essential in engaging the broader 
society and placing potential violators under the national microscope. The establishment of a 
new broadsheet quality English-language newspaper in Abu Dhabi may have already initiated 
this process. Although it is completely funded by a government agency, it is staffed by Western 
editors and has been given a genuine carte blanche to provide critical coverage of domestic 
affairs.555 
The thesis therefore proposes that a potential UAE NHRI should be modelled on the Human 
Rights Commission and it must fulfil the essential recommendations of the Paris Principles in 
terms of its independence, accountability, members’ appointment and composition, 
accessibility, and funding. 
5.8.1.1 Independence 
 
The research conducted through the review of literature and the data collected through the 
explorative qualitative study suggests, as Murray contends, that there must be at inception an 
explicit recognition that there must be a relationship ‘…between the governments on the one 
hand, and civil society on the other, especially when their ability to influence human rights 
                                                                




promotion and protection in that society requires that they cooperate and work closely with 
both’556. 
However, this entails that NHRIs still maintain their independence as they must ‘…operate 
separately from government and not be subject to its influence or control and therefore not to 
be viewed simply as part of the state machinery’557.  
The chapter has already identified through the spiral model that the UAE is in transition 
between the denial (phase 2) and socialisation (phase 3) and there should be no expectation 
that the NHRI will be fully independent at inception.  As Cardenas observes, the NHRIs could 
be ‘…more adept at promoting rather than protecting human rights norms at this stage’558. 
However, the requirements for Independence and accountability cannot be ignored.  Thus it is 
recommended that the nature of the relationship between the NHRI and the State be established. 
The terms of the functions and duties of the NHRI should be explicitly stated within the 
constitution or legislation that establishes the NHRI in the UAE. As argued previously and 
asserted by Benhaddou the NHRI should be an autonomous body and independent of the 
government. Nonetheless, due to the cultural specific socio-political factors as explained in 
chapters two and three, the NHRI should work with the government to examine the current 
legislation, alongside the draft laws and proposals, make recommendations for harmonisation 
of these laws with international human rights standards which are approved by the State and 
develop reports at national level regarding the situation of human rights and on specific issues, 
receive and examine complaints, and provide legal assistance to complainants.559 
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Reif argues that these roles mean that NHRIs require a great deal of autonomy, as they require 
adequate power and influence within their legal framework to conduct investigations and 
research into their own role and position at the implementation stage.560 Should the NHRI have 
authority to conduct independent investigations, this will feature as a global indicator of 
operational independence. 
NHRIs must have the power to initiate investigations without any interference by the State 
authorities. Consequently, in order for the NHRI to possess this degree of autonomy the UAE 
government must also assist the process by conducting broad structural reforms within its own 
political and legislative structures. 
5.8.1.2 Accountability 
 
As argued in chapter three, NHRIs should, in adherence to the Paris Principles, be accountable 
to the public and State. It has been argued through the entire body of this study that NHRIs are 
a unique institution. They do not operate or function like the broad machinery of government. 
The UN stipulates ‘…they are not under the direct authority of the executive, legislature or 
judiciary although they are, as a rule, accountable to the legislature either directly or 
indirectly’561. 
Murray states that ‘the NHRI should be accountable to the Parliament and public, but it has no 
accountability before the government’562. Hence it is asserted that the proposed NHRI should 
be accountable to the Federal National Council.563 The Federal National Council in the UAE 
formulates the traditional role of a parliament and established its Standing Committee on 
Human Rights on the December 28, 2012. The responsibility of this body, as per the 
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Millennium Declaration (Part V), is to improve the protection of human rights through its legal, 
regulatory and representative functions.564 
It is evident that UAE citizens have an institutional body through which they can express their 
concerns. Furthermore, concerns with regards to legislation can also be identified, brought 
before and addressed at the national level through the Federal National Council. This represents 
a great level of development and maturity of the political system.565 
Moreover, it also highlights the role and place of the Federal National Council in raising 
political awareness, whilst supporting the governmental initiatives. This is exemplified by a 
recent Federal National Council session, whereby an extremely high level of attendance by 
government ministers resulted in the Federal National Council members posing direct questions 
and engaging them on issues related to 
‘…arbitrary arrests, incommunicado detentions, and lengthy pre-trial 
detentions; limitations on citizen’s civil liberties (including the 
freedoms of speech, press, assembly, and association); citizen’s 
inability to change their government and reports of police and prison 
guard brutality’566 
 
5.8.1.3 Members’ Appointment and Composition 
 
Carver argues that the effectiveness of the NHRI is directly dependent upon the quality and 
independence of their leadership. This requires an independent appointment process as it is 
more likely to ensure the right calibre of leaders and members567 whilst providing the necessary 
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transparency. This will increase the credibility and confidence in the institution. It is 
recommended that the Constitutional Council should appoint the NHRI members.568 The 
essential requirements for these full time appointed members is that they are fully cognisant 
with human rights norms, laws and issues, not just in the UAE but globally. 
Burdekin and Naum contend that the idea is to prevent cronyism and nepotism in the form of 
political appointees, or even the sabotaging of the NHRI  through cuts in funding for staff 
appointments.569 This ensures the autonomy of the institution is maintained as only it can 
employ the required staff to conduct its functions. 
However, this is an area of grave concern as reports from across the world demonstrate that 
this aspect of the NHRI is usually politically influenced and inadequately funded, which leads 
to it being under-staffed and inadvertently working to carry out the governmental agenda. As 
was noted previously, ‘A commission without strong and independent commissioners is 
voiceless and powerless’570. 
5.8.1.4 Accessibility 
 
The federal structure of the UAE means that there is some disparity between some of the laws 
ordained by the national and local governments, and therefore it is imperative that the NHRI 
establishes local and regional offices to gain widespread coverage and provide uniformed 
accessibility right across the entire nation. Moreover, the location of NHRI offices within the 
regions and locales is pertinent to how it is perceived. Hence, NHRI branches should not be 
located in exclusive and wealthy areas. This also precludes them from locating within 
governmental premises. This is vital to the credibility of the NHRI and to how the domestic 
                                                                
568 See Chapter 3
 
 
569 Goodman and Pegram (n 194). 
570 Human Rights Watch (n 188). 
 221 
 
populace will perceive it. Additionally, the NHRI should have in place procedures and 
information that are readily and easily available to the most vulnerable members of society. 
This should entail that the NHRI is equipped to receive verbal and informal complaints in a 
variety of languages, as UAE society comprises more than 200 nationalities. 
5.8.1.5 Funding 
 
Aichele notes that NHRIs have had to rely on private and international donor agencies just to 
remain operational.  Hence, he argues, that there is a serious danger that governments influence 
the strategy of NHRIs through their annual funding.571 It is clear that this could be fatal for the 
development, credibility, partiality and autonomy of the NHRI. 
However, it is argued that this should not be an issue for a wealthy nation state like the UAE. 
The funding provided by the government should be sufficient to cover the overhead expenses 
incurred for staff salaries and premises in addition to its operational and administrative 
expenses, hence making it financially and politically independent from the government.572 
In addition, as Cardenas observes: 
The states with NHRIs may appear to be conceding some of their domestic 
sovereignty or control over national authority structures only to gain a 
firmer grip on it. To ensure that this does not occur, it will be necessary to 
create NHRIs that are more fully independent, perhaps funded partly by 
non-state sources, and have full jurisdiction573. 
It is advised that the UAE authorities should review Article 20 of the 2008 Law on 
Associations, which states: 
The society shall be subject to the ministry's control regarding the 
financial matters in order to verify the expenditures and to ensure safe 
allocation of its financial and in-kind resources for the purposes and 
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projects executed by the society under its articles of association. In order 
to achieve that, the ministry shall have access to the society's books, 
records, and documents574. 
Previously Sripati advised in the case of the Indian government that: 
The Federal Government must, after due appropriations by Parliament, 
pay to the Commission the sum of money that Parliament has approved. 
The NHRC should be given complete autonomy to spend such sums of 
money as it thinks necessary for performing its functions575. 
Likewise, an appropriate level of ‘funding and infrastructure will allow the NHRI to be 
independent of the government and not be subject to financial control’576. The NHRI will be 
independent from the executive branch577 and it is recommended, as per the UN handbook, that 
the UAE NHRI receive its funding from the Federal National Council as opposed to a particular 
ministry in order to maintain its autonomy and minimise if not eliminate any political 
interference.578 
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The argument of the above section stipulates that it is imperative to recognise that in 
establishing a NHRI, it must be granted a unique special constitutional status within the 
overarching political structure of UAE in line with the Paris Principles. This will enable it to 
have a substantial impact on the broad remit of society by first and foremost acting as a vehicle 
for education and awareness of human rights norms. 
Incorporation of this human rights mandate into the foundational constitution is a very 
important aspect. This will provide it with the legal and public credibility to conduct 
investigation into human rights violations after it has been recognised and accepted as a part of 
UAE society. Furthermore, in its role to further normative commitments, the NHRI should be 
authorised and supported in the acceptance of complaints from civilians and where appropriate, 
civil society assistance from non-governmental organisations and community groups should be 
encouraged. In this respect, the NHRI will actively define for the public the method and process 
by which to report violations and abuses. However, the aim of the NHRI is not to undermine 
the government or public officials but to monitor the public sphere and identify both the actions 
and its causes, which are deemed to have caused human rights violations. 
The independence of the NHRI is crucial to both its educational and investigative roles. 
Accordingly, the NHRI should be granted the power to conduct public enquiries into violations 
of human rights without any involvement from existing governmental establishments. In that 
respect the institution should be in a position to provide recommendations to the different 
governmental sectors that are in direct contact with the public including security forces and the 
judiciary. Moreover, the NHRI’s mandate must allow them oversight of the entire human rights 
jurisdiction including civil, political, economic, social and cultural aspects, which must include 
organising regular audits of rights implementation of economic, social and cultural rights. 
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Therefore, it is imperative that transparent rules and regulations are established, which not only 
identify the role of the NHRI but govern its interaction with other institutions, both 
governmental and non-governmental. The institution should be viewed as an independent entity 
with its main objective of addressing human rights violations, which aims to work seamlessly 
as part of an ecosystem of democratic institutions. Furthermore, the appointment of the 
members and staffing of the NHRI are of utmost importance. The UAE government must 
respect the diversity and the independence of the members of the NHRI. Although the selection 
of personal must be based upon qualification, membership must also ensure adequate 
representation and inclusion of all of UAE society; for example, women and minority 
representatives. Appointments should also allow for multi-membership of institutions as this 
offers a greater opportunity for pluralism in the NHRI. Establishing a multi-membership 
governing council of such nature can be effective in influencing the direction of the 
establishment. However, it must be recognised that whilst pluralism is a core composite 
requirement of a potential NHRI, the multiple leadership and representative composition of 
members could impact adversely upon the efficiency and promptness of the decision-making 
process as well as involve increased costs. 
Like any other governmental or public entity, the NHRI must be in control of and accountable 
for budget parameters which are overseen and monitored by the Federal National Council. The 
institution should be well endowed in a manner that will allow it to pursue its function. Unlike 
the standard lodging of a court case, individuals should not be expected to pay fees for filing a 
complaint and should be provided with all the legal support needed. Although many demands 
exist on the national treasury, providing adequate resources to the NHRI in order that they can 
fulfil their mandate efficiently and at a level that the international community recognises as 
demonstrating a strong commitment to human rights. 
The argument presented above represents general guidelines with respect to the operational 
aspects of the institution. Once establishment takes place and operations commence it should 
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be expected that unaccounted and unforeseen obstacles and circumstances will inevitably arise. 
In that sense the government should be flexible and willing to facilitate and solve any 
operational aspects that might render the work of the institution ineffective. Accordingly, it is 
recognised that the duty of the UAE government would be to ensure the NHRI hits targets for 




This chapter sought to address the core objective and question of: What is required for the 
establishment of an NHRI in the UAE? 
In response it can be stated that the very notion of human rights norms and the discourse 
generated to promote it reflects the development of the contemporary International socio-
political culture and the practices to enforce compliance and commitment by nation states. 
However, it can also be argued that although States uphold their commitments, there exists a 
certain amount of discrepancy in its implementation and adherence by governments. 
In attempting to reconcile the directives of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which 
exist to simultaneously promote positive and productive acts whilst seeking to negate and 
prohibit its essential causes, the UAE government has often exploited explicitly and implicitly 
the role of human rights discourse as a strategic tool, to introduce certain benevolent notions 
about the government and consequently shapes the perspectives of their own citizens to 
continue their subjugation and convince the international audience that this is a minor issue. 
This discourse is then further propagated through conferences and meetings at both the national 
and international stages, including the United Nations. At the domestic level, the government 
has formed regulatory bodies or Non-Governmental Organisations, to help promote the 
introduction of new laws, policies, and their capacity to work as an intermediary between the 
victims of violations and those accused of committing them. 
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The formation of this discourse has furthered the ability of the people to identify repressive 
practices. Furthermore, with the advent of social media, the awareness of human rights 
violations has become almost instantaneous. 
Therefore, the UAE, as an independent rational actor, is aware of the enormous social pressures 
surrounding these issues. Its response could be classified as that of a realist, as it has recognised 
the necessity and value of human rights through its international commitments from its 
formative period. This is evinced through its numerous ratifications and being a signatory to 
International conventions and protocols. This argument is further supported by the data 
collected in chapter four, whereby participants acknowledge UAE’s international commitments 
and its active process to change and implement policies that adhere to these international 
standards. However, it is also fairly evident that the discourse advocating the notion of human 
rights to be driven by common universal values as derived from a radical individual 
universalism viewpoint is in contradiction with the socio-political culture of the UAE. The 
concept of human rights within UAE society is not universal and does not apply equally to all 
human beings. Although the literature stipulates that the UAE may be ratifying and becoming 
signatories to human rights treaties due to pressures from powers with superior economic, 
military and political power, there are ample arguments that suggest the strategic and economic 
value of the UAE ensures that it is not coerced on the international stage. 
Rather the arguments suggest that the UAE has clauses for derogation of treaties and violation 
of human rights norms under the pretence of threats to its own national security. 
Therefore, the study suggests that the UAE should be examined from the lens of radical culture 
universalism (normative commitments), which argues that human rights discourse should be 
focused upon culture specific values to the UAE. Human rights norms and policies should be 
reflective of the cultural, social and ideological diversities that exist not only globally but also 
within regions, and specifically within nations. The argument here is that as the general UAE 
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society becomes aware of human rights norms over time, the common identity, understanding 
and appreciation of these issues will transform society and will reflect this new understanding. 
The process required to attain this transformation can be conceived through the social 
constructivist model as outlined by Risse and Sikkink, which provides the framework for the 
expansive development process required for State compliance. 
In beginning that discussion, it must be acknowledged that within the UAE, there exist no 
independent civil society associations, other than the ones established and controlled by the 
government. It must also be duly noted that independent international observers citing the 
human rights abuses committed by the UAE government have no physical presence in the 
country. Therefore, in accordance to the spiral model, the UAE is traversing between the denial 
and socialisation phases. It is asserted however, that this demonstrates UAE’s initial 
commitment and, as supported by the spiral model, the UAE would have to transform its entire 
socio-political culture for the necessary changes to take place. Conversely though, the argument 
identifies the Islamic and tribal aspect of UAE society would eventually have to undertake this 
due course of action in a manner, which was consistent with its own heritage and tradition. This 
is exemplified in the institution of the Majlis, which is a significant example of the normative 
commitment and innate process of radical culture universalism within the UAE. It is observed 
as per the findings of chapter four that the people perceive the national government to be a 
human rights institution in itself. This ideal is derived from the Islamic tradition and heritage 
of the region. Hence, interviewed participants identify the extraordinary level of permanence 
of the political structure and its institutions from its formation to be evidence of this cultural 
and local perspective. The pertinence of the tribal structure within Emirati society has aided the 
political and social stabilisation alongside maintaining the status quo. This point is recognised 
by even the opponents of the UAE government, who recognise the role of religion, culture and 
tribalism as vital factors in the growth and development of the nation. However, as the critics 
have also noted, this does imply that the government acts as both judge and jury by utilising 
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the notion of religion, faith and tribalism to justify and consolidate its power and hold over the 
people, which has consequently led them to enslave their own populace. 
This essentially implies that as per the perspective drawn from the radical culture universalistic 
perspective that the role and purpose of the NHRI in the UAE would be to provide and further 
Human Rights Education. This would then act to prepare the next generation of leaders to 
appreciate and support human rights provisions. This also means that concession must be made 
in expectations by the international community, as this is a long-term strategy. The creation of 
a NHRI would amalgamate UAE’s human rights agenda and educational programs into a 
systematic institutional endeavour. An approach supported by the dissenting critics of the UAE 
government, who believe that an NHRI could become a tool for educational awareness and 
mechanism for remedy, accountability and rehabilitation. In developing the NHRI, the UAE 
government could work closely with both domestic and International human rights 
organisations to create and establish educational programs. This strategy would also further the 
UAE government’s image as a role model for the region and other developing states across the 
world. In order to attain such a lofty position, the UAE from the context of the spiral model, 
should initiate a transition from the Prescriptive phase (4) to the Rule Consistent Behaviour 
phase (5), whilst reflecting its own socio-political outlook. Although the NHRI should maintain 
its independence from the executive and legislative branches of government, it has to be rooted 
in the legislative branch through either legislation or a constitutional provision. The established 
NHRI should then have a broad mandate that recognises the entire nation to be within the 
jurisdiction of the NHRI. This provides it access to each individual Emirate and resident for 
the purposes of furthering human rights education and provisions. The NHRI in the UAE 
should, as suggested in the main body of the chapter, be formed on the Human Rights 
Commission model, with a unique special constitutional status within the overarching political 
structure of UAE, in line with the Paris Principles. This would enable it to have a substantial 
impact upon all of UAE society as a medium for education and awareness of human rights 
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norms with the funding and support provided by the UAE government as an indicator of its 




Conclusions and Recommendation 
 
The primary purpose of this study was an exploration into the purpose of establishing a National 
Human Rights Institution (NHRI) in the United Arab Emirates (UAE). 
Due to the sensitivity and ambiguity surrounding this topic, there has been minimal research 
commenced in this arena. The scarcity in credible scholarly data relaying the (native) Emirati 
perspectives on human rights and NHRIs provides an explicit example of the point being made. 
This study has been undertaken so as to address the gap in the literature, by capturing and 
analysing primary first-hand data on the native Emirati perspective on human rights and the 
formation of a NHRI in the UAE. This implied that the focus would be on those involved in 
the process of developing, sustaining, maintaining or ensuring human rights provisions in a 
professional capacity in the UAE. Utilising a qualitative methodological framework, this 
exploratory study has initiated a pioneering investigative study, capturing the primary 
perspectives of the ‘social actors’ involved within the context of this topic. The aim here is to 
initiate and provide impetus for further research in this neglected area. 
The literature that exists generally reflects the perspectives of (external) international human 
rights organisations and media agencies, which are critical of the UAE for its suspect human 
rights record and provisions. Their predominant argument centres around the notion that the 
UAE government is too tribal and anachronistic to cope with the reality of its meteoric 
development. The economic boom accompanied by the mass migration of an International 
labour force has introduced previously alien concepts to the nation and the region. 
Subsequently this has translated to the complete curtailing of the rights of its migrant 




The analysis of the dialogical narrative collated through the field work process appears to 
support these claims. Study participants revealed that many organisations utilised their workers, 
usually desperate labourers from the Subcontinent, Far East or Africa as a slave work force. 
They have their passports taken from them on arrival into the UAE, they live in squalid 
conditions with little or no hygiene considerations, experienced problems with regular 
payments, holidays to their home nations and when returning, visa and immigration issues. 
This exemplifies the overtly unequivocal discrimination against migrant labourers. 
Some participants also discussed the harsh reality of accepting that there were no viable 
channels through which a foreign worker or resident could challenge the workings of a 
Governmental agency. They observed that government appeasers always argue and cite the 
argument that the UAE as a signatory to numerous agreements and International conventions 
and protocols is demonstrating its commitment to the recognition and value of human rights. 
However, in reality, they contend that the UAE’s overt compliance with International treaties 
and conventions is a concealment to appease its international partners. In truth, they argue, the 
geo-strategic value of the UAE allows the suppression of major human rights violations within 
the UAE by the mainstream media and international actors. 
According to the findings from the literature and the field study, this concealment of 
information is compounded by the fact that universal human rights are treated with a certain 
degree of scepticism and suspicion by commentators and observers in the UAE. The typical 
perspective derived from the interviews related to the notion that the contemporary notion of 
human rights was not only derived from the West but were designed to serve Western interests. 
As discussed in the previous chapter, the arguments cited above paint a certain perspective of 
the situation in the UAE. It is not for this study to argue or focus upon the points made, as these 
arguments and contentions have already been articulated and established. The review of 
literature is practically dominated by these topics. The analysis of data could read to support 
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the arguments focusing exclusively on human rights abuses in the UAE; however, that is not 
the purpose of this thesis. 
The novelty of this thesis is in its penetration of the previously unearthed perspectives on the 
purpose of a proposed NHRI in the UAE. Therefore, in order to understand the perspectives of 
the study participants, it is essentially based upon the interpretation of the researcher. The 
understanding and trust developed between the researcher and study participants was based 
upon mutual respect through personal relationships. Therefore, the perspective being furthered 
by the researcher, through the hermeneutic analysis and findings of the data are authentic and 
capture the essence of the dialogical narrative. 
This implies that the argument being presented identifies the UAE government as having 
suppressed the discourse on international human rights as it presented a direct challenge to their 
traditional tribal culture. However, the study also recognises that the UAE government has 
accepted this shortcoming and is working to implement the necessary changes to address this 
issue through both its informal and formal political processes. The tribal culture of the UAE 
necessitates a type of human rights discourse that is focused upon culture specific values, 
whereby human rights norms and policies are reflective of cultural, social and ideological 
diversities that exist not only globally but also within regions, and specifically within nations. 
The discussion postulates that normative commitments should be achieved through a process 
of socialisation. This implies that as the State governmental agency interacts with societal 
institutions, the individuals within that society will develop a greater appreciation for human 
rights norms and thus, the common values and identity of that society will be transformed to 
reflect this new understanding. 
Literature and data resulting from the interviews demonstrate that the notion of human rights 
within the Gulf States is encompassed in the intrinsic ethical and moral values enclosed within 
the Islamic faith. This stipulates that the regional perspectives on human rights are formulated 
by an axiomatic norm ordained by God Almighty. Hence, human rights are equated with the 
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Quranic values of dignity, identity, freedom to express, speak, move and associate with 
whomsoever one chooses. 
Conversely, the diverse perspectives also recognise that the freedom of an individual is 
curtailed by the prevailing norms and standards of the broader society in which the individual 
resides. An individual is free to act as they please within their own private domains, providing 
this does not entail any criminal acts or activity such as gambling, murder, prostitution etc. but 
they must act in accordance with the prevailing social norms in the public domain. This is 
evidence for an entrenched culture of engagement with the notion of safeguarding human 
values. 
It is contended that the UAE government is understood to be the custodian of the Islamic faith 
in the nation, thus, its entire purpose is to propagate the Islamic ideology through its institutions 
and ministries. The people perceive the government, specifically its leaders, as the vicegerents 
of Allah and have the authority for self-governance and self-regulation. This does not imply 
that they are unaccountable or independent from the will of Allah; rather it is incumbent upon 
them to protect and ensure the growth and development of their societies. This implies that the 
entire legal structure is based upon the Islamic legal code, the Sharia. Therefore, the 
government is expected to not only enforce, but make relevant laws considering the people’s 
reality and circumstances. The implication of this innate worldview is that the native and 
immigrant population perceive the national federal government to embody and be 
representative of their native culture, heritage and tradition. 
In chapter two, (where the question on ‘what aspects of the existing social, political and 
legislative milieu facilitate the establishment of an NHRI in the UAE? was addressed) it was 
demonstrated that the traditional political system was theoretically established to serve the 
native tribal interests. The formation of the UAE nation state and its modern bureaucratic 
structure is a reflection of the region’s historical and traditional praxis. The UAE is defined by 
its dynastic monarchies of the seven Emirates, the ruling families, which are exclusively 
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responsible for the formation and establishment of the government. These tribal and family 
lineages have become formalised to uphold the highest offices in the national government. 
Under the capacity of the federal constitution, the ruler of Dubai is also the UAE Prime Minister 
whilst the ruler of Abu Dhabi also uptakes the role of President of UAE. 
Only the seven rulers of the Supreme Council have been granted authority with regards to 
decision making regarding the federation. It has to be remembered that this is the traditional 
structure of the society and region and the criticism, as we shall come to analyse shortly, fails 
to acknowledge this reality. The discussion identifies the Majlis to be a significant example of 
the normative commitment and innate process of radical culture universalism within the UAE. 
The current system of governance reflects the traditional practices of Shura (consultation) 
within the Majlis (gathering). This informal method of governance is rooted in the original 
tribal tradition of Shura, which inherently embodies the notion of respecting the opinions, status 
and value of other individuals in the tribe. 
This is an essential quality of human rights norms and it is argued that it still defines the socio-
political style of the UAE. The Majlis is traditionally a part of the Islamic heritage of the region 
and ingrained into the tribal traditions. The council of elders, collectively comprising the 
Majlis, can still discuss whatever issue was and is pertinent to them in a cordial informal setting 
such as the house of the Sheikh or elder. The modern practice of the Majlis within a national 
socio-political context of the UAE entails the granting of an audience to the public by the rulers 
of the State. Petitioners to the President, Crown Prince, Prime Minister or other members of 
the ruling dynasty are able to present their concerns and issues directly and often receive instant 
responses or mandated actions. This practice has traditionally facilitated an open dialogue 
between the rulers and their subjects and raised the awareness of the rulers of the socio-
economic situation and reality of their followers. Through the interview schedules it was 
discovered that the consensus of the interviewees was that the UAE’s approach to social politics 
was perceived to be equivalent to Western style democracy but one that was grounded in the 
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social and cultural heritage of the region. The argument being presented clearly indicates that 
the people believe the government to be an extension of their own families, whereby the 
interests of the people are vested in the rulers and the rulers in the people. The members of the 
public are subsequently loyal and place their trust in the government to deliver on their 
demands. The research uncovered that the Emirati citizens felt more secure and were more 
informed as to the workings of their government because they generally had some direct 
connection to the government as result of a family relationship or personal association. The 
Emirati perspective was critical of the Western democratic tradition, which it contended was 
overtly bureaucratic and alienating as it secluded and marginalised people as objects that 
functioned to be operable within a mechanistic economic system. There is ample evidence here 
to justify the argument that there exists in the Gulf and specifically the UAE, a form of intimacy 
and kinship between the ruling families and their societies that is unique to that context. 
However, this does not mean that the study ignores the contention that the hierarchical tribal 
nature of the government is overtly autocratic within an undemocratic political structure, which 
has effectively enslaved its populace based on the extent of the authority granted to the seven 
rulers of the Supreme Council to make long reaching decisions across the entire federation. The 
supreme council is taken to be a ‘court of kings’, whereby, the rulers play judge and jury on 
politics and religion, thus curtailing any alternative opinions and disagreements. 
The argument stipulates that they give audience to their subjects within a  Majlis context to 
provide them with material comforts. Nevertheless, this practice has, it is argued, effectively 
paralysed the Emirati citizens as a nanny state, that fulfils and caters for their daily 
requirements. International Non-Governmental Organisations and the mass media argue that 
news of misconduct, transgressions or inhuman treatment by the government, especially against 
foreign workers, is suppressed. The Emirati citizens are so detached from reality that they are 
in an unaware and unconcerned state of existence, whereby they fail to bring the government 
to account. Those who have experienced some form of abuse or misconduct relate that any 
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individual seeking to speak to authority and challenge the exiting order is made an example of, 
thus ensuring that all dissent is effectively eradicated. The argument for an NHRI is made 
within this discourse, which seeks to counter the notion that the government is in effect the 
only institution that is able to monitor and regulate itself. The critical argument dissecting the 
human rights record of the UAE identifies the government to have usurped the functionality 
and purpose of culture, religion and tradition to provide legitimacy and justification to its rule. 
The government, it is proposed from this perspective, has assumed its role and status to be 
divinely ordained, which has subsequently, lead it to become a dictatorship that administers the 
nation through authoritarian styles of governance. 
The literature notes that the Constitution of the UAE579 was only ratified and made permanent 
in 1996, some twenty-five years after the nation’s creation. At present there exists no political 
opposition as political parties are prohibited. Only after 2006 was the election process on the 
emirate or federal level introduced. Therefore, there has been increasing discontent and 
criticism of the Federal National Council, which was formed to represent the wider Emirati 
citizenship. 
The UAE has been accused by several International Non-Governmental Organisations and 
human rights institutions acting as collective stakeholders to either address their concerns 
directly or to allow them to have representative observers in the nation, especially as the UAE 
government has shut down independent domestic and international Non-Governmental 
Organisations that had called for political transformation. The argument being made is that the 
UAE should be forced to establish an independent NHRI. 
                                                                
579 Federal National Council, ‘The UAE Constitution of 1971 with Amendments’’ 
<http://www.iedja.org/wp-  
content/uploads/pdf/litterature_juridique/EMIRATS%20ARABES%20UNIS/revision_constitutionne 
lle_2011.pdf > accessed 27 December 2017. 
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The notion of the NHRI is that although it is established by national governments, it acts 
exclusively within the broad premise of the Paris Principles. Hence, the question (what is the 
theoretical purpose of NHRIs in accordance to the Paris Principles and their place in the 
Arabian Gulf Region?) aids further understanding of how the government is innately perceived 
to define the role of the human rights institute. This argument is justified in the consideration 
that, despite the establishment of NHRIs in North Africa and the Middle East, there appeared 
to be an increasing universal crackdown on human rights activists. Alarmingly, NHRIs had 
failed to intervene or condemn the violations of human rights by the State in several instances. 
Furthermore, the literature also recognised that certain states were almost immune to moral 
pressure from non-state actors. Due to their geo-strategic importance, political or economic 
potential for major Western powers, they were not subject to sanctions or penalties. The 
discussion conceded that States had the flexibility, extent and method by which they could 
comply with their human rights obligations. Although several International Treaties explicitly 
make it incumbent upon national governments to protect human rights, there exist claw back 
clauses designed in specific articles that also allow them to suspend human rights under the 
pretence of national security. Hence, it is understood from the research undertaken that the 
establishment of a successful NHRI is dependent upon a democratic civil society that 
comprehends the role of social and political activism. However, the study discovered that this 
approach would encounter resistance from within the Arab governments themselves as the 
predominantly authoritarian forms of governance were utilising NHRIs as a political 
mechanism to respond to domestic and international criticism by Non-Governmental 
Organisations and critics of the regime. 
The argument proposed that the UAE Government has to utilise the framework proposed by 
the Paris Principles to initiate the formation of the NHRI. Although the Spiral Model, as 
proposed by Risse and Sikkink, recognises ‘the establishment of a NHRI to be consistent with 
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the requirements of the Paris Principles’580, there exists no homogenous model or structure for 
an ideal NHRI. It is argued that due to the unique cultural context of the UAE, the NHRI should 
reflect its societal context and heritage whilst taking into consideration the rights, traditions 
and influence of its immigrant population. 
Taking into consideration the radical cultural universalist (normative commitment) perspective, 
the NHRI has to be established with a broad mandate that encompasses the entire nation within 
its jurisdiction. This requires each individual Emirate to submit and accept its jurisdiction and 
autonomy and accept the NHRI to be independent from both executive and legislative arms of 
the government. Another recommendation is that the NHRI be established along the parameters 
of a Human Rights Commission, whilst adhering to the essential principles promulgated by the 
Paris Principles. This implies directly that the NHRI be independent, which obliges the UAE 
government, International Non-Governmental Organisations and other external parties to 
refrain from interfering in the mandates, function, composition and competence of the NHRI. 
Subsequently, the onus to initiate and develop relationships with all sectors of society, 
including governmental departments and non-governmental organisations lies within the 
responsibility of the NHRI. As stated already the NHRI should be established through the 
legislative and constitutional process, so that it is afforded official legal status, which implies 
in theory, its independence and impartiality. In the case of the UAE, as argued in chapter two, 
this is represented by the Federal National Council. 
The NHRI should be accountable as per the guidance of the Paris Principles, which imply a 
NHRI is not accountable to the government or the executive body. Instead the NHRI should be 
answerable before the Federal National Council, or a specific parliamentary body created 
thereof, before which it can present its own reports and request the government to release or 
share their reports on human rights provisions and violations. This also addresses the issue of 
                                                                
580 Risse-Kappen and others (n 375) 10. 
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funding, which must be allocated and dispensed through the Federal National Council or that 
specific parliamentary body to which it is answerable. As recognised in chapter three, there 
was a certain amount of irony in the issue of funding. To maintain the financial independence 
of the NHRI, the Federal National Council, or the parliamentary body must decide the means 
to secure the future operations of the NHRI, so that it is independent from political decision 
makers and economic fluctuations. 
The role of the Federal National Council or the parliamentary body is once again made apparent 
in the principle of the Appointment of Members. Although the Paris Principles are vague in 
their guidance on the recruitment process, they do stipulate a prohibition on government or 
executive representation. This clear principle ensures that representatives of the executive 
branch are not provided with the opportunity to acquire any voting rights in order to influence 
the NHRI. This independent democratic appointment process will at least purport to ensure the 
right calibres of leaders are elected to maintain the independence of the institution. To further 
ensure the credibility of the NHRI, its executive members should be elected or appointed in a 
transparent process that is representative of all sections of the UAE society, so that the NHRI 
becomes a model for and of diversity. This is also encompassed in the principle of the Pluralism 
of Composition, whereby the NHRI is not only an agent of the broad segments of society but 
is actively working to highlight, alleviate and bring to justice the divergent issues, violations 
and abuses within its remit. This demands pluralism within its staff, membership and the 
diversity of bodies and the platform it provides, thus giving rise to the final principle outlined 
by the Paris Principles, Accessibility. This entails the NHRI to be visibly and physically 
accessible and open to the general public. The NHRI offices should be located within the urban 
areas, where majority of the population reside. They should also not be located near security 
and government buildings and installations. It is recommended that that NHRI also establish 




It is asserted that along with fulfilling these core principles from the 1991 Paris Conference, 
the jurisdiction and investigatory powers provided to NHRIs must be recognised by the UAE 
government. This includes its role in investigating individual cases and bringing them before 
the Federal National Council or the designated parliamentary body. There are calls from 
International Non-Governmental Organisations and other human rights institutes that NHRIs 
should be given the authority to participate in court proceedings with the authority to call 
witnesses, gather evidence and if needed call State officials to have their practice and authority 
questioned before independent monitors, all the while having the authority to issue sanctions 
for violations or refusal to cooperate. This argument, although enticing, fails to acknowledge 
that the Paris Principles were not seeking to endow NHRIs with such formal powers of 
investigation and adjudication. The result of that would be the initiation of a court specific to 
hearing cases reporting human rights violations, as it is agreed that the broad generalist 
guidelines and standards of the Paris Principles imply a universal adherence. The argument 
contends that the necessities for independence and pluralism create no fixed definition or 
guidance, for there is an innate understanding of the existence of the divergent contexts of the 
world, which cannot be accounted for. The argument being presented argues that the Paris 
Principles must be analysed from a developmental perspective, whereby the principles become 
a recognised set of criterions that are essential in the functioning of the NHRI with its 
appropriate purpose. This can only be attained, as vouched by the Paris Principles through the 




It is recommended that the role of the proposed NHRI in the UAE should be as a promotional, 
educational, advisory, and investigative body. Any attempts by the NHRI to intrude into 
judicial and legislative practices may cast suspicion and doubts onto its allegiance and purpose. 
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The expectation would be that the UAE NHRI would work with educational institutions such 
as schools, colleges and universities and other sanctioned education providers to integrate 
human rights education into the syllabi of their institutions. Consequently, the overarching aim 
of the NHRI would be to deliver knowledge and educate the broad spectrum of civil society. 
The argument is that the formation and establishment of an NHRI does not address the inherent 
issue of human rights violations. It has to be legitimised and accepted by the broad society to 
be a viable and beneficial instrument that will enhance their relationship with the government. 
Any NHRI which is established to solely monitor the government would naturally introduce a 
culture of suspicion and uncertainty. The suggestion presented is that the NHRI should instead 
be established upon the premise of furthering human rights education and awareness. This will 
then act to prepare the next generation of leaders to be informed, enthusiastic backers of human 
rights provisions. It must be accepted that this is a long-term strategy; the justification for this 
is in the demonstrable actions the UAE government has already taken. 
In 2006, the Federal National Council elections signified an initial movement towards political 
liberalisation of the federal structure. Although the UAE government was heavily criticised for 
its selection of candidates and their remits, the President of the UAE introduced the adoption 
of amendments. These included increasing the powers of the Federal National Council, 
establishing a fixed duration for the Council’s members from two to four years and an increase 
in the duration of the annual sessions to more than seven months. This included the introduction 
of an election process, which provided the Emirati citizens with the opportunity to engage with 
the decision-making vehicle of government. It also allowed the UAE to establish an election-
based, democratic culture for the first time, ahead of its more established regional neighbours. 
The role of women has also increased, with up to 30% of the higher leadership and decision-
making positions in the UAE being occupied by women. In governmental posts women hold 
two-thirds of the jobs, while nine women were serving as ministers in the Government. In 2016, 
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two new ministries, the new Ministry of State for Happiness and the Ministry of State for 
Tolerance were established and women were appointed to both (ministerial) posts. 
From a strictly educational perspective the most significant step taken by the government has 
been by the Ministry of the Interior, which conducted human rights training courses between 
2009 and 2012 in police academies and schools to familiarise students and personnel with the 
broad nature of human rights norms and concepts; thus underlining the requirement for the 
establishment of an NHRI which could amalgamate, combine and initiate the entire human 
rights agenda and educational programs into a systematic institutional endeavour. 
The NHRI would also have the potential to act an instrument for educational awareness and 
mechanism for remedy and rehabilitation for those who have experienced human rights 
violations and for those responsible for the violations. The UAE government could work with 
International Non-Governmental Organisations to establish its NHRI and conceive its 
educational programs. If the UAE government grants the NHRI a unique special constitutional 
status within the overarching political structure of UAE in line with the Paris Principles, this 
would enable the NHRI to have a substantial impact upon all of UAE society as a medium for 
education and awareness of human rights norms. The funding and support provided by the UAE 
government would then serve as an indicator of its sincerity and commitment to the issue of 
human rights. This strategy would further the UAE government’s image as a role model for the 
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